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sexes, Yoshino shows that he major sexuality studies demonstrate hat the inci- 
dence of bisexuality is in fact greater than or comparable to the incidence of 
homosexuality. Yoshino explains the erasure of bisexuality by positing that 
both self-identified h terosexuals and self-identified homosexuals have overlap- 
ping interests in the erasure of bisexuality that lead them into an "epistemic 
contract" of bisexual erasure. These interests include: (1) the stabilization of 
exclusive sexual orientation categories; (2) the retention of sex as an important 
diacritical axis; and (3) the protection of norms of monogamy. Noting that 
such contracts tend to become visible only when they are challenged, Yoshino 
describes how bisexuals have increasingly contested their own erasure. Fi- 
nally, Yoshino examines the effects of bisexual invisibility and visibility in the 
legal realm, focusing on the sexual harassment jurisprudence of recent dec- 
ades. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Teaching a seminar on Sexual Orientation a d the Law, I faced an old 
inconsistency so frontally that it became difficult toavoid giving it sustained 
attention. I began the course in what appears to be a common way,l by pos- 
ing basic questions about sexual orientation. I asked why contemporary 
American society2 organizes people according to their sexualities;3 why we 
do so on the basis of sexual orientation in particular;4 and why, when classi- 
fying by sexual orientation, weinsist on doing so with the binary system of 
heterosexual and homosexual.5 Indiscussing the last question, I adduced the 
1. A leading casebook on sexual orientation a d the law, for example, begins with such an in- 
troductory unit. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
AND THE LAW 1-40 (2d ed. 1997) (presenting background materials discussing sexual classifica- 
tions). 
2. These temporal nd geographical restrictions apply to this entire analysis. These restric- 
tions partially recognize that he concept of orientation is culturally specific. See note 77 infra nd 
accompanying text (describing Latin bisexuality). That recognition, however, will unfortunately be 
incomplete, insofar as it ignores variations within modem American society based on, for example, 
culture, race, and class. See, e.g., Will Roscoe, How to Become a Beardache: Toward a Unified 
Analysis of Gender Diversity, in THIRD SEX, THiRD GENDER: BEYOND SEXUAL DIMORPHISM IN 
CULTURE AND HISTORY 329, 330-49 (Gilbert Herdt ed., 1994) (describing the Native American 
berdache, an identity based on gender atypicality hat cuts across the orientation categories consid- 
ered here, as an identity that is more socially salient in many Native American societies than those 
orientation categories). 
3. Resistance to the classification fpersons according to their sexualities can be seen in that 
usage of the word "queer" which refers to individuals who fall outside of the realm of the "normal," 
either because of their sexuality or for some other eason. See Michael Warner, Introduction to
FEAR OF A QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLITICS AND SOCIAL THEORY vii, xxvi-xxviii (Michael War- 
ner ed., 1993). This usage's "aggressive impulse of generalization," id.at xxvi, resists the reifica- 
tion of sexuality as an axis of demarcation by recasting the conflict between sexual deviance and 
sexual normalcy asone between social deviance and social normalcy. 
4. Resistance to the classification of persons according to their sexual orientations can be 
found in Eve Sedgwick's provocative list of alternative classifications. See EVE KoSOFSKY 
SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 25-26 (1990). Sedgwick notes that even if we set out 
to distinguish between people based on their sexualities, many other axes besides sex of object 
choice are available. See id. at 25. For example, "[s]exuality makes up a large share of the self- 
perceived identity of some people, a small share of others"'; "[s]ome people spend a lot of time 
thinking about sex, others little"; and "[s]ome people like to have a lot of sex, others little or none." 
Id. Indeed, Sedgwick contends that he rise of sex of object choice as the critical axis of definition 
was a contingent and puzzling historical development out of an era in which such other axes had 
analogous diacritical force. See id. at 8-9. 
5. Resistance to the classification fpersons according to a binary system of sexual orienta- 
tion can be found in Alfred Kinsey's classic statement: 
Males do not represent two discrete populations, heterosexual nd homosexual. The world is 
not to be divided into sheep and goats. Not all things are black nor all things white. It is a 
fundamental of taxonomy that nature rarely deals with discrete categories. Only the human 
mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separated pigeon-holes. The living world 
is a continuum in each and every one of its aspects. The sooner we learn this concerning hu- 
man sexual behavior the sooner we shall reach a sound understanding ofthe realities of sex. 
ALFRED C. KiNSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY & CLYDE E. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE 
HUMAN MALE 639 (1948) [hereinafter KINSEY ET AL., MALE]. 
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view-powerful in modem American culture from at least the publication of 
the Kinsey studies6 onward-that sexual orientation arrays itself along a 
continuum from exclusive heterosexuality to exclusive homosexuality.7 I 
noted that his view encouraged usto think of the straight/gay binary as de- 
fining the ends of a continuum that could be stretched, accordion-like, to ac- 
commodate ever finer gradations of cross-sex and same-sex desire. This 
meant recognizing a group-often called bisexuals-on the intermediate 
stretch of the continuum, as well as the possibility of a group-sometimes 
called asexuals-not represented onthe continuum at all.8 Indeed, I argued 
6. ALFRED C. KINSEY, WARDELL B. POMEROY, CLYDE E. MARTIN & PAUL GEBHARD, 
SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HuMAN FEMALE (1953) [hereinafter KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE]; KINSEY 
ET AL., MALE, supra note 5. 
7. See Carol Queen, Sexual Diversity and Bisexual Identity, in BISEXUAL POLITICS: 
THEORIES, QUERIES, & VISIONS 151, 152 (Naomi Tucker ed., 1995) (noting the importance of the 
Kinsey continuum). 
8. It is with some regret hat I have decided not to attempt a systematic discussion of asexuals 
in this article, especially since asexuals are, if anything, more likely than bisexuals to be erased in 
sexuality discourse. To concede that there are two forms of desire-cross-sex and same-sex de- 
sire-is to recognize the analytic possibility of at least four kinds of persons. These include: (1) 
those who harbor cross-sex but not same-sex desire; (2) those who harbor same-sex but not cross- 
sex desire; (3) those who harbor both forms of desire; and (4) those who harbor neither form of 
desire. Yet even those who acknowledge that orientation arrays itself on a continuum spanning the 
first three categories often ignore the fact that the continuum fails to represent he fourth. This is 
somewhat surprising, as the number of individuals in this category is not insignificant. See Naomi 
Mezey, Dismantling the Wall: Bisexuality and the Possibilities of Sexual Identity Classification 
Based on Acts, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 98, 106-07 (1995) (citing the Kinsey report and noting 
that the number of asexuals is "not negligible"). Kinsey, for example, found that asexuals included 
14 to 19 percent of unmarried women between the ages of twenty and thirty-five. See KINSEY ET 
AL., FEMALE, supra note 6, at 499. 
My regret is made keen by the convergences between bisexual and asexual erasure, most nota- 
bly the refusal by both self-identified straights and self-identified gays to acknowledge either cate- 
gory. Thus asexuals, like bisexuals, are prone to being accused of duplicity or false consciousness, 
or, more specifically, of being closeted gays. See JEFFREY S. NEVID, Lois FICHNER-RATHUS &
SPENCER A. RATHUS, HUMAN SEXUALITY IN A WORLD OF DIVERSITY 302 (1995) (describing 
asexuals as a subset of homosexuals). See generally ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, 
HOMOSEXUALITIES: A STUDY OF DIVERSITY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN (1978) (discussing asex- 
uals throughout as subsets of male and female homosexuals). 
The decision to defer a discussion of asexuals for another day, however, is supported by the 
undertheorized ivergences between bisexuality and asexuality, which suggest that the two topics 
deserve separate analysis. While both doubled and absent desire appear to threaten straights and 
gays, they do so in quite different ways. To take one crude cut at that difference, consider the dis- 
parate ways in which the time-honored conflation of sexuality and sin ramifies across bisexuality 
and asexuality. If this conflation leads some to view bisexuals as particularly culpable because of 
their "promiscuous" desire for both sexes, see notes 353-393 infra and accompanying text, it leads 
some of the same people to view asexuals as particularly pure. See Lucinda J. Peach, From Spiri- 
tual Descriptions to Legal Prescriptions: Religious Imagery of Woman as "Fetal Container" in the 
Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 73, 76 (1994) (noting that the two templates of the feminine in the Chris- 
tian tradition are Eve and Mary, and that Mary, in contrast o Eve, is portrayed as pure, celibate, and 
asexual). But while such purity is often ascribed to celibacy, see, e.g., Gabrielle Brown, The Celi- 
bate Life Is Fulfilling, in HUMAN SEXUALITY 393, 395 (Bruno Leone et al. eds., 1985) (noting that 
celibacy "can be thought of as the desire for something more eternal, more permanent"), it is not 
obvious whether that ascription applies equally to the subset of celibates who are asexual. Celibacy 
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that sexual orientation classifications that only used the two "monosexual" 
terms9 "heterosexual" nd "homosexual" were unstable and naive. 
As soon as the introductory unit was over, however, the inconsistency 
occurred. I found myself and the class falling back into the very "unstable" 
usages I had worked hard to retire-specifically the usages of the words 
"heterosexual" nd "homosexual" as mutually exclusive, cumulatively ex- 
haustive terms.10 While we sometimes rallied by using the word "queer" 
instead of "gay,""1 or by adding the rider "or bisexual" to "gay, "12 these ef- 
forts were token and fitful. In the face of legal discussionsl3 and academic 
commentary14 that were relentless inreifying the straight/gay binary, itwas 
difficult tohold the bisexual steadily visible, even as a spectral possibility. 
And while this failure to resist what I had criticized as a distortion was 
striking ina class that sought o treat he issue of sexual orientation with so- 
phistication, it was simultaneously a l too recognizable as an inconsistency 
that riddles more quotidian discourse. Many who would not deny that bi- 
sexuals exist when the subject of bisexuality arises can nonetheless revert to 
the straight/gay dichotomy when the topic shifts.15 I myself can speak at 
length about bisexuals at one moment and then, in the next, field a question 
may be pure because it constitutes a conquest of the baser desires of the body, see id.; if so, the 
celibate asexual's claim to purity is attenuated because his licentious desire is not overcome, but 
rather absent. And even if described as pure, the absence of desire may be viewed as a disquieting 
purity, insofar as our hedonic pleasure in others is viewed by some as a generative, fecundating, and 
humanizing force even (or perhaps especially) when sublimated. See Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of 
Repugnance: Why We Should Ban the Cloning of Humans, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 679, 691-92 (1998) 
("Sexual desire ... is thus sublimated into erotic longing for wholeness ...."). Thus, while bisexu- 
ality and asexuality may in some senses be viewed as simple opposites (oversexed v. undersexed), 
they share negative connotations. But these connotations, in tum, are differently negative. 
9. Technically, "monosexuality" denotes the state of possessing one of the two traditional 
"sexes" (male or female), as opposed to having one of the two traditional "orientations" (heterosex- 
ual or homosexual). See 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1029, (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED]. 
In this article, however, I follow the rising practice of using the term in the latter sense. See, e.g., 
RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN 
LAW 16 (1996) [hereinafter COLKER, HYBRID]. 
10. See Mezey, supra note 8, at 98 (describing the categories as exclusive and comprehen- 
sive). 
11. See MARJORIE GARBER, VICE VERSA: BISEXUALITY AND THE EROTICISM OF EVERYDAY 
LIFE 62-66 (1995) (discussing "queer" as a means of including bisexuals within a coalition move- 
ment of sexual minorities). 
12. See Liz A. Highleyman, Identity and Ideas: Strategies for Bisexuals, in BISEXUAL 
POLITICS, supra note 7, at 73, 83-86 (describing the "lesbigay" strategy of naming bisexuals along- 
side lesbians and gay men). 
13. See, e.g., notes 48-52 infra nd accompanying text; notes 503-534 infra nd accompany- 
ing text. 
14. See, e.g., notes 60-62 infra nd accompanying text. 
15. See Christopher James, Denying Complexity: The Dismissal and Appropriation fBisexu- 
ality in Queer, Lesbian, and Gay Theory, in QUEER STUDIES: A LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND 
TRANSGENDER ANTHOLOGY 217, 226 (Brett Beemyn & Mickey Eliason eds., 1996). 
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such as "Is X straight orgay?" without instinctively feeling as if an important 
possibility-the bisexual possibility-has been elided. 
What is happening here? Why is bisexuality so invisible? If we inter- 
pret hat invisibility as the product of erasure, why does that erasure occur? 
Why is bisexuality now becoming sufficiently visible that commentators 
have begun to theorize its invisibility as the result of erasure? How might 
contemporary sexual orientation politics and law look different if his trend 
toward visibility continues? This article will occupy itself with these ques- 
tions. 
Framing the questions in this way itself raises definitional issues. One of 
the difficult things about writing about sexuality is that here are too many 
distortions to correct at once. Some of these distortions must be accepted, 
although never without the fear that hey will infect the result. I address two 
such distortions at the outset. 
The first isa qualification fthe definition f"bisexual." In asking why 
bisexuals are invisible and/or erased, I assume that here is a category of in- 
dividuals who can usefully be denominated as bisexuals. I provisionally de- 
fine that category below.16 I emphasize, however, that I do not present the 
category of bisexuals (or heterosexuals, homosexuals, orasexuals) as a natu- 
ral kind awaiting detection. While individuals harboring both cross-sex and 
same-sex desire clearly exist, it does not necessarily follow that such indi- 
viduals hould be classified together as a group. Strictly speaking, then, the 
real question is not why bisexuals are erased: one cannot erase something 
that does not have material existence outside of one's writing it, and which 
one has never written. Rather the question iswhy we have divided the world 
of orientation i to categories that end to suppress the existence of bisexual 
desire. 
Even bearing this in mind, however, I find it difficult todiscuss that sup- 
pression without isolating the various constituencies that have interests in
effectuating or resisting it. While socially constructed, the constituencies of 
heterosexual, homosexual, bisexual, and asexual have political and material 
consequence. Underscoring their contingency takes nothing away from their 
social importance orheuristic utility. I therefore self-consciously retain the 
terms. 
The second issue is the definition f"sex." To possess "bi"-sexual de- 
sire implies the existence of two sexes-male and female. While bisexuality 
is sometimes seen as eroding the salience of the sex binary,17 it thus nomi- 
nally reifies the premise that here are only two sexes. That premise has been 
contested on the grounds that a significant portion of the population is inter- 
sexed at birth, with genitalia that do not conform tothe two conventional sex 
16. See text accompanying notes 71-109 infra. 
17. See text accompanying notes 314-352 infra. 
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categories.18 Yet a man who is attracted towomen and intersexed individu- 
als, but not to men, is not considered a bisexual, because the intersexed do 
not count as a sex for these purposes.'9 Bisexuality also suggests that hese 
two sexes are defined biologically rather than culturally.20 This is the classic 
division made between anatomical sex and social gender.21 Thus a lesbian 
who is attracted toboth "butch" and "femme" women will fail the classical 
definition fa bisexual, because even though she is attracted totwo indi- 
viduals who might be said to have different "genders," both of them are of 
the same "sex." 
I will again leave both these premises-that there are two sexes (male 
and female) and that anatomical sex can be coherently distinguished from 
social gender-unchallenged forthe purposes of this analysis. I wish to rec- 
ognize these premises, however, as deeply contestable ones, and to gesture 
briefly toward the costs of leaving them unassailed. First, the intersexed oc- 
cupy a place between the two conventionally ordained sexes (male and fe- 
male) that the bisexual occupies between the two conventionally ordained 
orientations. Making bisexuality visible on the grounds that intermediate 
categories deserve social attention while letting intersexuality remain invisi- 
ble thus creates an ironic asymmetry. More importantly, theelision of inter- 
sexuality represents a missed opportunity to interrogate orientation. For just 
as bisexuality challenges our conceptions ofsex,22 so too might intersexual- 
ity be used to challenge our conceptions oforientation. To see this, think of 
the man who is attracted more to intersexed individuals than to either men or 
to women.23 What is this man's orientation? What if he is attracted only to 
the intersexed? Is the bisexual, who is sometimes understood tobe "pan- 
sexual," also understood to be attracted tothe intersexed? 
More familiarly, the distinction between sex and gender has been under 
increasing fire in contemporary queer theory, such that its use requires de- 
18. See SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED 135 n.4 (1998) (noting esti- 
mate that he "frequency ofintersexuality may be as high as 2 percent of live births"). 
19. See id. at 5 (arguing that he popular fascination with intersexed individuals may stem in 
part from the fact hat one's heterosexual orhomosexual status is not called into question by attrac- 
tion to an intersexed person). 
20. See, e.g., MARTIN S. WEINBERG, COLIN J. WILLIAMS & DOUGLAS W. PRYOR, DUAL 
ATTRACTION: UNDERSTANDING BIXSEXUALITY 4 (1994) (defining bisexuality according to sex 
rather than gender). 
21. See Biddy Martin, Sexualities Without Genders and Other Queer Utopias, 24.2-3 
DIACRITICS 104, 104 (1994). 
22. See text accompanying notes 314-352 infra. 
23. There is a notable amount of pornography that depicts intersexed individuals, leading one 
to believe that some consumers may be particularly attracted tothe intersexed. See KESSLER, supra 
note 18, at 160 n.82 ("The attraction tointersexed bodies is far more common than what would be 
revealed in counting partners of the intersexed, as is evident in the abundant pornography available 
featuring actors with vaginas and standard-sized penises ...."). 
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fense.24 The defense is purely pragmatic-bisexuals resimply not currently 
understood as people who are attracted toboth genders, asopposed to sexes. 
While not attempted here, however, that extension should be theorized. This 
is because it is clearly true that people have gender orientations as well as 
sexual orientations-one can be attracted not to all men, but only to butch 
men, or not to all women, but only to femme women. Why are certain peo- 
ple attracted toboth kinds of gender performance within one sex, while oth- 
ers limit hemselves topeople who perform their gender only in one way? 
The answer is doubtless linked to the ways in which they perceive and ap- 
preciate "biological" sex. Indeed, it is the strength ofthis link that has led 
theorists like Judith Butler to posit that here is no pre-discursive biological 
substrate of sex that can be distinguished from gender.25 Be that as it may, 
this article leaves the work of theorizing the gender orientatation-bi- or oth- 
erwise-for another day. 
That said, I can now assail the question of why bisexuals are invisible 
and/or erased in contemporary American culture. In Part I, I demonstrate 
that bisexuality is invisible relative to homosexuality and that his invisibility 
is better explained by bisexual erasure than by bisexual nonexistence. After 
defining bisexual invisibility, I show that bisexuals (under any plausible 
definition fbisexuality) are much less socially and politically visible than 
homosexuals. I acknowledge, however, that this discrepancy invisibility 
does not necessarily betoken bisexual erasure, as it could simply mean that 
there are fewer bisexuals than homosexuals inthe population. Because de- 
termining the merit of this position requires a more precise definition f"bi- 
sexuality," I generate and defend a provisional definition fbisexuality as
the ability to feel more than incidental sexual desire for both sexes. Using 
this definition, I look at what he major sexuality studies ay about he inci- 
dence of bisexuality and homosexuality in the population. Two things are 
surprising about such an investigation. First, to my knowledge, no one has 
previously made such a systematic comparison. Second, when such an in- 
vestigation is actually made, it reveals that each of the major sexuality stud- 
ies demonstrates that the number of bisexuals is greater than or comparable 
to the number of homosexuals. This suggests that bisexual invisibility is not 
a reflection ofthe fact that here are fewer bisexuals than there are homo- 
sexuals in the population, but is rather a product of social erasure. 
Having demonstrated erasure in Part I, I seek to explain it in Part II. I 
suggest hat erasure occurs because the two dominant sexual orientation 
groups-self-identified straights and self-identified gays-have shared in- 
24. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF 
IDENTITY 7 (1990) (describing the claim, central to her work, that "this construct alled 'sex' is as 
culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the conse- 
quence that he distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all"). 
25. See id. 
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vestments inthat erasure. It is as if these two groups, despite their other 
virulent disagreements, have agreed that bisexuals will be made invisible. I
call this the epistemic contract of bisexual erasure. To support the existence 
of such a contract, I adduce evidence that self-identified straights and self- 
identified gays both deploy the same three strategies of bisexual erasure: 
class erasure, individual erasure, and delegitimation. 
In Part III, I describe the investments that both self-identified straights 
and self-identified gays have in bisexual erasure. These are: (1) an interest 
in stabilizing sexual orientation; (2) an interest inretaining sex as a dominant 
metric of differentiation; and (3) an interest indefending norms of monog- 
amy. I disaggregate each interest into its three components: (1) the compo- 
nent shared by both straights and gays; (2) the component held only by 
straights; and (3) the component held only by gays. 
The first investment monosexuals have in bisexual erasure is an interest 
in stabilizing sexual orientation. The component of that interest hared by 
both straights and gays is an interest inknowing one's place in the social or- 
der: both straights and gays value this knowledge because it relieves them of 
the anxiety of identity interrogation. Straights have a more specific interest 
in ensuring the stability of heterosexuality because that identity is privileged. 
Less intuitively, gays also have a specific interest inguarding the stability of 
homosexuality, insofar as they view that stability as the predicate for the 
"immutability defense" or for effective political mobilization. Bisexuality 
threatens all of these interests because it precludes both straights and gays 
from "proving" that hey are either straight orgay. This is because straights 
(for example) can only prove that hey are straight by adducing evidence of 
cross-sex desire. (They cannot adduce vidence of the absence of same-sex 
desire, as it is impossible to prove a negative.) But this means that straights 
can never definitively prove that hey are straight ina world in which bisexu- 
als exist, as the individual who adduces cross-sex desire could be either 
straight orbisexual, and there is no definitive way to arbitrate b tween those 
two possibilities. Bisexuality is thus threatening to all monosexuals because 
it makes it impossible to prove amonosexual identity. 
The second interest monosexuals have in bisexual erasure is an interest 
in retaining the importance of sex as a distinguishing trait in society. 
Straights and gays have a shared investment i  this because to be straight or
to be gay is to discriminate erotically on the basis of sex. Straights have a 
specific interest inpreserving the importance ofsex because sex norms are 
currently read through a heterosexual matrix: to be a man or a woman in 
contemporary American society is in part defined by one's sexual attractive- 
ness to the opposite sex. Gays also have a particular interest insex distinc- 
tions, as homosexuality is often viewed as a way to engage in complete sex 
separatism-that is,as a means of creating single-sex communities that are 
bonded together erotically as well as socially and politically. Bisexuality 
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endangers all of these interests because it posits a world in which sex need 
not (or should not) matter asmuch as monosexuals want it to matter. Indeed, 
bisexuals and asexuals are the only sexual orientation groups that have at 
least the capacity not to discriminate on the basis of sex in any aspect of their 
lives. 
The final interest that monosexuals have in bisexual erasure is an interest 
in defending norms of monogamy. Both straights and gays share this inter- 
est, as the dominant e hic of contemporary American society favors dyadic 
relationships. Straights may have a particular interest inthis insofar as the 
form of nonmonogamy associated with bisexuals has been connected to HIV 
infection, with bisexual "promiscuity" acting as a bridge (phantasmatically if 
not actually) between the "infected" gay population and the "uninfected" 
straight population. Gays may have a particular interest inmonogamy inso- 
far as they seek to assimilate into "mainstream" society. Bisexuality threat- 
ens all of these interests because bisexuals are often perceived to be "intrin- 
sically" nonmonogamous. 
Thus, along at least three different axes, both gays and straights have 
distinct but overlapping interests hat are threatened by the concept of bi- 
sexuality. It is thus unsurprising that both of these sexual orientation groups 
collude in bisexual erasure. 
In Part IV, I examine how self-identified bisexuals both capitulate oand 
resist he epistemic contract. I first show how the contract retards the degree 
to which individuals can articulate a bisexual identity. I then turn to the 
ways in which individuals articulating such an identity have begun to dis- 
solve the contract. I hypothesize that his visibility will only increase over 
time, and I endorse this trend. 
In Part V, I look at how bisexual invisibility and visibility affect practical 
outcomes in the legal realm. Taking the case of same-sex sexual harassment, 
I note that bisexuals have remained largely invisible in that jurisprudence, 
although they are more visible in this doctrinal rea than in others. I then ask 
how that jurisprudence might be transformed if bisexuals were rendered 
more visible. 
I. THE ERASURE OF BISEXUALS 
That bisexuals are being erased will appear self-evident to many. Yet 
numerous conversations I have had on the subject of bisexuality have called 
into question the nature of the proposition (e.g., under what definition fbi- 
sexuality is erasure occurring?), if not its veracity (e.g., under a particular 
definition, are bisexuals really being erased?). Answering these questions i
useful, not only to assuage the doubts of skeptics, but also to ensure that non- 
skeptics are talking about he same thing when they agree that bisexuals are 
being erased. I therefore treat bisexual erasure as a controversial proposition 
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that must be proven rather than assumed. That proposition consists of two 
claims: first, hat bisexuals are invisible; second, that his invisibility stems 
not from nonexistence, but rather from erasure. 
A. Bisexual Invisibility 
To show that bisexuals are invisible, I must specify and defend a defini- 
tion of bisexual invisibility (as opposed to a definition fbisexuality),26 and
then produce vidence that bisexuals are invisible under this definition. De- 
fining bisexual invisibility is somewhat difficult, as bisexuality exists at the 
intersection f many different kinds of social invisibility. Even when nar- 
rowly defined, however, bisexual invisibility is easy to prove. 
1. Bisexual invisibility defined. 
There are at least three causes of bisexual invisibility, and it will be use- 
ful to speak of each as creating a different kind of invisibility.27 The three 
invisibilities can be seen as nested within each other: the first affects 
straights, gays and bisexuals; the second affects only gays and bisexuals; and 
the third affects only bisexuals. In this article, I focus on the last kind of in- 
visibility. 
The first kind of invisibility arises from a general urge to keep all sex- 
ualities invisible, which leads to the invisibility not only of bisexuals, but 
also of homosexuals, and even of heterosexuals. As David Halperin has 
noted, sexuality discourse has always been haunted by "the ancient and per- 
sistent specter of sexual despecification."28 Despite recent efforts odemys- 
26. It may seem strange that I define "bisexual invisibility" before defining "bisexuality." See 
notes 71-109 infra nd accompanying text. The order arises from the fact hat I believe that bisexu- 
als are invisible under any definition ofbisexuality, such that I need not specify the definition of 
bisexuality indemonstrating bisexual invisibility. 
27. In contrast to the way I have used the words in previous work, "invisibility" and "visibil- 
ity" in this article refer to social rather than corporeal (in)visibility. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimila- 
tionist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption a d the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't 
Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485, 497-98 & n.44 (1998) (using the word "invisibility" throughout to refer to 
"corporeal invisibility"). Corporeal visibility refers to "the perceptibility of traits such as skin color 
that manifest themselves on the physical body in a relatively permanent and recognizable way." Id. 
at 497. Social visibility, incontrast, "designates the perceptibility of nonphysical traits." Id. Social 
visibility includes "'declarative visibility,' which arises when a corporeally invisible trait is made 
visible through speech," id. at 497 n.44; "[p]olitical visibility, [which] 'arises when a person claims 
group membership as a central and constitutive f ature of her identity,"' id. (quoting Kathryn 
Abrams, The Supreme Court, Visibility, and the "Politics of Presence," 50 VAND. L. REv. 411, 414 
(1997)); and "programmatic v sibility," which "'arises from group members' efforts oconnect heir 
group-based i entities with a particular political interest or program,"' id. (quoting Abrams, supra, 
at 414). For the most part, the term "visibility" inthis article will refer to the subset of social visi- 
bility that is political visibility. 
28. DAVID M. HALPERIN, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 65 (1995). 
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tify sex, "the erotic still arouses acute moral anxiety and confusion."29 Thus 
it is still true that, as Richard Posner has noted, "[a]nyone in our society who 
wants to write about sex ... had better explain what he source of his interest 
in the subject is."30 In the law, squeamishness about sexuality causes even 
heterosexual sexual subjects to be shrouded in euphemism. For instance, a 
number of state statutes criminalizing sodomy denote heterosexual as well as 
homosexual sodomy no more specifically than as a "crime against nature."31 
As one legal encyclopedia puts it, the terms of these statutes "reflect the leg- 
islators' reluctance toset out in detail the elements of sodomy because of its 
loathsome nature."32 That these chronically vague provisions33 have been 
upheld against void-for-vagueness challenges34 suggests that the judiciary 
shares the legislative squeamishness about sexuality. Judicial reticence 
about naming deviant heterosexual sexual practices can also be seen in the 
contexts of obscenity regulation35 and sexual harassment.36 
29. JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY 1 (1986); see also JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS: MEANINGS, MYTHS & MODERN SEXUALITIES 44 (1985) ("Sexuality is a fertile 
source of moral panic, arousing intimate questions about personal identity, and touching on crucial 
social boundaries.... This is what makes ex a particular site of ethical and political concern-and 
of fear and loathing."). 
30. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 1 (1992). 
31. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ? 13-1411 (1999) ("A person who knowingly and without 
force commits the infamous crime against nature with an adult is guilty of a class 3 misde- 
meanor."); IDAHO CODE ? 18-6605 (1999) ("Every person who is guilty of the infamous crime 
against nature, committed with mankind or with any animal, is punishable by imprisonment i  he 
state prison ot less than five years."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, ? 34 (West 1992) ("Who- 
ever commits the abominable and detestable crime against nature, either with mankind or with a 
beast, shall be punished by imprisonment i  the state prison for not more than twenty ears."); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. ? 750.158 (West 1999) ("Any person who shall commit he abominable 
and detestable crime against nature ither with mankind or with any animal shall be guilty of a 
felony ...."); MISS. CODE ANN. ? 97-29-59 (1998) ("Every person who shall be convicted of the 
detestable and abominable crime against nature committed with mankind or with a beast, shall be 
punished by imprisonment i  he penitentiary for a term of not more than ten years."); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ? 14-177 (1999) ("If any person shall commit he crime against nature, with mankind or 
beast, he shall be punished as a Class I felon."); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, ? 886 (West 1999) 
("Any person who is guilty of the detestable and abominable crime against nature, committed with 
mankind or with a beast, shall be guilty of a felony."). Unlike other "crime against nature" statutes, 
none of the above statutes goes on to define what constitutes a "crime against nature." 
32. 70A AM. JUR. 2D Sodomy ? 3 (1987) (authored by Lonnie E. Griffith, Jr.). 
33. For a discussion of the vagueness of these statutes, ee RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN 
(OUT)LAw: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 47-57 (1992). 
34. See, e.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (per curiam) (upholding Tennessee "crime 
against nature" statute against vagueness challenge); Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (per 
curiam) (same for Florida statute); Hogan v. State, 441 P.2d 620 (Nev. 1968) (same for Nevada 
statute); Wamer v. State, 489 P.2d 526 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (same for Oklahoma statute). 
35. See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 
383 U.S. 413, 441 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting) (noting that "quotations from typical episodes [of 
an allegedly obscene book] would so debase our Reports that I will not follow that course"). 
36. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore S rvs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998) (omitting graphic 
facts in sexual harassment case in the "interest of both brevity and dignity"). 
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The second kind of invisibility relates pecifically tosame-sex desire. It 
can be seen in the treatment ofsame-sex desire as unspeakable. As Eve 
Sedgwick notes, the nonmedical terms for same-sex desire in the Christian 
tradition i cluded "'that sin which should be neither named nor committed,' 
the 'detestable and abominable sin, amongst Christians ot to be named,' 
...'things fearful to name,' . . . [and] 'the love that dare not speak its 
name .... "'37 In the law, the code of silence about same-sex desire can be 
seen in so-called "no promo homo" statutes,38 which prohibit public educa- 
tion likely to promote homosexuality.39 It can also be seen in the military's 
current "don't ask, don't tell" policy, in which articulations of same-sex de- 
sire are chilled.40 Unlike the first kind of invisibility, this invisibility does 
not pertain to cross-sex desire. Thus, heterosexuality may be promoted un- 
der the "no promo homo" statutes,41 and articulated under "don't ask, don't 
tell."42 In both cases, however, bisexuals are made as invisible as homo- 
sexuals. This is because "unspeakable" same-sex desire is also a component 
of bisexuality. Despite their name, the "no promo homo" statutes also pro- 
hibit he promotion fbisexuality, either by explicitly encompassing bisexu- 
37. SEDGWICK, supra note 4, at 202-03 (footnotes omitted). 
38. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1702-06 
(1993) (describing the genesis of these statutes). 
39. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ? 15-716(c) (1998) ("No district shall include in its course of 
study instruction which: (1) Promotes a homosexual life-style. (2) Portrays homosexuality as a 
positive alternative life-style. (3) Suggests that some methods of sex are safe methods of homosex- 
ual sex."); CONN. GEN. STATE. ? 46a-81r (1997) ("Nothing in [the enumerated sections] shall be 
deemed or construed ... to authorize the promotion of homosexuality orbisexuality in education 
institutions ...."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. ?17-281(A)(3) (West 1999) ("No sex education course 
offered in the public schools of the state shall utilize any sexually explicit materials depicting male 
or female homosexual ctivity."); MiNN. STAT. ? 363.021 (1999) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be 
construed to ... authorize or permit he promotion of homosexuality orbisexuality in education 
institutions or require the teaching in education institutions of homosexuality orbisexuality as an 
acceptable lifestyle . . . ); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. ? 85.007(b) (West 1992) ("The 
materials in the education programs intended for persons younger than 18 years of age must ... 
state that homosexual conduct is not an acceptable lifestyle . . ."). 
40. See 10 U.S.C. ? 654(b)(2) (1998) (noting that, in the absence of further findings, a mem- 
ber stating "that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual" will be separated from the armed forces). 
Because I allude repeatedly tothe policy in this article, I briefly describe it here. The policy imme- 
diately predating "don't ask, don't tell" contained a categorical exclusion of homosexuals, noting 
that "[h]omosexuality [was] incompatible with military service." 32 C.F.R. pt. 41 app. A (1998) 
("Enlisted Administrative Separations: Standards and Procedures"). After winning his first presi- 
dential election, then President-elect Bill Clinton maintained that he would lift the ban on gays in 
the military and permit gays to serve openly. See JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READ-ER'S GUIDE 
TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY 20 (1999). This engendered massive resistance on the part 
of the military establishment. See id. at 21. The current policy, colloquially known as "don't ask, 
don't tell," was framed as a compromise. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 27, 92 (1994). 
Under this policy, gays can serve in the military, but they may not serve openly without risking 
separation. See 10 U.S.C. ? 654(b)(2) (1998). 
41. See note 39 supra. 
42. See note 40 supra. 
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ality within their interdictions r by prohibiting homosexual cts.43 And the 
"don't ask, don't tell" policy explicitly muzzles bisexuals as well as homo- 
sexuals-the "statements" portion of the statute asserts that he presumption 
of homosexual conduct is triggered if "the member has stated that he or she 
is a homosexual or bisexual."44 
The final kind of invisibility pertains only to bisexuality. Bisexual in- 
visibility manifests itself in the studied omission of bisexuality indiscussions 
of sexual orientation. One example among many45 is an anthology of essays 
on sexual orientation e titled Homosexuality/Heterosexuality.46 This elision 
carries over into the law, where discussions of sexual orientation almost in- 
variably privilege the straight/gay binary. One example among many47 is the 
recent Supreme Court opinion in Romer v. Evans.48 In that case, the Court 
found that Amendment 2 of Colorado's tate constitution violated the federal 
Equal Protection Clause. Amendment 2 stated that here would be "No Pro- 
tected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation."49 The 
Amendment thus took the class of bisexuals eriously, probably because the 
municipal ordinances it overrode explicitly protected bisexuals.50 The Court, 
however, subsumed bisexuals into the homosexual category, noting that it 
would refer to the "named class" protected by the ordinances "as homosexual 
persons or gays and lesbians."51 Thus, the only references tobisexuals in the 
opinion occur in the quoted language of the ordinances and Amendment 2; 
when the Court speaks for itself, it speaks solely about homosexual per- 
sons.52 
Because I wish to consider how bisexuals qua bisexuals are being erased, 
I focus on the third kind of invisibility. Thus, bisexual invisibility is defined 
for the purposes of this article as that social invisibility hat affects only bi- 
sexuals. In order to determine how significant that invisibility is,I must iso- 
late its effects from the effects of the other kinds of invisibility. I can ac- 
complish this isolation by comparing the relative visibility of bisexuality and 
43. See note 39 supra. 
44. 10 U.S.C. ? 654(b)(2) (1998) (emphasis added). 
45. For other examples, ee notes 54-70 infra nd accompanying text. 
46. HOMOSEXUALITY/HETEROSEXUALITY: CONCEPTS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION (David P. 
McWhirter, Stephanie A. Sanders & June Machover Reinisch eds., 1990). 
47. For other examples, ee text accompanying otes 503-534 infra. 
48. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
49. Id. at 624 (quoting COLO. CONST., art. II ? 306 (1992)). 
50. See id. (citing DEN. REV. MUN. CODE, art. IV, ?? 28-91 to 28-116 (1991); ASPEN MUN. 
CODE ? 13-98 (1977); BOULDER REV. CODE ?? 12-1-1 to 12-1-11 (1987)). 
51. Id. 
52. This does not indicate that he Court was intending toexclude bisexuals from its protec- 
tions, but rather that the Court permitted the homosexual category to absorb bisexuals. Yet this 
absorption, ofcourse, is itself an example of bisexual invisibility. 
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homosexuality.53 To demonstrate that bisexuality is invisible under my defi- 
nition, I must demonstrate that bisexuality is less socially visible than homo- 
sexuality. 
2. Evidence of bisexual invisibility. 
Such a demonstration s easily made. On-line searches for the words 
"homosexuality" and "bisexuality" inmainstream newspapers, newsmagazi- 
nes, and academic abstracts reveal a striking discrepancy inthe incidence of 
the two terms. In the period from January 1,1990 to November 30, 1999, 
the Los Angeles Times had 2790 documents mentioning "homosexuality" and 
121 documents mentioning "bisexuality";54 USA Today had 1768 documents 
mentioning "homosexuality" and twenty-nine documents mentioning "bi- 
sexuality";55 and The Wall Street Journal had 396 documents mentioning 
"homosexuality" and nine documents mentioning "bisexuality."56 In the 
same time period, Time magazine had 240 documents mentioning "homo- 
sexuality" and fifteen documents mentioning "bisexuality";57 US. News and 
World Report had 120 documents mentioning "homosexuality" and three 
documents mentioning "bisexuality";58 and The New Republic had 144 
documents mentioning "homosexuality" and three documents mentioning 
"bisexuality."59 While I expected much less of a discrepancy inmoving 
from popular to academic sources, this proved not to be the case. In the 
same time period, the Social Sciences Abstract Database on Wilson Web had 
1122 documents mentioning "homosexuality" and eighty-seven documents 
mentioning "bisexuality";60 theGeneral Sciences Abstracts had 221 docu- 
ments mentioning "homosexuality" and six documents mentioning "bisexu- 
ality";;61 the Humanities Abstracts had 962 documents mentioning "homo- 
sexuality" and twenty-six documents mentioning "bisexuality."62 
The discrepancy between the relative visibility of homosexuality and bi- 
sexuality can be described sociologically as well as statistically. Robin Ochs 
53. A comparison of bisexuality and heterosexuality would not isolate this kind of invisibility 
because bisexuality could be more invisible than heterosexuality due to the second kind of invisi- 
bility. 
54. Search of WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Library, LAT File (Mar. 22, 1999). 
55. Search of WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Library, USATD File (Mar. 22, 1999). 
56. Search of WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Library, WSJ File (Mar. 22, 1999). 
57. Search of WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Library, TIMEMAG File (Mar. 22, 1999). 
58. Search of WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Library, USNWR File (Mar. 22, 1999). 
59. Search of WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Library, NEWREPUB File (Mar. 22, 1999). 
60. Search of General Science Abstracts Database, Wilson Web (Mar. 18, 1999) <http:// 
wilsonweb2.hwwilson.com/cgi-bin/auto login.cgi>. 
61. Search of General Science Abstracts Database, Wilson Web (Mar. 18, 1999) <http:// 
wilsonweb2.hwwilson.com/cgi-bin/auto login.cgi>. 
62. Search of Humanities Abstracts Database, Wilson Web (Mar. 18, 1999) <http:// 
wilsonweb2.hwwilson.com/cgi-binlauto-login.cgi>. 
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has argued that bisexuals are invisible not only relative to straights, but also 
relative to gays.63 She points out that while we sometimes suspend the gen- 
eral presumption that all individuals are straight, the presumption that re- 
places it is that all individuals within that context are gay.64 Thus, "[i]n most 
families, for example, members are presumed tobe heterosexual; conversely, 
at a women's bar all the women present are presumed lesbians."65 There are 
few contexts, however, in which an individual ispresumed bisexual. In a 
similar vein, Marjorie Garber has observed that bisexuals have few recogniz- 
able symbols of their identity66-the pink and blue "biangle" is one of the 
few symbols pecifically denoting bisexuality67 and is much less culturally 
visible than the gay symbols68 ofthe pink triangle69 or the rainbow.70 Thus, 
even when the heterosexual presumption that all individuals are straight is
suspended, itis replaced by the monosexual presumption that all individuals 
are straight orgay. 
It is understandable that he heterosexual presumption has received more 
theoretical attention than the monosexual presumption. The erosion of the 
presumption that all individuals are heterosexual was obviously necessary to 
identify the fallback presumption that all individuals are heterosexual orho- 
mosexual. The evidence above demonstrates, however, that he monosexual 
presumption is powerful, and urgently requires such attention. 
I will therefore take it to be relatively uncontroversial that bisexuals, 
howsoever defined, are less socially visible than homosexuals incontempo- 
rary American culture. What remains to be explored isthe cause of this in- 
visibility. 
63. See Robin Ochs, Biphobia: It Goes More than Two Ways, in BISExuALITY: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS OF AN INVISIBLE MiNoRITY 217, 225 (Beth A. Firestein ed., 1996) 
[hereinafter INVISIBLE MINORITY]. 
64. See id. 
65. Id. 
66. See GARBER, supra note 11, at 25. 
67. See id. (noting that "lavender and blue 'biangles' seem to go unrecognized"). 
68. It is true that these "gay" symbols have been appropriated for multiple other purposes. 
See id. ("Pink triangles . . . have been taken over as 'the province of every liberal-leaning Clinton 
supporter."'). But the inaugural gay meanings of these symbols still remain intact and widely un- 
derstood. 
69. See, e.g., Gays Revise Nazi Symbol, S.F. CHRON., June 29, 1992, at D5 (noting high visi- 
bility of pink triangles during Gay Pride Month); Deb Price, Concentration Camps' Pink Triangle 
Recalled at Holocaust Museum, STAR TRIB., May 5, 1993, at 3E (noting that "[t]he pink triangle is 
sported around the world . . . as a sign of gay pride"). 
70. See, e.g., Thomas J. Brady, How Some Gays Choose to Show the Colors, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Nov. 19, 1997, at DI (noting rising popularity of rainbow as symbol of homosexuality); 
Deb Price, Rainbow Flag is Symbol of a United Gay People, STAR TRIB., Apr. 19, 1995, at 4E (de- 
scribing utility of rainbow symbol in recognizing homosexuals). 
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B. Bisexual Erasure 
In discussing this project with peers, I was struck by how many of them 
agreed that bisexuals were invisible relative to homosexuals without believ- 
ing that bisexuals were being erased. In their view, the scant visibility of 
bisexuals relative to homosexuals did not signify their "erasure," but rather 
accurately reflected their smaller elative numbers. Call this the "relative 
nonexistence thesis." The merit of this position depends on the numbers of 
bisexuals and homosexuals inthe population. Those numbers in turn depend 
on the definitions of"bisexual" and "homosexual." I thus provide and de- 
fend a provisional definition f"bisexuality" (and, by doing so, provide and 
defend efinitions of"homosexuality" and "heterosexuality"). I then apply 
this definition to a number of major sexuality studies to compare the relative 
incidences of bisexuality and homosexuality. 
1. Bisexuality defined. 
I discuss the definition fbisexuality with some care because the validity 
of my thesis depends up on this definition. Whether bisexual invisibility de- 
notes bisexual erasure turns on how expansively or narrowly bisexuality is 
defined. To adopt whatever definition fbisexuality undergirds the conven- 
tional wisdom that "' [e]veryone is bisexual,'`71 for example, is to demon- 
strate bisexual erasure at the moment of definition. Similarly, toadopt what- 
ever definition of bisexuality undergirds the countervailing conventional 
wisdom that "' [t]here isno such thing as bisexuality,"'72 is simultaneously to 
demonstrate bisexual nonerasure. 
Neither definition is particularly satisfactory. The universalizing defini- 
tion of bisexuality maximizes the number of persons erased, but only by 
dropping the threshold ofbisexual ascription solow as arguably to empty the 
term of diacritical force.73 The eradicating definition fbisexuality mini- 
71. GARBER, supra note 11, at 16 (quoting conventional wisdom); see also PAULA C. RUST, 
BISEXUALITY AND THE CHALLENGE TO LESBIAN POLITICS: SEX, LOYALTY, AND REVOLUTION 1 
(1995) [hereinafter RUST, CHALLENGE] (quoting view that "[e]veryone isinherently bisexual"). 
72. GARBER, supra note 11, at 16 (quoting conventional wisdom); see also RUST, 
CHALLENGE, supra note 71, at 1 (quoting view that bisexuality "does not exist"). 
73. This can be seen in the intuitive distance between the statement "Everyone is bisexual" 
and the statement "I am bisexual"-that is, in the ability of individuals to say the former without 
conceding the latter. At the level of formal logic, this makes no sense. If I am part of "everyone," 
and "everyone isbisexual," then I, too, must be bisexual. At the level of praxis, however, it is in- 
telligible because the word "bisexual" in the first sentence is seen to have a sufficiently dilute sig- 
nificance (precisely because it is spread so thinly across the mass of humanity) as to have no conse- 
quence. In the second sentence, the word "bisexual" is seen to have a sufficiently potent signifi- 
cance (precisely because it refers to some, but not others, in the human population) as to have seri- 
ous ramifications. Put in Sedgwickian terms, this is the difference b tween a universalizing dis- 
course of bisexuality (in which bisexuality is a latent rait in all of us) and a minoritizing discourse 
of bisexuality (in which bisexuality is a trait hat some, but not others, possess). See SEDGWICK, 
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mizes the number of persons erased but only by raising the threshold ofdefi- 
nition to dizzying heights.74 Eliminating these two endpoints, however, still 
leaves a vast spectrum ofchoice. 
In staking out a definitional position, two issues must be defensibly re- 
solved. The first is the axis or axes along which sexual orientation will be 
defined. The second is how expansively or narrowly todefine a particular 
sexual orientation along the chosen axis or axes. 
There are three axes along which sexual orientation is conventionally de-
fined: desire, conduct, and self-identification.75 Definitions can rely on a 
single axis, or on a combination fthe axes.76 The number of bisexuals will 
vary dramatically according to the permutation used. Consider, for example, 
this taxonomy of bisexualities constructed bya study using a pure conduct- 
based definition: 
[1] "Defense Bisexuality" (defending a ainst homosexuality in societies where 
it is stigmatized), [2] "Latin Bisexuality" (the insertive role in certain "Mediter- 
ranean cultures" isnot regarded as homosexual, so that men who participate in
same-sex encounters may consider themselves nonetheless heterosexual), [3] 
"Ritual Bisexuality" (as with the Sambia of Papua-New Guinea, in which 
younger males fellate older men in order to ingest heir "masculinizing" semen, 
a practice that is part of a rite of initiation, may continue for years, and is appar- 
ently replaced by exclusive heterosexuality after marriage), [4] "Married Bi- 
sexuality," [5] "Secondary Homosexuality" (more frequently called "situational 
bisexuality"-sex with same-sex partners in prisons or other single-sex institu- 
tions, in public parks or toilets, or for money), [6] "Equal Interest in Male and 
Female Partners" (so-called true bisexuality), [7] "Experimental Bisexuality," 
and [8] "Technical Bisexuality" (with partners who may be dressed as members 
of the other sex, or have had some form of gender eassignment: ranssexuals 
or members of a "third sex" in some cultures).77 
supra note 4, at 1 (using these terms in discussing the definitions ofhomosexuality and heterosexu- 
ality). 
74. Indeed, there is a way in which the two positions converge in their extremity. Cf 
GARBER, supra note 1 1, at 105 (noting that bisexual invisibility can be "produced as a startling by- 
product of omnipresence"). For if "everyone isbisexual" then the definition fbisexuality must be 
so anemic as to leave open the possibility that "no one is bisexual" in a less anemic sense. Con- 
versely, if "no one is bisexual" then the definition fbisexuality must be so robust as to leave open 
the possibility that "everyone isbisexual" in some less robust sense. See Michael du Plessis, Bla- 
tantly Bisexual; or, Unthinking Queer Theory, in REPRESENTING BISEXUALITIES 19, 30 (Donald E. 
Hall & Maria Pramaggiore eds., 1996) (noting that "[i]f everyone isbisexual, 'bisexuality' can no 
longer be a specific or pertinent feature"). 
75. See EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, JoHN H. GAGNON, ROBERT T. MICHAEL & STUART 
MICHAELS, THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY: SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 290 (1994) [hereinafter LAUMANN ET AL.] (noting that "homosexuality" can refer to 
"same-gender behavior, desire, self-definition, r identification or some combination of these ele- 
ments"). 
76. See id. 
77. GARBER, supra note 11, at 30 (numbering added). 
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This array appears o vertiginously diverse that it might fairly be asked 
whether these individuals should all be characterized bythe same term.78 In 
actuality, however, this array gives an oversimplified picture of bisexuality, 
insofar as it only uses one axis of definition. 
For if a different axis were used, many of the individuals who fall into 
many of the above categories would not be characterized as bisexuals, and 
vice versa. Thus, if we relied on desire alone, no "defense bisexuals" would 
be considered bisexual, given that hey only profess cross-sex desire to miti- 
gate the stigma of possessing same-sex desire.79 Some "ritual bisexuals" and 
"situational bisexuals" might also fall out of the desire-based category. This 
is because these individuals could be engaged in same-sex conduct for rea- 
sons other than sexual desire (such as initiation i to adult status in the case of 
the ritual bisexual8O orfinancial remuneration n the case of the situationally 
bisexual sex worker8l). At the same time, however, we might expect many 
individuals who would not be characterized as bisexuals under a conduct- 
based definition tobe included under a desire-based definition. This would 
encompass all individuals who nursed unacted same-sex desires. 
Similarly, ifwe defined bisexuality according to self-identification alone, 
"defense bisexuality" would probably be the only category that was not seri- 
ously diminished. "Latin bisexuals" engage in sexual conduct with both men 
and women but self-identify as heterosexual r ther than as bisexual.82 And a 
significant portion of the men who engage in extramarital s me-sex con- 
duct,83 or who view their same-sex conduct as "experimental"84 or "situ- 
ational,"85 are likely to self-identify as straight. 
Because the populations captured by the different axes are so different, 
the choice of axis (or combination faxes) is crucial. The choice cannot be 
made acontextually, but will depend on the purpose for which the definition 
is used. For example, the study that generated the taxonomy described above 
used a conduct-based definition because its purpose was to examine the role 
78. Cf id. at 31 (speculating about the usefulness of using the single term "bisexuality" to de- 
scribe a similarly diverse array of activities and fantasies). 
79. See Ronald C. Fox, Bisexuality in Perspective: A Review of Theory and Research, in 
INVISIBLE MINoRITY, supra note 63, at 3, 22-23. 
80. See id. at 23. 
81. See FRITZ KLEIN, THE BISEXUAL OPTION 19 (1978) ("Male prostitutes who allow them- 
selves to be fellated for money often do not consider this a homosexual act, or consider themselves 
bisexual."). 
82. See Fox, supra note 79, at 23. 
83. See John J. Brownfain, A Study of the Married Bisexual Male: Paradox and Resolution, in
BISEXUALITIES: THEORY AND RESEARCH 173, 173 (Fritz Klein & Timothy J. Wolf eds., 1985) 
(noting evidence that "individuals who choose to live within a conventional marriage while simul- 
taneously having significant love-sex relations with members of their own sex .... are not rare, 
only rarely identified"). 
84. See KLEIN, supra note 81, at 18. 
85. Seeid. 
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of bisexuality in the transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
("HIV").86 This definition makes obvious sense because HIV is spread 
through sexual conduct rather than through desire or self-identification.87 
However, neither this nor any other axis of definition will be valid across all 
contexts. 
So which axis or combination of axes is best suited for our purposes? I 
believe that the answer is a pure desire-based efinition. This may seem 
self-serving as the desire-based efinition is likely to yield more bisexuals 
than a conduct-based or self-identification-based definition,88 thereby making 
the claim of erasure asier to sustain. 
But the purely desire-based efinition of bisexuality can be defended 
against this criticism. One can frame that defense by (1) asking who is bi- 
sexual under a desire-based efinition who would not be bisexual under a 
conduct-based or self-identification-based d finition, and then (2) asking 
whether it is fair to call those individuals bisexual for the purposes of deter- 
mining erasure. The analogy to homosexuality is useful. For when we ask 
those questions about homosexuality, the answers are that the desire-based 
definition includes those who have unacted same-sex desires and that it is 
clearly defensible to call those individuals homosexual. I assume that these 
individuals do not act out their desires through conduct or self-identification 
because of the stigma of homosexuality, and I assume that the inability to 
convert desire to conduct or self-identification s consequential to that indi- 
vidual (at least insofar as the desire is more than incidental).89 I would call 
the individual who possesses unexpressed same-sex desire a closeted homo- 
sexual rather than a heterosexual. Indeed, I would view the exclusion of 
such individuals from the definition of homosexuals for the purposes of 
demonstrating erasure to be ironic, as it would permit erasure to control that 
definition, tolet erasure rase itself. And I would not expect much resistance 
to these analytic moves. 
I believe that these moves will be much more strongly resisted when ap- 
plied to bisexuality, but that they are nonetheless valid. The desire-based 
definition will include individuals who desire both sexes but who do not ex- 
press that dual desire either through conduct or through speech. The resis- 
tance arises when this suppression is characterized as consequential. It is 
harder to argue that bisexuals are giving up an important aspect of their 
86. See GARBER, supra note 11, at 30. 
87. See Joseph P. Stokes, Kittiwut Taywaditep, Peter Vanable & Daniel J. McKirnan, Bisex- 
ual Men, Sexual Behavior, and HIV/AIDS, in INVISIBLE MINORITY, supra note 63, at 149, 150-51. 
88. See, e.g., COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 9, at 15 (noting that "[o]nly about 1 percent of the 
adult population identifies a bisexual," but that "nearly 4 percent acknowledge that they are at- 
tracted to people of both sexes") (citing Trip Gabriel, A New Generation Seems Ready to Give Bi- 
sexuality a Place in the Spectrum, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1995, at CIO). 
89. I discuss the restriction that he desire be more than incidental below. See notes 99-108 
infra nd accompanying text. 
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identity since they are not being denied all satisfactory interpersonal sexual 
expression (as a homosexual in the same position arguably is) but merely 
sexual expression with one sex.90 In fact, the stereotype ofbisexuals as 
"greedy" or "promiscuous" implies that bisexuals are asking for more than 
their due, such that hey should be forced to give up sexual expression with 
one of the two sexes.91 Yet for the purposes of erasure, the inquiry is 
whether they are forgoing something rather than whether they should be for- 
going it. And the answer to that positive, rather than normative, question is 
clearly affirmative. Tothe extent that bisexuals are not permitted toexpress 
their dual desires, they might fairly characterize themselves a harmed. To 
exclude the individual who has unexpressed dual desires again permits era- 
sure to erase itself. For that reason, I believe that a purely desire-based defi- 
nition of bisexuality is the most appropriate. 
Even after desire is justified as the pertinent axis, we must determine 
how expansively or narrowly todefine bisexuals based on desire. At one 
extreme, there is Freud's view that bisexual desire is a universal condi- 
tion92-perhaps the most prestigious version of the "everyone is bisexual" 
position. At the other extreme isthe view that only "true" or sex-blind bi- 
sexuals-those who have equal desire for men and women93-are bisexual, 
which asymptotically approaches the view that "no one is bisexual" depend- 
ing on how seriously one takes the requirement of equality.94 Isolating desire 
as the axis of definition thus till eaves the full spectrum of bisexual defini- 
tion-from bisexual universality to bisexual nonexistence-available. 
90. See Arthur A. Murphy & John P. Ellington, Homosexuality and the Law: Tolerance and 
Containment II, 97 DICK. L. REv. 693, 709-10 (1993) (arguing that existing sodomy laws should be 
modified to exonerate "true homosexuals" but not bisexuals, on the ground that bisexuals can more 
easily modify their behavior). 
91. See notes 353-357 infra nd accompanying text. 
92. See, e.g., Sigmund Freud, Analysis Terminable and Interminable, in 23 THE STANDARD 
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 211, 243-44 (James 
Strachey trans., Hogarth Press 1973) (1937) [hereinafter WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD] ("We have 
come to learn, however, that every human being is bisexual in this case and that his libido is dis- 
tributed either in a manifest or latent fashion, over objects of both sexes."); Sigmund Freud, Civili- 
zation and Its Discontents, in21 WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, supra, at 57, 105 (1930) ("Man is an 
animal organism ... with an unmistakably bisexual disposition."); Sigmund Freud, The Psycho- 
genesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman, in 18 WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, supra at 145, 
158 (1920) ("In all of us, throughout life, the libido normally oscillates between male and female 
objects ...."); id. at 157 (noting "the universal bisexuality of human beings"). 
93. What it means to have "equal" desire for men and women is of course a deeply fraught 
question. Perhaps this is why true bisexuality is framed as "sex-blind" bisexuality-implying that, 
if bisexuals do not even "see" sex, they cannot disburse their desire unequally on the basis of sex. 
But, as discussed below, the rhetorical formulation f "sex-blindness" is somewhat misleading, as
bisexuals can in fact ell the difference b tween men and women. And if the bisexual can differen- 
tiate, it seems unlikely that his differentiation willnot affect her desire asymmetrically, given the 
power of sex as a diacritical trait in our society. See notes 314-318 infra nd accompanying text. 
94. See RUST, CHALLENGE, supra note 71, at 48-49 (describing this definition of bisexuality 
and noting its restrictiveness). 
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Here I choose a narrow view of bisexuality. I do not take this position 
because I reject he view that bisexuality is universal-I remain agnostic as 
to this point. Rather, I adopt this position because assuming universal bi- 
sexuality would make my argument too easy (and therefore too easy to dis- 
miss). 
I place two restrictions o  my desire-based definition fbisexuality. The 
first restriction pertains to the nature of desire. Desire is a classic floating 
signifier, that is, a term without a clear referent. Especially in postmodem 
times, its ambiguity has been resolved in favor of an expansive definition. 
Thus, under a Foucaultian reading, sexual desire should not be distinguished 
from other pleasurable uses of the body.95 And under a Sedgwickian read- 
ing, desire can incorporate i sputative opposite, as in the theory that he ho- 
mophobia of "homosexual panic" is in actuality fueled by an occluded, 
guilty, and surprised desire.96 But if the desire-based definition fbisexual- 
ity encompasses the nonsexual pleasure (and sexual displeasure) we feel in 
the company of other men and women, we are all indeed bisexuals. 
To avoid such a dilution of the bisexual definition, I restrict the defini- 
tion of desire to its more veryday meaning of "sexual appetite or lust."97 I
thus take the categories of the "homosocial" and the "homosexual" (or, alter- 
natively, the "hostile" and the "desirous") to be analytically distinct.98 
The second restriction pertains to the frequency with which the desire is 
experienced. To be classified as a bisexual under my definition, anindivid- 
ual's sexual desire for each sex must be more than incidental. To understand 
this restriction, it is helpful to examine the analogous restrictions commonly 
placed on homosexuality. If Kinsey is to be believed, in the middle of this 
century, a single same-sex sexual experience was sufficient to brand an indi- 
vidual as a homosexual.99 That cultural consensus, if it ever existed, has 
95. See 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 157-59 
(Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (criticizing the privileging ofsex over other economies 
of "bodies and pleasure"). 
96. See SEDGWICK, supra note 4, at 20. Sedgwick contends that "[j]udicially, a 'homosexual 
panic' defense for a person (typically a man) accused of antigay violence implies that his responsi- 
bility for the crime was diminished by a pathological psychological condition, perhaps brought on 
by an unwanted sexual advance from the man whom he then attacked." Id. at 19. Sedgwick goes 
on to observe that "the reason why this defense borrows the name of the (formerly rather obscure 
and little-diagnosed) psychiatric classification 'homosexual panic' is that it refers to the supposed 
uncertainty about his own sexual identity of the perpetrator ...." Id. at 20. Thus, the word "homo- 
sexual" in "homosexual panic" is aptly ambiguous, representing both the same-sex desire in the 
victim and the same-sex desire in the perpetrator. The ambiguity represents he transitivity (imag- 
ined or real) of same-sex desire, which could be described as the real cause of the panic. 
97. 4 OED, supra note 9, at 522. 
98. That these distinctions are made in many quarters, as in the case of sexual harassment, 
will be demonstrated below. See text accompanying otes 430-534 infra. 
99. In 1948, Kinsey stated: 
Everywhere in our society there is a tendency toconsider an individual 'homosexual' ifhe is 
known to have had a single xperience with another individual ofhis own sex. Under the law 
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shifted in certain fora to one that holds that adventitious homosexual desire, 
even if manifested inexplicit same-sex conduct, isnot sufficient to strip an 
individual of heterosexual status. This latter view is perhaps best seen in the 
legal system-probably the preeminent cultural site in which public institu- 
tional determinations f exual orientation are currently made. Congres- 
sional support for this view can be seen in the "don't ask, don't tell" stat- 
ute.'00 The statute generally makes homosexual conduct grounds for exclu- 
sion from the military.101 Yet it also contains an exemption through which 
an individual who has engaged in same-sex sexual conduct can remain in the 
military ifhe can demonstrate that such conduct is unlikely to recur.102 To 
the extent hat we view Congress as attempting to weed out homosexuals, 
this so-called "queen-for-a-day" exemptionl03 may be seen as a self-imposed 
check on labeling individuals a gay based on isolated same-sex sexual con- 
duct. The judiciary also uses its interpretive faculty to restrict the definition 
of "homosexual" inthis way. Judicial "queen-for-a-day" exemptions can be 
seen in the contexts of the civil service,104 adoption,105 and marriage.106 
an individual may receive the same penalty for a single homosexual experience that he would 
for a continuous record of experiences. Inpenal and mental institutions a male is likely to be 
rated 'homosexual' ifhe is discovered tohave had a single contact with another male. In soci- 
ety at large, a male who has worked out a highly successful marital djustment is likely to be 
rated 'homosexual' ifthe community leams about a single contact that he has had with another 
male. 
KiNSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 5, at 647, 650. 
100. 10 U.S.C. ? 654 (1998). 
101. The statute asserts that "[a] member of the armed forces hall be separated from the 
armed forces" if it is found "[t]hat he member has engaged in, attempted toengage in, or solicited 
another to engage in a homosexual ct or acts ..." 10 U.S.C. ? 654(b)(1) (1998). 
102. Even if a finding ismade that a servicemember hasengaged in homosexual conduct, the 
member can evade separation if he or she can show, inter alia, that "such conduct is a departure 
from the member's usual and customary behavior," 10 U.S.C. ? 654(b)(1)(A) (1998); "such con- 
duct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur," id. ? 654(b)(1)(B); and "the member does 
not have a propensity orintent to engage in homosexual cts," id. ? 654(b)(1)(E). 
103. See HALLEY, supra note 40, at 39-48. 
104. In Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582, 583 (D.C. Cir. 1963), for example, the court accepted 
that a veteran was not homosexual even though e had had four homosexual encounters a an ado- 
lescent. The court quoted the psychiatric evaluation of the appellant William Dew: 
"I decidedly do not believe [Dew] to have a homosexual personality disorder. I believe that 
the several incidents which e gave a history of having engaged in while age 18 and a fresh- 
man in college were isolated incidents primarily the result of his curiosity. I do not feel that 
isolated episodes of homosexual behavior can be considered abnormal or perverted, but rather 
a process of normal sexual investigation and curiosity. There is considerable evidence in the 
psychiatric literature that his allegation is true." 
Id. at 583 n.3 (quoting testimony ofpsychiatrist). 
105. See In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987) (excluding from defini- 
tion of homosexual in a proposed adoption statute those persons who, for example, had had one 
homosexual experience during adolescence, but who then engaged in exclusively heterosexual 
behavior). 
106. See Freitag v. Freitag, 242 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (deciding that man's 
confession of homosexual experiences prior to marriage did not mean he had "a true case of homo- 
sexuality"). 
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These exemptions can be read as precluding aberrant acts of same-sex desire 
from tainting an individual with a homosexual identity. 
Since bisexuality is also a stigmatized i entity, we would expect hat 
isolated homoerotic conduct would not earn an individual  bisexual ascrip- 
tion. The evidence already adduced supports his, as it suggests that indi- 
viduals maintain heterosexual (rather than bisexual or homosexual) identities 
despite isolated homosexual conduct.107 My definition fbisexuality thus 
also excludes individuals who only have incidental or occasional same-sex 
desire.108 In the interest of symmetry, my definition further xcludes indi- 
viduals who only have incidental or occasional cross-sex desire. This elimi- 
nates from the bisexual category those who, for example, experimented with 
homosexual ctivity intheir young adulthood but then engaged in completely 
heterosexual activity for the rest of their adult lives (or vice versa). 
To summarize, my analysis adopts a restricted desire-based definition f
bisexuality. I first chose and defended desire as the axis of definition. I then 
placed two restrictions on the desire-based definition: (1) I defined esire as 
sexual appetite; and (2) I required more than incidental desire for both sexes 
before classifying anindividual sbisexual. The definition is not presented 
as perfect, even for these purposes, but simply as workable.109 Having de- 
fined bisexuality inthis way, I now examine what he major sexuality studies 
say about the relative incidence of bisexuality and homosexuality in the 
population. 
2. The studies. 
How do the major sexuality studies describe the relative numbers of bi- 
sexuals and homosexuals inthe population? I expected to find many secon- 
dary sources that set forth the answer to this question. To my surprise, this 
proved not to be the case.110 This might be explained by a certain reluctance 
to use the existing studies for any purpose, given that they suffer from a
number of problems. These include problems with methodology in particu- 
lar studies, problems with obtaining truthful accounts in any study, and 
problems with calibrating orientation even assuming truthful accounts. 
107. See notes 100-106 supra and accompanying text. 
108. I address the question of what constitutes "incidental or occasional desire" below. See 
note 146 infra nd accompanying text. 
109. The definition, for example, makes no attempt to calibrate "the erotic appeal of trans- 
gression," GARBER, supra note 11, at 29; the intensity ofdesire, see generally Michael D. Storms, 
Theories o/Sexual Orientation, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 783 (1980); or the ways in 
which desire is connected to other aspects of an individual's self-conception (such as her politics or 
self-identification), see SEDGWICK, supra note 4, at 25-26. 
1 10. The source that came closest o a systematic comparison of the relative incidence of bi- 
sexuality and homosexuality was Fox, supra note 79, at 16-17. Even this source, however, left out 
many of the major studies. 
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These are serious issues that anyone deploying the studies hould address, 
and I do so below.",1 
The belief that these problems are keeping people from utilizing the 
studies, however, is probably incorrect. The famous ten percent figure for 
homosexuals, for example, arises from the Kinsey studies.112 This suggests 
that it is not a generic use of the studies, but rather specific uses of them, that 
are being suppressed. The stark discrepancy between the popularization f
the Kinsey findings on homosexuality and the lack of popularization fthe 
Kinsey findings on bisexualityl13 suggests that bisexual invisibility provides 
an alternative explanation for the absence of such comparisons. I therefore 
thought i useful to go through the major sexuality studies and to make a 
systematic comparison. 
In evaluating the "studies that purport to tell about sex in America,"114 
Robert T. Michael and his colleagues discussed seven major studies115: the 
Kinsey study (which is actually comprised of separate studies for men16 and 
womenl17), the Playboy study,118 the Redbook study,l19 the Hite study,120 the 
Masters and Johnson study,121 the Janus and Janus tudy,122 and the Laumann 
study.123 They also attested to the reliability oftwo unnamed studies from 
France and England, which are identifiable ased on their other work as the 
11 1. See notes 177-186 infra and accompanying text. 
11 2. See, e.g., BRUCE BAWER, A PLACE AT THE TABLE: THE GAY INDIVIDUAL IN AMERICAN 
SOCIETY 82 (1993) ("From the appearance of the Kinsey Reports in 1948 and 1953 until very re- 
cently, it was a truism that about 10 percent of Americans are homosexual."); Jennifer Gerarda 
Brown, Competitive F deralism and the Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 
S. CAL. L. REV. 745, 776 (1995) ("Since 1948, when Alfred C. Kinsey and his associates released 
their path-breaking study, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, the oft-cited statistic is that ten 
percent of the population is gay."). 
113. See MARTIN S. WEINBERG, COLIN J. WILLIAMS & DOUGLAS W. PRYOR, DUAL 
ATTRACTION: UNDERSTANDING BISEXUALITY 4 (1994) (noting that Kinsey's findings about bi- 
sexuality "have been generally ignored"). 
114. ROBERT T. MICHAEL, JoHN H. GAGNON, EDWARD 0. LAUMANN & GINA KOLATTA, 
SEX IN AMERICA: A DEFINITIVE SURVEY 15 (1994). It bears note that this is a companion volume 
to the Laumann study, see LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 75, written by the same researchers who 
conducted that study. 
115. See MICHAEL ET AL., supra note 1 14, at 15-25. 
1 16. K[NSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 5. 
1 17. KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 6. 
118. The Michael study does not provide a citation for the Playboy study. As there are a 
number of Playboy studies to which it could refer, I do not attempt a citation here. 
119. CAROL TAVRIS & SUSAN SADD, THE REDBOOK REPORT ON FEMALE SEXUALITY 
(1975). 
120. SHERE HITE, THE HITE REPORT: A NATIONWIDE STUDY ON FEMALE SEXUALITY 
(1976). 
121. WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON, HOMOSEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE 
(1979). 
122. SAMUEL S. JANUS & CYNTHIA L. JANUS, THE JANUS REPORT ON SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 
(1993). 
123. LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 75. 
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Spira study124 and the Wellings study.l25 Other sources corroborate that his 
list is a fairly comprehensive rendering ofthe major sexuality studies.126 
I narrowed this list of nine studies in two ways. First, I eliminated the 
studies-the Redbook study,127 the Hite study,128 and the Spira study129-that 
did not include data sufficient to permit a comparison of the relative inci- 
dences of bisexuals and homosexuals inthe population. I then eliminated the 
Playboy study because I thought a magazine study was likely to be less accu- 
rate and less credible than the other studies.130 This left five studies that I felt 
usefully compared the incidences of bisexuality and homosexuality. 
The five studies defined sexual orientation differently, each using some 
pernutation of the three axes of desire, conduct, and self-identification.131 
Where possible, I adjusted the definition used by the study to conform tomy 
restricted desire-based definition fbisexuality. As the studies used different 
definitions, and as even studies using the same definition used different 
scales132 or measures,133 it is not surprising that he studies differ widely in 
124. See ALFRED SPIRA, NATHALIE BAJOS & THE ACSF GROUP, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND 
AIDS (1994). 
125. KAYE WELLINGS, JULIA FIELD, ANNE JOHNSON & JANE WADSWORTH, SEXUAL BE- 
HAVIOR iN BRITAIN: THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF SEXUAL ATTITUDES AND LIFESTYLES (1994). 
126. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Monogamy More Prevalent han Believed, Survey Finds, L.A. 
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 7, 1994, at NI (noting popularity ofHite, Redbook, and Playboy studies); Eliza- 
beth Valk Long, To Our Readers, TIME, Oct. 17, 1994, at 4, 4 (indicating that he Hite, Laumann, 
and Masters and Johnson reports were featured ascover stories in Time magazine). 
127. The Redbook survey asked a sample of women whether they had had a "sexual experi- 
ence with another woman" since the age of 18, without asking about whether the women who had 
had such experiences had also had sexual experiences with men. TAVRIS & SADD, supra note 119, 
at 1 63. 
128. The Hite Report asked a sample of women the question "Do you prefer sex with men, 
women, yourself, or not at all?" HITE, supra note 120, at 261. The report noted: "A hundred and 
forty-four women in this study (8 percent) said they preferred sex with women. Another seventy- 
three identified themselves a 'bisexual,' and eighty-four more women had had experiences with 
both men and women but did not answer as to preference (another 9percent)." Id. This statement 
could be read to mean that 8% of women could be characterized as lesbian, while 9% could be 
characterized as bisexual. The question, however, is infelicitously worded for my purposes, given 
that preference for women as sex partners might not be an exclusive or even a strong preference. 
Similar problems arise when one tries to characterize the remaining 9% as bisexual, given that it 
probably includes individuals with only incidental experiences with one sex (who are not consid- 
ered bisexual under my definition). Thus, while the Hite Report is widely known, I do not rely on it 
here. 
129. The Spira study does not clearly distinguish between homosexuals and bisexuals, making 
a comparison of the incidence of these two groups impossible. See generally SPIRA ET AL., supra 
note 124. 
130. Had I not already eliminated it, the Redbook study would also have been excluded on 
this basis. 
131. See notes 136-176 infra nd accompanying text. 
132. Compare KiNSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 5, at 639-41 (arraying individuals according 
to the criteria of desire or behavior on a seven-point scale), with WELLrNGS ETAL., supra note 125, 
at 179 (arraying individuals according to the criteria of desire or behavior on a five-point scale). 
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many of their esults. For example, according to these studies, bisexuals are 
estimated to comprise anywhere from 0.2 percent134 to fifteen percent135 of 
the total population. What is surprising, however, is that each study found 
that the incidence of bisexuality was greater than or comparable to the inci- 
dence of homosexuality. 
a. Kinsey (1948 & 1953). 
Begin at the beginning,136 with Alfred Kinsey's foundational studies of 
sexual behavior in the human male'37 and female.138 Inboth studies, Kinsey 
defined sexual orientation according to a combination fdesire ("psychosex- 
ual response"'39) and conduct ("overt sexual experience"I40), without reliance 
on self-identification.141 Based on this definition, he created the famous 
"Kinsey scale," which limned a sexual orientation continuum spanning from 
0 to 6.142 The numbers denoted the following orientations: 
0-No homosexual contacts involving psychic or physical response; exclusive 
heterosexual contacts 
1-Incidental homosexual contacts; frequent heterosexual contacts 
2-More than incidental homosexual contacts; but more frequent heterosexual 
contacts 
3-Equal homosexual nd heterosexual contacts 
4-More than incidental heterosexual contacts; but more frequent homosexual 
contacts 
5-Incidental heterosexual contacts; frequent homosexual contacts 
6-No heterosexual contacts; exclusive homosexual contacts143 
133. Compare the definition of a Kinsey 1 in KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 5, at 639-41, 
and KiNSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 6, at 471, with the definition of a Kinsey 1 in MASTERS & 
JOHNSON, supra note 121, at 14-15. For more on this comparison, see note 154 infra. 
134. WELLINGS ET AL., supra note 125, at 183. 
135. See KiNSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 5, at 650-5 1. 
136. This analysis marches through the studies chronologically in order to provide a sense of 
the timeline on which the studies were conducted. It is probably worth pointing out, however, that 
the first wo studies, which were conducted before 1980, are fundamentally different from the last 
three, which were all conducted in the 1990s. For example, it is somewhat surprising that the Kin- 
sey studies remain the most widely cited of the studies, despite the fact that they were conducted in 
an era where sexual mores were dramatically different. See Mezey, supra note 8, at 104 (noting 
that Kinsey's work is still the most "widely cited research on sexuality in the United States"). 
137. KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 5. 
138. KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 6. 
139. KiNSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 6, at 471; KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 5, at 
647. 
140. KiNSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 6, at 471; KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 5, at 
647. 
141. See KiNSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 6, at 471-72; KiNSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 
5, at 639-41. 
142. See KiNSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 6, at 471-72; KiNSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 
5, at 639-41. 
143. See KiNSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 6, at 471-72; KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 
5, at 639-41. 
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This scale has proved immensely influential, not only in subsequent stud- 
ies,144 but also in more popular literature.145 
While Kinsey resisted breaking this continuum into the three categories 
of heterosexual, bisexual, and homosexual,146 it will be useful for me to do 
so. I defined bisexuality earlier as the ability to experience desire in a more 
than incidental way for both men and women. Because Kinsey himself cre- 
ated categories of incidental same-sex desire or behavior (Kinsey 5s) and 
incidental cross-sex desire or behavior (Kinsey Is), it is easy to restrict his 
scale to fit my definition. I therefore categorize Kinsey Os and Is as "hetero- 
sexual," Kinsey 2s, 3s, and 4s as "bisexual," and Kinsey 5s and 6s as "homo- 
sexual." However, because Kinsey did not disaggregate d sire and conduct, 
a complete adaptation of his standard to mine is impossible. To the extent 
that his definition captured individuals who had sexual conduct with both 
sexes without desire for both sexes, it will be overinclusive. 
Under this definition, what is the ratio f bisexuals to homosexuals inthe 
Kinsey studies? Kinsey found that "25 per cent of the male population ha[d] 
more than incidental homosexual experience or reactions (i.e., rate[d] from 
2-6) for at least three years between the ages of 16 and 55,"147 while "10 per 
cent of the males [were] more or less exclusively homosexual (i.e., rate[d] 5
or 6) for at least three years between the ages of 16 and 55."148 Under his 
time and age restrictions, Kinsey thus found that fifteen percent of the male 
population fell within the bisexual range (Kinsey 2s, 3s, and 4s) while only 
ten percent of the male population fell within the homosexual range (Kinsey 
5s and 6s). For women, an average of ten percent of unmarried females and 
2.5 percent of married females rated from 2 to 6 "in each of the years be- 
tween twenty and thirty-five years of age."149 In contrast, only an average of 
four percent of unmarried females and less than one percent of married fe- 
males rated 5 or 6 "in each of the years between twenty and thirty-five years 
144. See, e.g., MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 121, at 8 (noting its deployment ofthe Kin- 
sey scale); WELLINGS ET AL., supra note 125, at 179 (noting its deployment ofa modified Kinsey 
scale). 
145. See, e.g., Veronica Groocock, Alfred C. Kinsey: A Public/Private Life, NEW STATES- 
MAN, Nov. 21, 1997, at 49 (reviewing book about Kinsey and his reports); William A. Henry, Born 
Gay?, TIME, July 26, 1993, at 36, 37 (noting Kinsey's estimate of the incidence of homosexuality in 
the population); John Leland, Bisexuality, NEWSWEEK, July 17, 1995, at 44, 47 (discussing Kin- 
sey's findings on bisexuality); Jonathan Weiner, The Gay Science, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 2, 
1995, at 35, 36 (discussing methodology and results of Kinsey report). 
146. See KiNSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 5, at 639 (noting that sexual orientation is better 
described as a continuum). Indeed, Kinsey cautioned that even his seven-point scale was a distor- 
tion of the continuum ofsexual orientation. Id. at 647 ("Finally, it should be emphasized again that 
the reality is a continuum, with individuals in the population occupying not only the seven catego- 
&es which are recognized here, but every gradation between each of the categories, aswell."). 
147. Id.at650. 
148. Id. at 651. 
149. KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 6, at 473. 
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of age."150 Under these time and age restrictions, Kinsey thus found that six 
percent of unmarried women and more than 1.5 percent of married women 
fell into the bisexual range, while only four percent of unmarried women and 
less than one percent of married women fell into the homosexual range. In 
the Kinsey studies, we see a remarkable consistency ofresult, in which the 
percentage ofbisexuals (Kinsey 2s, 3s, and 4s) is 1.5 times the percentage of
homosexuals (Kinsey 5s and 6s) for both men and women. 
b. Masters and Johnson (1979). 
The Masters and Johnson study also deployed the Kinsey scale.151 The 
study, however, involved only "homosexual" subjects-it admitted into its 
data pool only individuals whom the researchers deemed to be Kinsey Is to 
Kinsey 6s.'52 The limitation was almost certainly too strictly enforced-for 
example, "[t]he Kinsey 1 representatives were accepted into the program 
only if they could document that hey were currently living in a homosexual 
relationship ofat least three months' duration."153 This implies that he re- 
searchers were deploying the Kinsey scale in a different way than Kinsey 
himself did, for it is extremely doubtful that he Kinsey researchers would 
have classified as a Kinsey 1 any individual who had been involved in a 
same-sex relationship ofthat duration.154 The Masters and Johnson classifi- 
cation would thus underreport the number of individuals who would be bi- 
sexual under my definition. Despite this, however, the Masters and Johnson 
study also found that he incidence of bisexuality was greater than or compa- 
rable to the incidence of homosexuality. For men, the percentage ofbisexu- 
als (Kinsey 2s, 3s, and 4s) in the sample was 46.8 percent, while the percent- 
age of homosexuals (Kinsey 5s and 6s) was 48.9 percent.155 For women, the 
percentage of bisexuals was 59.8 percent, while the percentage of homo- 
sexuals was 36.6 percent.156 Thus, while the ratio of bisexual men to gay 
men was lower than that in the Kinsey study, the study still found that bisex- 
150. Id. at 473-74. 
151. MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 121, at 8. 
152. See id. at 14. 
153. Id. at 14-15. 
154. See KiNSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 6, at 471 ("Individuals are rated as I's if their 
psychosexual responses and/or overt experience are directed almost entirely toward individuals of 
the opposite sex, although they incidentally make psychosexual responses to their own sex, and/or 
have incidental sexual contacts with individuals of their own sex.... Such persons make few if any 
deliberate attempts orenew their homosexual contacts.") (emphases added); KrNSEY ET AL., MALE 
supra note 5, at 639 ("Individuals are rated 1's if they have only incidental homosexual contacts 
which have involved physical or psychic response, or incidental psychic response without physical 
contact."). The individuals described as Kinsey Is by Masters and Johnson seem highly unlikely to 
meet these criteria. 
155. See MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 121, at 29. 
156. See id at 32. 
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ual men existed in comparable numbers to gay men. And the ratio of bisex- 
ual women to lesbians was greater than that found in the Kinsey study. 
c. Janus and Janus (1993). 
The Janus tudy relied on self-identification alone, asking subjects to la- 
bel themselves a heterosexual, homosexual, orbisexual.157 It is thus impos- 
sible to ascertain how subjects in the Janus pool would be defined according 
to my restricted desire-based definition. But it nonetheless bears note that 
the study reported a roughly one-to-one ratio f bisexuals to homosexuals for 
both men and women.158 Among male respondents, five percent self- 
identified as bisexual while four percent self-identified as homosexual.159 
Among female respondents, hree percent self-identified as bisexual, while 
two percent self-identified as homosexual.160 The report also suggested that 
there may have been some under-reporting of bisexuality: "In our interviews, 
we found ... respondents who identified themselves as heterosexual nd re- 
ported having homosexual relations [and] respondents who identified them- 
selves as homosexuals and reported that hey have heterosexual relations as 
well."161 
d. Wellings (1994). 
In a study of sexual behavior in Britain,162 researchers u ed a five-point 
scale (adapted from the seven-point Kinsey scale)163 to ascertain sexual at- 
traction and sexual experience among men and women. Attraction was not 
further defined,164 butsexual experience was defined as "any kind of contact 
with another person that [the subject] felt was sexual," including "kissing or 
touching, or intercourse orany other form of sex."165 Unlike the Kinsey 
study, the Wellings tudy disaggregated attraction a d experience, yielding 
two sets of data.166 The five-point scale, to which I have assigned numbers, 
was as follows: 
157. See JANUS & JANUS, supra note 122, at 70. 
158. See id. While the Janus report obtained ata on same-sex experiences, itdid not report 
similar data on bisexual experiences, making a comparison of the two on this axis impossible. 
159. Seeid. 
160. Seeid. 
161. Id. These individuals could, of course, be Kinsey ls and Kinsey 5s respectively, in
which case it would not be underreporting of bisexuality under my definition. 
162. WELLINGS ET AL., supra note 125. 
163. Seeid. at 179. 
164. See id. at 181. 
165. Id. 
166. See id. 
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Wellings 0-only heterosexual attraction/experience 
Wellings 1-mostly heterosexual attraction/experience 
Wellings 2-both heterosexual and homosexual ttraction/experience 
Wellings 3-mostly homosexual ttraction/experience 
Wellings 4-only homosexual ttraction/experiencel67 
The Wellings scale is both easier and harder to adapt to my definition of 
sexual orientation than the Kinsey scale. It is easier in that the Wellings 
scale disaggregates desire and conduct, thereby permitting the isolation of 
desire. It is harder in that the Wellings scale does not clearly distinguish 
between incidental desire (or conduct) and nonincidental desire (or conduct). 
To be consistent with the Kinsey-based bisexual category above, the bisexual 
category should include (1) all Wellings 2s; and (2) some but not all Wel- 
lings Is; and (3) some but not all Wellings 3s. I therefore indicate the num- 
ber of "bisexuals" as a range extending from a narrow underinclusive defini- 
tion (ust Wellings 2s) to a broad overinclusive definition (Wellings Is, 2s, 
and 3s). By the same logic, I indicate the number of "homosexuals" as a 
range extending from a narrow definition (ust Wellings 4s) to a broad defi- 
nition (Wellings 3s and 4s). 
Insofar as attraction was concerned, for men, 0.5 percent (narrow defini- 
tion) to 5.0 percent (broad definition) were attracted to both men and women, 
while 0.5 percent (narrow definition) to 1.0 percent (broad definition) were 
attracted (almost) exclusively to men.168 For women, 0.2 percent (narrow 
definition) to 4.2 percent (broad definition) were attracted to both men and 
women, while 0.3 percent (narrow definition) to 0.5 percent (broad defini- 
tion) were attracted (almost) exclusively to women.169 The Wellings study 
thus also found bisexuals to exist in numbers greater than or comparable to 
the number of homosexuals.170 
167. See id. at 183. 
168. See id. 
169. See id. 
170. The ratio of bisexuals to homosexuals according to the behavior-based definition was 
similar to that generated under the desire-based definition. In its behavior inquiry, the Wellings 
study asked two different sets of questions. The first set was similar to the attraction-based question 
described above. See id. at 182; note 165 supra and accompanying text. It determined that for 
men, 0.3% (narrow definition) to4.8% (broad definition) had sexual experience with both men and 
women, while 0.4% (narrow definition) to1.0% (broad definition) had sexual experience (almost) 
exclusively with men. See WELLINGS ET AL., supra note 125, at 183. For women, 0.1% (narrow 
definition) to2.5% (broad definition) had sexual experience with both men and women, while 0. 1% 
(narrow definition) to 0.3% (broad definition) had sexual experience (almost) exclusively with 
women. See id. 
The study asked a separate set of questions pertaining tothe exclusiveness of same-sex experi- 
ence. Men and women were asked about the sex of their sexual partners over different time peri- 
ods-(1) ever; (2) in the last five years; (3) in the last two years; and (4) in the last year. Id. at 209. 
For men, the percentage of those with both male and female partners a opposed to the percentage 
of those with exclusively male partners for these time periods was as follows: (1) 3.4% v. 0.3% 
ever; (2) 0.8% v. 0.6% in the last five years; (3) 0.5% v. 0.6% in the last two years; and (4) 0.4% v. 
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e. Laumann (1994). 
The Laumann study categorized sexual orientation separately according 
to all three of the common indicia-desire, conduct, and self- 
identification.171 Subjects were asked to complete the phrase "In general are 
you sexually attracted to . . ." with one of five responses: "(1) only men; (2) 
mostly men; (3) both men and women; (4) mostly women; and (5) only 
women."172 The scale for attraction is thus identical to the five-point Wel- 
lings scale; I therefore finesse the difficulties of mapping this onto my defi- 
nition in the same way as above.173 For men, 0.6 percent (narrow definition) 
to 3.9 percent (broad definition) were attracted to both men and women, 
while 2.4 percent (narrow definition) to 3.1 percent (broad definition) re- 
ported attraction to men only.174 For women, 0.8 percent (narrow definition) 
to 4.1 percent (broad definition) reported attraction to both men and women, 
while 0.3 percent (narrow definition) to 0.9 percent (broad definition) re- 
ported attraction to women only.175 Taking the narrow and broad definitions 
as setting the endpoints of a range, the percentages of "bisexuals" are again 
greater than or comparable to those of "homosexuals."176 
0.7% in the last year. See id. For women, the percentage of those with both female and male part- 
ners as opposed to the percentage of those with exclusively female partners for these time periods 
was as follows-(1) 1.7% v. 0.1% ever; (2) 0.5% v. 0.2% in the last five years; (3) 0.2% v. 0.2% in 
the last two years; and (4) 0.2% v. 0.2% in the last year. See id. Under both sets of questions, the 
percentage of individuals having sex with both men and women was greater than or comparable to 
the percentage of individuals having sex only with their own sex. See id. 
171. See LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 75, at 31 1. 
172. Id. at 658. 
173. See note 168 supra and accompanying text. 
174. See LAUMANN ETAL., supra note 75, at 31 1. This statistic provides the most support for 
the nonexistence thesis of any in the studies urveyed. Under the narrow definition there are four 
times more homosexuals than there are bisexuals. If one takes the midpoint of each range, how- 
ever, the ratio f bisexuals to homosexuals i close to parity (2.25: 2.75). 
175. See id. 
176. In studying conduct, the Laumann study again asked a set of questions imilar to that 
asked in the Wellings tudy. Subjects were asked about the sex of their sexual partners over differ- 
ent time periods-(1) since puberty, (2) since age 18, (3) in the past five years, and (4) in the last 
year. Id. For men, the percentages of those with both male and female partners a opposed to the 
percentage of those with exclusively male partners for these time periods were as follows: (1) 5.8% 
v 0.6% since puberty; (2) 4.0% v. 0.9% since age 18; (3) 2.1% v. 2.0% in the past five years; and 
(4) 0.7% v. 2.0% in the past year. Id. For women, the statistics were as follows: (1) 3.3% v. 0.2% 
since puberty; (2) 3.7% v. 0.4% since age 18; (3) 1.4% v. 0.8% in the past five years; and (4) 0.3% 
v. 1.0% in the past year. Id. 
When asked to self-identify, 2.0% of men self-identified as "homosexual" and 0.8% of men 
self-identified as "bisexual." Id. 0.9% of women self-identified as lesbian, while 0.5% of women 
identified asbisexual. Id. 
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f. Critiques of the studies. 
The five studies considered above all came to roughly the same conclu- 
sion about the relative incidence of bisexuality tohomosexuality-namely, 
that he incidence of bisexuality was greater than or comparable to the inci- 
dence of homosexuality. While three problems with these studies merit dis- 
cussion, none ultimately damages the validity of this conclusion for my pur- 
poses. 
The first problem concerns the flawed methodology of some of the 
studies. The primary methodological flaw concerned sampling practices. As 
the Laumann researchers noted, the Kinsey studies, the Masters and Johnson 
study, and the Janus and Janus tudy all failed to engage in probability sam- 
pling.177 Of the studies canvassed above, only the Laumann study and the 
Wellings study used such sampling.178 Another flaw related to the time vari- 
able. Again, all studies but the Laumann and Wellings tudies failed to ask 
questions that adequately narrowed the timeframe in which individuals expe- 
rienced esire. This led these studies to some version of the "once a bisex- 
ual, always a bisexual" position, in which a woman who had more than inci- 
dental desire for a woman in her adulthood but who had subsequently expe- 
rienced only desire for men would still be considered bisexual. 
The Laumann study and the Wellings tudy, however, did not suffer 
from either of these flaws. Both studies engaged in probability sampling, 
and both took the time variable into account.179 And the findings of these 
two studies about the relative numbers of bisexuals and homosexuals were 
comparable tothe findings of the other studies. Thus, even if we accept hat 
the Kinsey, Masters and Johnson, and Janus and Janus tudies were illegiti- 
mate, this only means that here are fewer studies to support the same con- 
clusion. 
The second problem isone endemic to all sexuality studies, which is the 
problem of having to rely on subjective accounts to determine s xual orien- 
tation. Because desire and conduct were not calibrated irectly by these 
studies, researchers were forced to rely on individual ccounts of both.180 In 
this sense, distinguishing desire and conduct on the one hand from self- 
identification on the other is slightly misleading, since all of the data relied 
on some form of self-identification. The fact hat all of the information col- 
177. See LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 75, at 44, 46 (criticizing Masters and Johnson study 
and Janus tudy); MICHAEL ET AL., supra note 1 14, at 17 (criticizing Kinsey studies). 
178. See LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 75, at 46. 
179. See notes 170, 176 supra. 
180. While attempts have been made to ascertain arousal (which is taken as a proxy for de- 
sire) directly, see ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 173-74 (1997), the studies canvassed here made no 
such attempts. 
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lected was based on subjective accounts raises the concern that individuals 
gave untruthful responses. 
For my purposes, the most damaging way in which subjects could have 
dissembled would have been for homosexual subjects to have said they were 
bisexual. If these homosexual subjects had engaged in such "defense bi- 
sexuality," there would have been underreporting of homosexuality and 
overreporting of bisexuality inthese studies.181 The confidentiality assured 
in all of the studies,l82 however, diminishes the motive to dissemble in this 
way. Moreover, bisexuals also have incentives to characterize themselves as 
homosexuall83 or heterosexual,184 so we could also expect some overreport- 
ing of homosexuality and underreporting of bisexuality. 
The third and most general concern is that no study will ever be able to 
tell us who is straight, who is gay, and who is bisexual. There are weak and 
strong versions of this concern. The weak version is that even if all indi- 
viduals told the truth as they knew it, some may not have known the truth.185 
The studies would then be flawed because they relied on some subjects with 
incomplete knowledge. This will, of course, always be a problem with sur- 
vey data. Moreover, assuming that there is a truth to be known, I think it is 
reasonable to assume that he studies would give a closer approximation of 
the actual number of bisexuals than more quotidian forms of information. 
This is because the studies provided a relatively self-reflective andconfiden- 
tial forum in which individuals could articulate a stigmatized desire. But this 
does not mitigate he strong version of the concern, which is that experiences 
of sexual orientation are so different as not to be commensurable. Even as- 
suming this, however, the studies might hen be read not to ascertain the ac- 
tual number of bisexuals, but rather to underscore a disjunction between aca- 
demic and popular discourse. In other words, we might ask why academic 
knowledge about the number of homosexuals trickled so quickly into main- 
stream culture,186 while academic knowledge (produced in the same studies) 
181. See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text. 
182. See JANUS & JANUS, supra note 122, at 5 (discussing confidential nature of study); 
KINSEY ET AL., FEMALE, supra note 6, at 59 (same); KINSEY ET AL., MALE, supra note 5, at 44-45 
(same); LAUMANN ET AL., supra note 75, at 71-73 (same); MASTERS & JOHNSON, supra note 121, 
at 49 (same); WELLINGS ET AL., supra note 125, at 15, 20 (same). 
183. For example, bisexuals have an incentive to characterize themselves a gay in order to 
interact socially with other sexual orientation groups. See RUST, CHALLENGE, supra note 71, at 95- 
98 (noting that some lesbians refuse to interact with or date openly bisexual women). They may 
also self-identify as gay simply because this is the most readily available template for same-sex 
desire. See text accompanying otes 397-398, infra. 
184. Bisexuals have an incentive to characterize themselves a straight to partake of hetero- 
sexual privilege. See Brownfain, supra note 83, at 173 (describing married bisexuals who pass as 
straight). 
185. See, e.g., SEDGWICK, supra note 4, at 26 (noting that Western romance tradition, in- 
cluding psychoanalysis,  predicated on the assumption that our sexual desires are not transparent 
to ourselves). 
186. See note 112 supra and accompanying text. 
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about he number of bisexuals did not. This in itself is suggestive of the era- 
sure of the conceptual category of bisexuality, even if that category has no 
stable referent. 
C. Bisexual Erasure as a Cause of Bisexual Invisibility 
In this Part, Imade two claims. My first claim was that bisexuals are in- 
visible. In making that claim, I specified that while bisexuals are affected by 
at least three different kinds of invisibility, only one-the invisibility ofbi- 
sexuals qua bisexuals-is the subject of this analysis. I maintained that he 
best way to isolate the extent of this kind of invisibility was to compare the 
relative visibilities of homosexuality and bisexuality. I then adduced both 
statistical and sociological evidence to demonstrate that bisexual invisibility 
is far more pervasive than its homosexual counterpart. 
My second claim was that this invisibility betokens bisexual erasure 
rather than bisexual nonexistence. This required me to be more precise about 
my definition fbisexuality. I therefore adopted and defended a restricted 
desire-based definition. Applying this definition (where possible) to five 
major sexuality studies, I found that he studies all demonstrated hat he in- 
cidence of bisexuals is greater than or comparable tothe incidence of homo- 
sexuals. 
Putting these two claims together, I conclude that bisexuals are invisible 
in modem American society and that this invisibility arises from erasure 
rather than from nonexistence. I now turn to the reasons for this erasure. 
II. THE EPISTEMIC CONTRACT OF BISEXUAL ERASURE 
There are at least three different explanations for why bisexuals are be- 
ing erased in popular culture. While I describe all three, I focus on only one 
of them-the political explanation. This political explanation posits that bi- 
sexuals are being erased because the two most powerful sexual orientation 
constituencies-self-identified straights and self-identified gays-have mu- 
tual investments in the erasure of bisexuals.187 I call this the epistemic con- 
tract of bisexual erasure. I then support the existence of such mutual inter- 
187. This hypothesis comporis with Naomi Mezey's insightful account of bisexuality, which 
contends that "those who walk on either side of the boundary between heterosexuality and homo- 
sexuality tirelessly repair and define" that boundary to deny bisexuals any ontic ground. See 
Mezey, supra note 8, at 101. My analysis, however, extends beyond Mezey's in positing that the 
investments that straights and gays have in bisexual erasure subsume more than the desire to pre- 
serve the "ethics" of heterosexuality and homosexuality. Compare id. at 112-20 (explaining bisex- 
ual erasure by noting heterosexual and homosexual ethics), with text accompanying otes 258-394, 
infra (explaining bisexual erasure by noting investments in stabilizing orientation, preserving the 
importance ofsex as a distinguishing trait, and maintaining orms of monogamy). 
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ests by demonstrating how both straights and gays use the same strategies to
erase bisexuals. 
A. Different Explanations 
There are three xplanations for why bisexuality is invisible relative to 
homosexuality and heterosexuality. These explanations-which I call ontic, 
cognitive, and political-are general explanations for why any intermediate 
category that straddles a binary opposition might be rendered invisible. 
While all of these explanations are deeply intertwined, I will argue that he 
political explanation is the most powerful. 
The ontic explanation is that we see things as binaries because they are 
binaries.188 In describing how his philosophical predecessors adopted oppo- 
sites as principles, Aristotle noted that "'they give no reason for doing so, but 
are, as it were, compelled by the truth itself."'189 A variety of modem think- 
ers have also maintained that binary classifications reflect "the twoness of 
reality,"190 orreal oppositions in the world.191 This is not necessarily to say 
that all aspects of reality are composed of opposed principles, merely that 
some-such as night/day, male/female, and life/death-seemingly are.192 
Under this theory, the binary opposition between gay and straight is such a 
"real" binary, and bisexuality iserased because it does not exist. 
The ontic theory may be assailed on empirical and nonempirical 
grounds. The previous Part contested this theory by noting that studies have 
shown that he category of bisexuality is just as "real" as the category of ho- 
mosexuality.193 One could also make a nonempirical case for skepticism of 
the straight/gay binary based on its suspicious convenience. The straight/gay 
binary is often seen as a simple back formation from the male/female binary, 
insofar as the sexual orientation binary categorizes individuals according to 
the sex of their object choice.194 But there is no reason to believe that be- 
cause there are only two sexes (assuming for the sake of argument that his is 
188. See RODNEY NEEDHAM, COUNTERPOINTS 35 (1987) (noting position that oppositions 
are "an unevadable response of consciousness to its environment"). 
189. G.E.R. LLOYD, POLARITY AND ANALOGY 15 & n.2 (1966) (quoting Aristotle's Physics). 
190. David Maybury-Lewis, The Quest for Harmony, in THE ATTRACTION OF OPPOSITES 1, 
12 (David Maybury-Lewis & Uri Almagor eds., 1989) (quoting C.R. HALLPIKE, THE FOUNDA- 
TIONS OF PRIMITIVE THOUGHT 234 (1979)). 
191. See Maybury-Lewis, supra note 190, at 12 (citing HALLPIKE, supra note 190); ROBERT 
HERTZ, The Pre-Eminence of the Right Hand: A Study in Religious Polarity, in DEATH AND THE 
RIGHT HAND (1960); LLOYD, supra note 189. 
192. Maybury-Lewis, supra note 190, at 12. 
193. See text accompanying notes 110-186 supra. 
194. As I demonstrate below, the male/female binary may also (counterintuitively) be seen as 
a back formation from the straight/gay binary. See notes 339-341 infra and accompanying text. 
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true)l95 individuals will themselves break into two discrete categories based 
on desire for one sex or the other. If anything, it is counterintuitive hatwo 
sets of desired objects would lead to two corresponding sets of desiring sub- 
jects (each of which only desired one set of objects).196 Coffee and tea are 
two different objects, but we do not assume that all individuals break down 
into mutually exclusive sets of coffee drinkers and tea drinkers. 
The cognitive explanation is that here is a human tendency to under- 
stand things in terms of binaries.197 Inother words, even if the underlying 
reality isnot a set of binaries, our limited cognitive capacity as human beings 
leads us to apprehend complex phenomena interms of "[t]he extreme sim- 
plicity of ... binary structure," which "link[s] the fewest erms capable of 
sustaining a relation."198 This theory, which is a hallmark of structural an- 
thropology,199 posits that binary thinking is "a spontaneous and necessary act 
of the mind, such that it is to be found in every type of culture."200 Under 
this theory, bisexuality disappears as a category because of a human blind- 
ness to all intermediate categories. 
The cognitive theory can also be contested on empirical nd nonempiri- 
cal grounds. The empirical critique notes that our capture by binary episte- 
mology is by no means complete. The intensity ofbinary thinking varies 
across and within cultures,201 thereby demonstrating that it is not an inescap- 
able fact of human cognition. The existence of alternative cognitive models 
also substantiates his point-think of the infinite subdivision model of the 
continuum,202 or the triadic model of dialectical thinking ("thesis-antithesis- 
synthesis").203 This critique is supplemented bya nonempirical one. Bi- 
sexuality, after all, is not inimical to all binaries-consider the bisex- 
uallmonosexual binary. Thus, even if we believe that he human mind has a 
tendency to binarize, that does not explain why the straight/gay binary pre- 
vailed over the bisexual/monosexual binary. The answer to that question, I 
contend, ispolitical. 
195. As noted above, there is a growing literature challenging the binary nature of sex. See 
note 18 supra and accompanying text. 
196. See note 8 supra (discussing how two forms of desire lead analytically toat least four 
categories of persons). 
197. This view is perhaps most prominently associated with Claude Levi-Strauss. See gener- 
ally CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 217-44 (George Weidenfeld & Nicolson Ltd. 
trans., 1966) (observing that binary thinking manifests itself across a diverse array of societies). 
198. NEEDHAM, supra note 188, at xi. 
199. See Uri Almagor, Dual Organization Reconsidered, inTHE ATTRACTION F OPPOSITES, 
supra note 190, at 19, 19. 
200. NEEDHAM, supra note 188, at 1. 
201. See Maybury-Lewis, supra note 190, at 12. 
202. See NEEDHAM, supra note 188, at 230-31. 
203. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, Hegel's First Philosophy of Law, 62 TENN. L. REv. 823, 
839 (1995). 
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The political explanation is that some intermediate categories are harder 
to see because they are caught in the middle of a political struggle. Bisexu- 
ality is invisible not because we are innately blind to intermediate categories, 
but because agonistic politics have bifurcated the continuum we would oth- 
erwise see.204 Under this explanation, the clash between opposed forces has 
compelled a choosing of sides and a denial of intermediate ground. In the 
remainder ofthis article, I concern myself solely with this political explana- 
tion. 
In considering how political struggle has erased bisexuals, I must first 
identify the relevant groups in that struggle. I believe that the relevant 
groups are still heterosexuals, homosexuals, and bisexuals. But here a cru- 
cial shift in definition ccurs. When these groups define themselves politi- 
cally, they define themselves according to self-identification rather than 
through conduct or desire. In speaking of the straight, gay, or bisexual in- 
vestments inbisexual erasure, I thus mean the investments of seif-identified 
straights, elf-identified gays, and self-identified bisexuals. 
My hypothesis that bisexuals remain invisible because both self- 
identified straights and self-identified gays have overlapping political inter- 
ests in bisexual erasure. It is as if self-identified straights and self-identified 
gays have concluded that whatever their other disagreements, they will agree 
that bisexuals do not exist. Put another way, the sexual orientation contin- 
uum that runs from straight through bisexual to gay is a "loopified" one, in 
which straights and gays are actually closer to each other on this issue than 
either group is to bisexuals.205 Because of this, self-identified straights and 
self-identified gays enter into what I will call an epistemic contract of bisex- 
ual erasure. 
B. The Epistemic Contract Defined 
As I define it, an epistemic contract is a contract inthe sense that a social 
contract isa contract. In other words, it is not a conscious arrangement be-
204. See generally GARBER, supra note 11, at 80 (arguing that political struggle isdefined by 
opposite poles which suppress the middle ground); Mezey, supra note 8, at 112-20 (noting the strict 
political enforcement of rigid categories of sexual identity). 
205. Cf Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REv. 913, 934-35 
(1992) (noting incentives for political parties at opposite nds of a political continuum to unite 
against he middle of the continuum). The term "loopification" appears to be Duncan Kennedy's 
coinage. See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1349, 1354-57 (1982) (describing theory of "loopification" inwhich the ends of a con- 
tinuum are closer to each other than either is to the middle). Other scholars have also noted this 
political phenomenon. See, e.g. Herbert McClosky & Dennis Chong, Similarities and Differences 
Between Left-Wing and Right-Wing Radicals, 15 BRIT. J. POL. Sci. 329, 343 (1985) (noting that the 
"programmatic d fferences between the radical eft and the radical right frequently act to obscure 
the characteristics that are shared by the two camps" including "intolerance ofambiguity"). 
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tween individuals, but rather a social norm that arises unconsciously.206 It 
might be fairly asked why the epistemic contract (or, for that matter, the so- 
cial contract) isexpressed asa contract asopposed to a norm. My answer is 
that I believe the contractual l nguage better captures the fact that the ar- 
rangement arises between distinct groups who enter it because of overlap- 
ping but not congruent interests. Norms appear to arise from society as a 
whole, while "social contracts" eem to arise out of the constituencies nto 
which society is fractured. "Don't ask, don't tell," for example, is a con- 
tractual formulation f the norm of gay silence that lays bare the interests 
(and implicitly the constituencies) involved: straights will not inquire if gays 
will not flaunt.207 The choice, however, isultimately semantic-one could 
easily rephrase the substance of what follows in the language of norms. 
The epistemic contract is epistemic nsofar as it relates to the nature of 
knowledge. It is a social arrangement about what can be acknowledged or
known. This arrangement arises between groups that have distinct but over- 
lapping interests inthe promulgation or repression fcertain kinds of knowl- 
edge. In this article, I focus on the latter-that is, on an epistemic contract 
that relates to what cannot be known. 
The epistemic contract is a political model that could be profitably ap- 
plied beyond the sexual orientation context o other intermediate id ntity 
categories. Multiracials, for example, can be readily analogized to bisexuals 
in many regards.208 Multiracials, like bisexuals, are alternatively defined 
according to universalizing definitions which state that all (or almost all) in- 
dividuals are multiracial,209 or according to minoritizing definitions which 
state that a small proportion fthe population ismultiracial.210 Multiracials, 
like bisexuals, are usually defined in the latter sense, and according to an 
analogously varied set of terms.211 As in the bisexual context, he tendency 
206. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 14 
(G.D.H. Cole trans., 1950) ("The clauses of this contract ... have perhaps never been formally set 
forth, [but] they are everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized ... 
207. See Yoshino, supra note 27, at 556. 
208. Ruth Colker's book Hybrid usefully analogizes the problematic bipolar model of orien- 
tation with those that obtain in the contexts of race, gender, and disability. See generally COLKER, 
HYBRID, supra note 9. 
209. See John A. Powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Categories Reconsid- 
ered, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 789, 797-98 (1997) (noting that if multiracial means that an individual has 
ancestry of different races, then "virtually everyone is multiracial"). 
210. See, e.g., Luther Wright, Jr., Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptual- 
izing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REv. 513, 557- 
58 (1995) (noting that biracial people, defined as people with parents of different recognized races, 
comprise roughly three percent of births in the United States). 
211. Such shifting definitions can be seen in the United States Census's categorization of in- 
dividuals with both white and black ancestry. From 1790, when the Census began to distinguish 
(based on third-party reports) between whites and blacks, to 1850, no intermediate category was 
recognized. See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, Afri- 
can Americans, and the US. Census, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1182 (1997). This is similar to mod- 
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to adopt narrow binarizing definitions ofrace can be traced to anxieties felt 
by both the dominant and the subordinate groups.212 Recently, self-identified 
multiracials, ike self-identified bisexuals, have organized to resist such bi- 
narizing definitions.2l3 And these self-identified multiracials, like self- 
identified bisexuals, face the dilemma of whether simply to add the interme- 
diate group as a third category or to deploy it to more deeply interrogate the 
principle of racial categorization.214 
At the same time, however, the political model adduced here clearly does 
not describe all intermediate categories. The contemporary American middle 
class, for example, is both an intermediate category (as its name would sug- 
gest) and much more visible than any other class.215 This should inspire 
caution in applying the model too quickly even to groups that seem superfi- 
cially to be greatly illuminated by it.216 I therefore constrain myself in this 
analysis to the context of sexual orientation. 
The epistemic contract of bisexual erasure is a particularly powerful one. 
This can be seen by contrasting it to the epistemic contract of homosexual 
erasure xemplified by the military's current "don't ask, don't tell" policy.217 
"Don't ask, don't tell" satisfies both criteria of an epistemic contract. It is a 
els of orientation that fail to recognize the bisexual possibility. See notes 226-232, 238-242 infra 
and accompanying text. From 1850 to 1910, the Census recognized an intermediate category of 
"mulattoes." See JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULATrOES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 24 (1995); Hickman, supra, at 1185. Indeed, in the 1890 census, enumerators were 
asked to categorize the intermediate span between black and white according to a set of named 
fractions (octoroon, quadroon, mulatto). See WILLIAMSON, supra, at 112; Hickman, supra, at 1186. 
This partitioned continuum is reminiscent of the Kinsey scale. See note 143 supra and accompa- 
nying text. After the census of 1920, however, the Census Bureau moved away from the named 
fractions rule to the "one drop rule." See WILLIAMSON, supra, at 114; Hickman, supra, at 1187. 
This rule of hypodescent could be analogized to the "one act rule" in the orientation context. See 
note 99 supra and accompanying text. 
212. See F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? ONE NATION'S DEFINITION 137 (1991) (noting 
that both blacks and whites support a binarizing "one drop rule"). 
213. See Hickman, supra note 211, at 1164-65. 
214. See id. at 1165 ("One wing of this new multiracial movement argues that a new 'multira- 
cial box' should be made available for the growing number of children of interracial marriages. 
Another wing of this movement, in books and law review articles, suggests that the addition of this 
category should be a part of a wholesale redefinition of the racial identities of most Americans."). 
215. This discrepancy in visibility between the middle class and other intermediate categories 
such as bisexuals and multi-racials may be due to the different incentives felt by the privileged class 
in each context. The "upper class" may feel pressure to erase itself in ways that heterosexuals and 
whites may not. See PETER W. COOKSON, JR. & CAROLrNE HODGES PERSELL, PREPARING FOR 
POWER: AMERICA'S ELITE BOARDrNG SCHOOLS 28 (1985) ("Part of the socialization for power is 
learning how to conceal wealth, or at least minimize its importance by never openly referring to it 
....'). I am indebted to Bruce Ackerman for raising the discrepancy, and to Zachary Potter for 
suggesting this explanation for it. 
216. Multiracials and bisexuals, for example, can be easily distinguished on a number of 
grounds, such as the fact that multi-racial identity is often thought o be genetic and heritable, while 
bisexual identity is often thought o be behavioral and not inherited. 
217. 10 U.S.C. ? 654 (1998). 
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contract insofar as it articulates the needs of two distinct constituencies- 
crudely, self-identified straights and self-identified gays. As conventionally 
told, each side gets something out of the policy2l8-self-identified straights 
secure a military in which homosexuality is repressed ("don't tell"); self- 
identified gays garner a military inwhich gays can ostensibly serve without 
being subjected to witchhunts or harassment ("don't ask").219 And "don't 
ask, don't tell" is epistemic nsofar as what is really at issue in the contract is
a joint repression of knowledge. Self-identified straights and self-identified 
gays have been led through their distinct but overlapping interests oagree 
that individuals in the military do not have to own what they know-that 
homosexuals exist in their anks. 
As I have argued elsewhere, the existence of the "don't ask, don't tell" 
policy signifies both continuity and discontinuity with prior social norms. 220 
It signifies continuity in that he policy did not spring full-fledged from the 
head of Congress, but rather grew out of the underlying culture.221 In other 
words, "don't ask, don't tell" arises out of a pervasive strategy ofsilence that 
has long affected gays in public ulture-a strategy that permits gays to live 
as equal citizens if and only if they agree to "pass" as straight.222 Atthe 
same time, however, "don't ask, don't tell" also signifies a breakdown ofthat 
underlying culture, for if that culture were still extant, there would be no 
need to codify it.223 
In contrast to "don't ask, don't tell," bisexual erasure as such needs no 
explicit legal enforcement. This is because bisexual erasure is still suffi- 
ciently rooted in social culture and thus appears natural, just as homosexual 
erasure appeared natural when "don't ask, don't tell" was so rooted. What 
explains the discrepancy? 
The answer is that straights and gays are the most powerful constituen- 
cies in both of these contracts, and that gays feel differently about homosex- 
ual erasure than they do about bisexual erasure. The epistemic contract of 
"don't ask, don't tell" is less a case of real interest convergence b tween 
straights and gays than it is a case of compromise. The policy splits the dif- 
218. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 40, at 92 (describing "don't ask, don't tell" as a 
compromise); Diane H. Mazur, The Unknown Soldier: A Critique of "Gays in the Military" Schol- 
arship and Litigation, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 223, 227-28 (1996) (same); Francisco Valdes, 
Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and 
"Sexual Orientation " in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 370 (1995) (same). 
219. There is evidence that the witchhunts have persisted under the "don't ask, don't tell" 
policy. See C. DIXON OSBURN & MICHELE M. BENECKE, SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEFENSE 
NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING CONTINUES: THE FIRST YEAR UNDER "DON'T ASK, DON'T 
TELL, DON'T PURSUE" 11 (1995) (noting documentation of 15 actual or attempted witchhunts un- 
der "don't ask, don't tell"). 
220. See Yoshino, supra note 27, at 556-57. 
221. See id.at556. 
222. See id. 
223. See id. at 556-57. 
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ference between the self-identified straight interest in the removal of gays 
from the military and the self-identified gayinterest inthe ability of gays to 
serve openly (although itstrongly favors the former).224 This is why this 
particular epistemic contract is so unstable-each side (and particularly the 
gay side) wants more than the status quo provides.225 Incontrast, he epis- 
temic ontract of bisexual erasure is, at least insofar as gays and straights are 
concerned, a case of real interest convergence. Both straights and gays, for 
different reasons, want bisexuals to be invisible. Because these two 
groups-which again are the most powerful sexual orientation constituen- 
cies-want this invisibility, his epistemic contract ismuch more stable. In- 
deed, it is so stable as not to be perceived asa contract a all. 
C. Strategies of Erasure 
The existence of a bilateral contract of bisexual erasure is supported by 
the fact hat both straights and gays engage in the same strategies ofbisexual 
erasure. There are three such strategies: (1) class erasure, (2) individual era- 
sure, and (3) delegitimation. These strategies imply the acceptance of suc- 
cessively stronger claims about bisexual existence-the first strategy does 
not recognize the category of "bisexuality"; the second acknowledges the 
category but excludes an individual from it; and the third accepts individual 
bisexuality asa stable identity but stigmatizes it.
1. Straight deployments ofthe strategies. 
Class erasure occurs when straights deny the existence of the entire bi- 
sexual category. This can occur explicitly orimplicitly. Afew decades ago, 
explicit denial appears to have been fairly common even among academic 
theorists, some of whom believed that all self-identified bisexuals were actu- 
ally homosexuals indenial.226 While the claim that "there is no such thing as 
bisexuality" remains part of the common wisdom today,227 perhaps the more 
prominent form of denial is now the implicit one. Such implicit denial often 
occurs through t e use of the straight/gay binary as a complete means of de- 
scribing all individuals.228 As discussed above,229 this was the strategy used 
224. See COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 9, at 64. 
225. Gay dissatisfaction with the status quo can be seen in the legal challenges to the policy. 
See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 631 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding "don't ask, don't tell" 
against constitutional challenge); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1424 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); 
Richenberg v.Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 
927 (4th Cir. 1996) (same). 
226. See Fox, supra note 79, at 21. One theorist, for example, maintained that bisexuality was 
"a state that has no existence beyond the word itself," that is, "an out-and-out fraud." EDMUND 
BERGLER, HOMOSEXUALITY: DISEASE OR WAY OF LIFE 80-89 (1956). 
227. GARBER, supra note 11, at 16. 
228. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text. 
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by the Romer Court. A more subtle strategy ofimplicit class erasure is the 
description fbisexuality as "bisexual chic" in the mainstream (and thus pre- 
sumptively straight) press.230 As the phrase suggests, bisexuality is here 
made visible as a phase, fashion, or fad-its appearance is inscribed with its 
imminent disappearance.231 Indeed, impending evanescence may be the pre- 
condition for visibility.232 
Individual erasure recognizes that bisexuals exist as a class, but contests 
that a particular individual is bisexual. Such challenges by straights often 
arise when a self-identified bisexual is accused of being a duplicitous ornas- 
cent homosexual.233 In either case, the bisexual self-ascription s seen as a 
"phase" from which an individual will ultimately emerge.234 Such erasure 
replicates the "phase" paradigm of bisexual chic at the level of the individ- 
ual-ontogeny here recapitulates phylogeny. Self-described bisexuality is
thus een not as a stable individual identity but a place from which a stable 
monosexual identity is acknowledged orchosen. 
Finally, delegitimation occurs when straights acknowledge the existence 
of individual bisexuals but attach a stigma to bisexuality. Itmay seem odd to 
characterize d legitimation as a strategy ofbisexual invisibility, given that it 
makes bisexuality more visible. But because it chills the expression of bi- 
sexuality by portraying it only in a negative way, I include it here. Common 
straight s ereotypes of bisexuals portray them as promiscuous, a  duplicitous, 
as closeted, and especially as bridges for HIV infection from the "high risk" 
gay population tothe "low risk" straight population.235 
229. See notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text. 
230. See, e.g., Bisexual Chic: Anyone Goes, NEWSWEEK, May 27, 1974, at 90, 90 (noting that 
bisexuality "was probably inevitable," since "his-and-her clothes, hair styles and role assignments 
blurred the line between the sexes until they overlapped, the only thing left o swap was sex itself'); 
The New Bisexuals, TIME, May 13, 1974, at 79 (describing fashionability of bisexuality); see also 
GARBER, supra note 1 1, at 18-24 (describing bisexual chic). 
231. See GARBER, supra note 11, at 20 (asking whether bisexual chic turns bisexuality into "a 
fashion-like platform shoes, bell-bottomed trousers, or double-breasted suits-that appears and 
then disappears, goes underground, only to be 'revived' with a difference?"). 
232. An analogy may be made to Leo Bersani's hypothesis that AIDS has made gays more 
visible in part because it promises their ultimate disappearance-gay visibility ismade most palat- 
able at the moment i s transience is underscored. LEO BERSANI, HOMOS 21 (1995). While obvi- 
ously less sinister, the concept of bisexual chic may operate in the same way, reassuring straight 
culture that it is safe to look at bisexuals by characterizing them as a passing fancy. 
233. See GARBER, supra note 1 1, at 145. 
234. The instability ofbisexuals, which is framed here in temporal terms as a "phase" argu- 
ment, can also be framed in spatial terms, as in descriptions ofbisexuals as being "on the fence." 
See, e.g., Amber Ault, Hegemonic Discourse in an Oppositional Community: Lesbian Feminist 
Stigmatization fBisexual Women, in QUEER STUDIES, supra note 15, at 204, 206. 
235. See Ochs, supra note 63, at 227. 
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2. Gay deployments of the strategies. 
That gays and lesbians would collude with straights inthe erasure of bi- 
sexuals is superficially surprising.236 As sexual minorities who have them- 
selves been rendered invisible, one would expect that gays and lesbians 
would be loath to assume the role of oppressor relative to other sexual mi- 
norities.237 Yet gays deploy all of the strategies ofbisexual erasure used by 
straights. This supports he thesis that bisexual invisibility must be under- 
stood not as the unilateral erasure of bisexuals by straights, but the bilateral 
erasure of bisexuals by both straights and gays. 
Self-identified gays deploy all three strategies ofbisexual erasure-class 
erasure, individual erasure, and delegitimation. Speaking of class erasure, 
Christopher James laments the phenomenon i  which a queer, gay, or lesbian 
theorist "excludes bisexuality as a relevant category of sexual identity," and 
then "claims behaviorally bisexual people or texts with bisexual characters or
content as 'queer,' gay,' or 'lesbian."'238 James goes on to give examples of 
scholarly texts that elide the bisexual category and unself-consciously cate- 
gorize individuals whom he believes would be more appropriately deemed 
bisexual as queer, gay, or lesbian.239 This practice of elision, of course, is 
not limited to the academy. As Marjorie Garber notes, popular compendi- 
ums of gay "lists," such as The Gay Book of Days240 and The Gay/Lesbian 
Almanac,241 purport to list only gays (as their titles would suggest), but in- 
clude many bisexuals in their pages.242 
Even when gays formally recognize bisexuals as a category, they can 
peremptorily evacuate individuals from that category.243 A classic example 
236. See WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 113, at 8 (noting with surprise that bisexuals reported 
homosexuals to be just as negative as heterosexuals about bisexuality). 
237. See id. at 117 (noting that bisexuals, when confronted with hostility from gays, may be 
dismayed because they view themselves victimized by the same kind of prejudice as gays). 
238. James, supra note 15, at 228. To his credit, James acknowledges that some usages of the 
words "queer," "gay," and "lesbian" might be thought o encompass bisexuality. Id. at 228-29. (I 
think this is most true for the term "queer"-bisexuals, for example, would seem to fit comfortably 
within the usage of the word "queer" to denote all those who fall outside of the regimes of the 
"nornal," see supra note 3.) But James points out that because these words signify exclusive ho- 
mosexuality for many others, theorists who use the terms expansively should declare and justify 
such usage. James, supra note 15, at 229. 
239. See id. at 229 (criticizing DAVID BERGMAN, GAIETY TRANSFIGURED: GAY SELF- 
REPRESENTATION IN AMERICAN LITERATURE (1991) for appropriating Herman Melville, Henry 
David Thoreau, and Henry James as gay men); James, supra note 15, at 229-30 (criticizing KARLA 
JAY & JOANNE GLASKOW, LESBIAN TEXTS AND CONTEXTS: RADICAL REVISIONS (1990) for ap- 
propriating Emily Dickinson, Virginia Woolf, H.D., and Djuna Barnes as lesbians). 
240. MARTiN GREIF, THE GAY BOOK OF DAYS: AN EVOCATIVELY ILLUSTRATIVE WHO'S 
WHO OF WHO IS, WAS, MAY HAVE BEEN, PROBABLY WAS, AND ALMOST CERTAINLY SEEMS TO 
HAVE BEEN GAY DuRING THE PAST 5,000 YEARS (1982). 
241. JONATHAN NED KATZ, THE GAY/LESBIAN ALMANAC: A NEW DOCUMENTARY (1983). 
242. See GARBER, supra note 1 1, at 49-50. 
243. See Ault, supra note 234, at 208. 
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of such individual erasure can be found in the beginning of lesbian theorist 
Terry Castle's The Apparitional Lesbian.244 Castle there invokes the figure 
of Greta Garbo, whom she views as exemplifying the book's thesis-that 
"[w]hen it comes to lesbians . . . many people have trouble seeing what's in 
firont ofthem."245 This social myopia seems to extend to bisexuals as well, 
because Castle characterizes Garbo as a "lesbian actress"246 even after ob- 
serving that Garbo "occasionally had affairs with men as well as women."247 
Castle's subsequent concession that Garbo could be characterized as a bisex- 
ual exonerates her from the charge of class erasure.248 But her summary re- 
jection of that characterization implicates her in individual erasure-Castle 
believes it "more meaningful to refer to [Garbo] as a lesbian"249 because 
"while Garbo sometimes makes love to men, she would rather make love to 
women."250 But how do we know that Garbo prefers women to men? And, 
even assuming that we know that Garbo sexually preferred women to men, 
why does this make her a lesbian? 
Like straights, gays can often engage in this kind of erasure by charac- 
terizing individuals who self-describe as bisexual as going through a "phase" 
that will end in monosexuality.251 Thebelief that bisexuals are protohomo- 
sexuals is a particularly prevalent one among ays.252 The greater force with 
which this belief is expressed in the gay community may be partially ex- 
plained by experiential skepticism. Like straights, gays have observed "bi- 
sexuals" subsequently come out as gay.253 But presumably unlike self- 
identified straights, some self-identified gays have gone through this phase 
themselves.254 This experience may lead them to be suspicious of those who 
claim bisexuality as a stable identity. The claim that bisexuals are protoho- 
mosexuals may also be more intensely held in the gay community, perhaps 
244. TERRY CASTLE, THE APPARITIONAL LESBIAN: FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITY AND MOD- 
ERN CULTURE (1993). 
245. Id. at 2. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 15. 
248. See id. 
249. See id. 
250. Id. 
251. See WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 113, at 117. This characterization is particularly 
ironic given that gays themselves are often told by straights that their homosexuality is just a phase 
on their way to heterosexuality. See Teemu Ruskola, Minor Disregard: The Legal Construction of 
the Fantasy that Gay and Lesbian Youth Do Not Exist, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 269, 280 (1996). 
252. See, e.g., Paula C. Rust, Sexual Identity and Bisexual Identities: The Struggle for Self- 
Description in a Changing Sexual Landscape, in QUEER STUDIES, supra note 15, at 64, 65. 
253. See GARBER, supra note 11, at 145 (describing how Boy George, David Geffen, and 
Elton John all self-identified as "bisexual" before "coming out" as gay). 
254. See, e.g., RUST, CHALLENGE, supra note 71, at 44 ("Bisexual identity is often consid- 
ered a stepping stone on the way to coming out as a lesbian. Slightly more than half of [the lesbians 
in the study] called themselves bisexual before they came out as lesbians; in hindsight, these 
women might well see their earlier bisexual identity as a transitional stage."). 
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because gays have more to lose than straights when bisexuals abandon 
them.255 Politicized homosexuals may be particularly prone to holding this 
view.256 
Finally, gays delegitimate bisexuals in two ways. Again, the more obvi- 
ous way is simple denigration-"the lesbian and gay community abounds 
with negative images of bisexuals as fence-sitters, t aitors, cop-outs, closet 
cases, people whose primary goal in life is to retain 'heterosexual privilege,' 
[or] power-hungry seducers who use and discard their same-sex lovers 
, , "257 Less intuitively, gays can also delegitimate bisexuals by imperson- 
ating them. Some might contend that such "defense bisexuality" increases, 
rather than decreases, bisexual visibility, as gays who say they are bisexual 
swell the ranks of the bisexual category. But the transience and the quality 
of the visibility must also be considered-such gays may later eveal them- 
selves to be gay, thereby detracting from the credibility ofthose who experi- 
ence their bisexuality asa stable identity. 
D. The Epistemic Contract as a Cause of Bisexual Erasure 
While the erasure of the bisexual category can be explained through a 
variety of hypotheses, the political hypothesis is the most plausible. I there- 
fore focus on that explanation, maintaining that self-identified straights and 
self-identified gays have shared political interests hat lead them into an 
epistemic contract of bisexual erasure. The existence of such a contract is
demonstrated by the fact hat both straights and gays use the same strategies 
to erase bisexuals. This suggests that he erasure is being driven ot just by 
straight interests, but also by gay interests. I now explore the nature of those 
interests. 
III. MONOSEXUAL INVESTMENTS IN THE EPISTEMIC CONTRACT 
In this Part, I hypothesize that bisexuals are erased because their visibil- 
ity is threatening to three interests hat both straights and gays possess: (1) 
an interest inthe stability of sexual orientation categories; (2) an interest in
the primacy of sex as a diacritical characteristic; and (3) an interest in the 
preservation f monogamy. While these interests overlap in some ways, they 
are also distinct in others. I thus disaggregate each interest into three por- 
tions: (1) the portion of the interest that is shared by both straights and gays; 
255. See Mezey, supra note 8, at 118 ("As an oppressed subculture, homosexual communities 
rely on an ethic of homosexual identity to maintain strength and coherence against the constant 
onslaught of virulent attacks ...."). 
256. See WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 113, at 117. 
257. Lisa Orlando, Loving Whom We Choose, in BI ANY OTHER NAME: BISEXUAL PEOPLE 
SPEAK OuT 223, 224 (Loraine Hutchins & Lani Kaahumanu eds., 1991). 
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(2) the portion of the interest that is distinctively straight; and (3) the portion 
of the interest that is distinctively gay. 
It will be useful to enter two qualifications before mbarking on this 
analysis. First, I am mindful that separating the parties and attributing view- 
points to them in the way that I have risks essentializing the opinions that 
members of each category have about he others. After some thought, I have 
overridden this weighty objection. I do so because I believe that certain 
opinions are more likely to be held by one group than another, although it
will not be held by all members or only members of that group.258 Thus, 
when I speak of the "investment of self-identified gays in bisexual erasure," I 
do not mean that all gays or only gays have this investment. Rather, I indi- 
cate the investment i  bisexual erasure that is more likely to be held by self- 
identified gays than by any other group. 
Second, I wish to stress the importance of distinguishing between 
stereotypes of bisexuality and the realities underlying those stereotypes. The 
following analysis will sometimes identify a viewpoint as a stereotype but 
nonetheless give it weight in the analysis. That weight, however, arises only 
from the fact that the investments of self-identified straights and self- 
identified gays will often be driven by perceptions rather than by realities. 
Indeed, I will argue that he stereotypes that bisexuals are (1) politically un- 
reliable, (2) completely sex-blind, or (3) intrinsically promiscuous, are ex- 
tremely powerful inshaping straight and gay attitudes about bisexuals. Such 
argumentation, of course, should not be taken as accession to the validity of 
those stereotypes. 
A. Stabilization ofSexual Orientation 
Bisexuality destabilizes sexual orientation bymaking it logically impos- 
sible to prove that one has a monosexual identity. Both straights and gays 
have shared investments in stabilizing their identities, as members of all 
groups are likely to draw some comfort from rigid social orderings. Straights 
and gay, however, also have distinctive investments in tabilizing orientation 
categories. For straights, it is an investment i  the retention fheterosexual 
privilege; for gays, it is an investment in the retention ofthe immutability 
defense and one in the ability to form an effective political movement. 
1. Shared investment. 
Bisexuality calls into question the sexual orientation fthe self. To see 
this, contrast the ease of proving one is straight orgay in a world in which 
258. Compare, e.g., COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 9, at 21-24 (noting that many gays have 
negative opinions about bisexuality), with, e.g., id. at 24 (noting that some gays were more tolerant 
of Colker's fluid sexuality than she herself was). 
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bisexuals are not acknowledged toexist with the difficulty ofproving the 
same thing in a world in which bisexuals are recognized. In a world that de- 
nies bisexual existence, cross-sex desire and same-sex desire are mutually 
exclusive.259 This means that he presence of cross-sex desire ipso facto ne- 
gates the presence of same-sex desire, and vice versa. Thus, demonstrating 
cross-sex desire is sufficient to prove that one is heterosexual and not homo- 
sexual. 
That we live in this world-and under this analytic regime-is demon- 
strated by how sexual orientation is proved here. As I will show in some 
detail, alleged harassers in the sexual harassment context have adduced ex- 
actly such claims of cross-sex desire as dispositive of their heterosexuality.260 
Similarly, legal institutions as igning individuals a homosexual identity have 
presumed that any individual who has manifested same-sex desire (and not 
deployed the queen-for-a-day exception) ishomosexual.261 
In a world that recognizes bisexuals, a would-be heterosexual must show 
(1) that he is not gay and (2) that he is not bisexual. (While I take hetero- 
sexuality asmy example, itshould be clear that his analysis is equally appli- 
cable to homosexuality.) The first he can do by showing cross-sex desire. 
The second he can only do by proving the absence of same-sex desire. But 
this is impossible to do, as it is impossible to prove a negative. Thus, after 
the bisexual possibility is acknowledged, it is not only harder, but logically 
impossible, toprove one's heterosexuality. Evidence of cross-sex desire is 
nonresponsive to the charge that one harbors same-sex desire, for no amount 
of loving attention that a man gives to his wife can prove that he does not 
lust in his heart for men. In order to safeguard a regime in which "straight- 
ness" (or "gayness") can be proved, all monosexuals must repress bisexual 
existence. 
Both straights and gays have a shared investment in stabilizing their 
identities, as members of all groups take comfort inknowing their place in 
the social order. This interest may seem less intuitive for gays, who occupy 
a disfavored place in that order. But as Mary McIntosh as noted, rigid cate- 
gorization may be comforting even to those stigmatized within it, because "it 
appears to foreclose on the possibility of drifting back into normality and 
259. This analysis assumes, without endorsing, the erasure of asexuality as an analytic possi- 
bility. See note 8 supra. 
260. See notes 520-534 infra nd accompanying text. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ? 170- 
B:2 (1992) (defining anyone who engages in same-sex oral or anal sex as a homosexual); Wood- 
ward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1069 n.l (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting Secretary of the Navy 
Instruction 1900.9A) (describing Navy's pre-1993 policy defining anyone with same-sex desire as a 
homosexual). 
261. See COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 9, at 45-56 (discussing the legal definition of homo- 
sexuality in adoption and military contexts). 
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thus removes the element of anxious choice."262 Robin Ochs provides anec- 
dotal support for this hypothesis: 
When I have asked gay men to explain their fears about bisexuality and bisex- 
ual people, one theme has repeatedly arisen. As one gay man put it, "Coming 
out as gay was the hardest and most painful thing I have ever done in my life. 
Now I'm finally at a place where I have a solid identity, a community, a place 
to call home. Bisexuals make me uncomfortable ecause their existence raises 
for me the possibility that I might be bisexual myself. And coming to terms 
with my identity was so hard for me the first ime around, I cringe at the 
thought of having to go through such a long, hard, painful process a second 
time."263 
Thus gays, along with straights, share an interest in identity stabilization, 
since such stabilization roots them in a community and relieves them of the 
anxious work of identity interrogation. 
2. Straight investment. 
As members of the privileged orientation class, straights have a distinc- 
tive interest in maintaining their identity. That identity must be assured at 
both the individual nd at the collective l vels. 
At the individual level, bisexuality hreatens heterosexuals in the manner 
described above, by making it impossible for them definitively to prove their 
heterosexuality. The investment in stabilizing their orientations at the indi- 
vidual level leads self-identified straights otake different stances toward 
homosexuals and bisexuals. Ironically, the investment in heterosexual 
privilege can lead straights toincrease the visibility ofhomosexuals. Prior to 
the introduction of the concept of homosexuality, no such incentive existed, 
as the concept of heterosexuality wasso universal sto be itself invisible.264 
Since the introduction of the concept of homosexuality,265 however, hetero- 
sexuality's stability has been predicated on opposition to homosexuality, as 
262. Mary McIntosh, The Homosexual Role, in FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY 25, 28 (Edward Stein ed., 1990). 
263. Ochs, supra note 63, at 232. 
264. See JOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A 
HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES 1940-70, at 10 (1983) (noting that in colonial 
America, where "the existence of lesbians and gay men was inconceivable," the term 
"'[h]eterosexuality' remained undefined, since it was literally the only way of life"); GARBER, su- 
pra note 11, at 40 (asserting that "[b]efore people began to speak of 'homosexuals' as a kind of 
person, a social species, there was no need for a term like 'heterosexual"'). The fact that he term 
heterosexuality s a conceptual back formation from the term homosexuality is reflected linguisti- 
cally in the fact that the word "heterosexual" post-dated the word "homosexual." See GARBER, 
supra note 1 1, at 40; DAVID M. HALPERIN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HOMOSEXUALITY 155 n.1 
(1989). 
265. See, e.g., 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 95, at 42-43 (dating creation of concept of the homo- 
sexual to the late nineteenth century). 
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"the denotation fany term is always dependent on what is exterior to it."266 
That opposition i turn is only possible if homosexuals are visible nough to 
be distinguished away. Thus, even attempts oexorcise homosexuality be- 
yond the pale of discourse do so only by naming it.267 It is in this sense that 
D.A. Miller claims that heterosexuals "unabashedly need" homosexuals.268 
While straights need gays, they do not need bisexuals. To the contrary, 
the very system in which straights need homosexuals i undergirded bybi- 
sexual nonexistence. This is because straights need gays to exorcise the pos- 
sibility of same-sex desire from themselves. But this exorcism can only oc- 
cur in a world where bisexuals do not exist. 
Two linked objections might be raised. The first is that most hetero- 
sexuals actually do not spend much time worrying about whether they are 
straight. Like whiteness in the race context,269 heterosexuality in the orien- 
tation context is sufficiently privileged as to achieve a kind of transpar- 
ency.270 It might hus be contended that straights cannot be repressing bi- 
sexuality out of any need to prove their straightness since they do not feel 
this need. This contention, however, has grown harder to make, as the 
greater visibility of sexual minorities (indicatively gays) has somewhat de- 
naturalized heterosexuality. More to the point, the fact that straights can 
leave their sexual orientations undertheorized should itself be seen as a pre- 
cious entitlement.271 Even straights who do not feel as if they must prove 
their sexual orientation may have an interest in not having to think about 
their sexual orientation. And bisexuality, more than homosexuality, requires 
them to do precisely this. 
A related objection isthat, as a practical matter, we assess orientation by
gestalt intuitions rather than by analytic proof. A woman might not be able 
to "prove" that her husband is straight, but she may believe she can com- 
fortably infer this from any number of small gestures he makes towards her 
and other women and men. And if no analytic proof is required, itarguably 
does not matter that no such proof exists. But this is debatable-being told 
that here is no logical way to prove one is straight could plausibly affect 
266. Diana Fuss, Inside/Out, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES 1, 1 (Diana 
Fuss ed., 1991). 
267. "Don't ask, don't tell" is a good instance of this dynamic as it makes homosexuality un- 
speakable by naming it for the first time in the United States Code. See 10 U.S.C. ? 654 (1994). 
268. D.A. Miller, Anal Rape, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES, GAY THEORIES, supra note 
266, at 135. 
269. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement ofDiscriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 957 (1993). As Flagg notes: "The 
most striking characteristic of whites' consciousness of whiteness i that most of the time we don't 
have any. I call this the transparency phenomenon: the tendency of whites not to think about 
whiteness, or about norms, behaviors, experiences, orperspectives that are white-specific." Id.
270. See, e.g., JANIS BOHAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 31-34 (1996). 
271. See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, Privilege of Unknowing: Diderot's The Nun, in 
TENDENCIES 23, 23 (1993) (discussing this "privilege of unknowing"). 
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even one's informal orientation ascriptions. Indeed, the popular press, when 
linking bisexuality with AIDS, often sought o affect orientation ascriptions 
in exactly this way, suggesting that women could not know for certain that 
their husbands were straight.272 Moreover, something closer to the rigorous 
form of proof may be required in specialized contexts. As I will show,273 this 
includes the legal realm, a context in which orientation determinations have 
some of their most serious consequences. 
Bisexuality challenges the integrity of heterosexuality a  the collective as 
well as at the individual level. Individual straights wish to stabilize the 
straight/gay binary because they wish to locate themselves a belonging to 
the heterosexual group. What membership in that group means, however, is
determined at the collective rather than at the individual level. As Naomi 
Mezey has argued, straights collectively attempt topreserve a "heterosexual 
ethic," that is, an ethic that heterosexuality has the monopoly on sexual vir- 
tue.274 In order for the heterosexual ethic to present i self as congruent with 
virtue, however, the homosexual ethic must be presented as congruent with 
vice.275 The survival of the heterosexual ethic is thus dependent on a binary 
world view of "right and wrong, of health and sickness, of heterosexual and 
homosexual."276 
Mezey describes the martial rhetoric of homophobia asarising out of this 
dependence.277 She then astutely notes that he real enemy to the heterosex- 
ual ethic is not the named enemy of homosexuality, butthe unnamed enemy 
of bisexuality.278 Bydeconstructing thestraight/gay binary, bisexuality re- 
veals that it cannot be isomorphic with the virtue/vice binary. It thus threat- 
ens the heterosexual ethic at the collective l vel as well as threatening het- 
erosexual identity atthe individual level. 
3. Gay investment. 
Gays, as well as straights, have distinctive investments in stabilizing 
their sexual orientation. Again, their interest insuch stabilization is less in- 
tuitive. I earlier noted that gays, like straights, have a generic interest in 
simply "knowing their place" in the social order, even if that place is a stig- 
matized one. But gays also have interests inidentity stabilization that arise 
272. See, e.g., Richard A. Knox, Bisexuals Put Women at Risk Studies Say, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 20, 1990, at 57 (describing difficulty ofknowing whether a "straight" man is actually bisex- 
ual); Jon Nordheimer, AIDS Specterfor Women: The Bisexual Man, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1987, at 1 
(similar). 
273. See notes 503-534 infra nd accompanying text. 
274. Mezey, supra note 8, at 112-21. 
275. See id. at 116. 
276. Id. atllS. 
277. See id. 
278. See id. 
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not in spite of, but because of, their stigmatized status. Insofar as these in- 
vestments are related to stigma, they will be held by gays but not by 
straights. These interests may also be broken into individual n'd collective 
interests. 
The individual gay interest inidentity stabilization arises out of a desire 
to retain the immutability defense. Gays often defend their homosexuality 
by characterizing it as an immutable trait.279 This defense can sometimes 
mitigate the stigma ssociated with homosexuality, both in the eyes of oth- 
ers280 and in the eyes of gays themselves.281 Immutability hasexonerative 
force because of the widely held belief that it is abhorrent topenalize indi- 
viduals for matters beyond their control.282 That belief has found widespread 
expression i American anti-discrimination jurisprudence.283 
Bisexuals threaten the immutability defense. The reasoning here is not 
immediately obvious. Formally, bisexuality and immutability arenot neces- 
sarily inconsistent. There could, after all, be four immutable categories- 
immutable heterosexuality, immutable homosexuality, immutable bisexual- 
ity, and immutable asexuality.284 Indeed, there might be an infinite number 
of categories on (and off) the sex-of-object choice spectrum, allof which are 
immutable. 
But as a practical matter, the introduction of bisexuals complicates the 
immutability defense through a two-step rocess. First, once the bisexual 
possibility is introduced, it becomes impossible for the self-identified gayto 
prove he is gay, in precisely the same way it becomes impossible for the self- 
identified straight to prove he is straight.285 Even assuming discrete immuta- 
ble categories, it will be unclear whether the individual manifesting same-sex 
desire who says he is immutably gay is immutably gay, or whether he is in 
truth immutably bisexual. Second, to the extent that an individual is immu- 
279. See Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation a d the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Ar- 
gumentfrom I mutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 507 (1994) [hereinafter Halley, Biology]. 
280. See id. at 567 (noting potency of immutability argument to persuade non-gays of the 
humanity of gays); see also id. at 518 n.62 (citing studies howing that people who think homo- 
sexuality isimmutable are more likely to disapprove of discnrmination against homosexuals). 
281. See id. at 535 (describing researcher's elation at discovering an alleged biological basis 
for homosexuality, because the researcher had "'always felt hat [he] was born gay"'). 
282. See, e.g., ESSAYS IN MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (John M. Fischer ed., 1986) (collecting es- 
says describing relationship between moral responsibility and free will). 
283. See, e.g., Frontiero v.Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (quoting 
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)) (noting that legally burdening immuta- 
ble characteristics violates "the basic concept of our system that legal burdens hould bear some 
relationship toindividual responsibility"). The Supreme Court has called this reliance on immuta- 
bility into question in subsequent dictum. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 
432, 442-43 n.10 (1985). 
284. Cf WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 113, at 4 (asking "[i]f homosexuality and heterosexu- 
ality are genetically predetermined, does that mean we need to look for a bisexual gene as well?"). 
285. See notes 259-273 supra and accompanying text. 
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tably bisexual, his immutability will generally not work to exonerate him. 
This is because immutability offers absolution by implying a lack of 
choice.286 But even an immutable bisexual is perceived to have a choice-he 
can choose to fit into the heterosexual matrix by selecting a partner of the 
opposite sex.287 The gay investment in bisexual erasure may thus arise in 
part because it problematizes the immutability defense. 
Such an investment could be challenged on normative grounds, as im- 
mutability has the vices of its virtues. The virtue of the immutability defense 
is that it forecloses the question of validity.288 In so doing, however, itcon- 
stantly defers the normative d bate that could establish the identity's valid- 
ity.289 Indeed, avid use of the immutability argument may be read as an im- 
plicit concession of the identity's invalidity-for ifan identity were truly 
perceived to be valid, many would not ask if it was immutable.290 Just as 
immutability moots the question of validity, so too does validity moot the 
question of immutability. 
As the gay rights movement progresses, some theorists are privileging 
the validity argument over the immutability argument, contending that being 
gay is valid regardless of whether itis chosen.291 This may in part be fueled 
286. See Halley, Biology, supra note 279, at 518-19 (noting that immutability operates as an 
exoneration strategy because it eliminates choice). 
287. See id. at 528 (noting that he immutability theory "does not explain why bisexuals-by 
hypothesis capable of satisfactory sexual encounters with members of the so-called 'opposite' 
sex-should not be encouraged or forced to do so"). To be sure, one could say that homosexuals 
also have this choice. But a social distinction appears to be drawn between the bisexual and the 
homosexual based on the perceived sacrifice ach must make to choose to live as a heterosexual. 
The immutable bisexual, unlike the immutable homosexual, isnot giving up all sexual pleasure in 
conforming to heterosexual norms of conduct, but merely giving up sexual pleasure with one of two 
sexes. See notes 90-91 supra and accompanying text. 
A similar kind of logic can be seen in judicial treatments of bilingual individuals. In Garcia v. 
Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), for example, the Fifth Circuit considered a Title VII employ- 
ment discrimination claim brought by a bilingual Mexican-American employee to challenge his 
former employer's prohibition speaking Spanish on the job. The court noted that "[t]o a person 
who speaks only one tongue ... language might well be an immutable characteristic l ke skin 
color." Id. at 270. It then went on to note, however, that "the language a person who is multi- 
lingual elects to speak at a particular time is by definition a matter of choice." Id. (emphasis added). 
Thus, the court reasoned that while people who do not possess a favored trait may be protected on 
grounds of immutability, people who possess both a favored and a disfavored trait will never be so 
protected, because they may always choose to manifest only the favored trait. 
288. See VERA WHISMAN, QUEER BY CHOICE 11-13 (1996). 
289. See id. at 6 ("If we argue against only the 'possible to change' assertion, we leave un- 
challenged the more insidious assumption that it is desirable or necessary to do so. And to the ex- 
tent that homosexuality is acceptable only if it is not chosen it remains tigmatized, illegitimate, 
deviant."). 
290. Cf. BERSANI, supra note 232, at 57 ("[T]he very question of 'how we got that way' 
would in many quarters not be asked if it were not assumed that we ended up the wrong way, the 
purpose behind the question has generally been to learn how we might best go back and right he 
wrong."). 
291. See WHISMAN, supra note 288, at 30-32. 
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by the fact hat he immutability defense is not available for gays who do not 
experience their orientation as immutable.292 (Asconventionally told, lesbi- 
ans are more likely than gay men to fall into this group because of lesbian- 
ism's nexus to feminism.)293 To the extent hat he immutability s rategy it
threatens becomes less important, bisexual visibility will become more palat- 
able. Indeed, those wishing to hasten the move from immutability arguments 
to validity arguments might embrace bisexual visibility. This is because bi- 
sexuals, in contrast tohomosexuals or heterosexuals, will always be seen as 
having a choice.294 As such, they literally embody the fact that individuals 
might choose (and choose to acknowledge) same-sex sexuality. 
As a positive matter, however, the day when gays (or at least gay men) 
renounce the immutability defense appears distant. Even commentary 
deeply critical of the use of immutability n the courts recognizes that im- 
mutability remains a potent argument inthe political forum.295 The immuta- 
bility argument is often the only effective strategy for gays "seeking to per- 
suade their parents, coworkers, and neighbors that hey can love someone of 
the same sex and remain fully human."296 Continued gay reliance on the 
immutability argument may lead to continued gay reliance on bisexual era- 
sure. 
The other gay interest instabilizing gay identity is a collective interest in
effective political mobilization. Even (or perhaps especially) gays who be- 
lieve that all individuals are somewhat bisexual may feel that bisexuals 
should nonetheless ally themselves with gays in order to combat homopho- 
bia. This is in part because bisexuals are seen as flight risks-individuals 
who could at any time abandon the gay community o lead straight lives.297 
And even if they do not actually leave, bisexuals may be seen as less com- 
mitted to fighting heterosexual privilege because of their ability to partake of 
292. See Halley, Biology, supra note 279, at 520. 
293. See RUST, CHALLENGE, supra note 71, at 163 (noting that some feminists see a connec- 
tion between lesbianism and feminism, relying on the assumption that "lesbianism is a possible 
choice for all women"). 
294. Whether this is actually the case is open to question. In the Weinberg study, a group of 
bisexuals were asked: "Is it possible that someday ou could behave either exclusively homosexual 
or exclusively heterosexual?" WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 113, at 33. Approximately eighteen 
percent of bisexuals aid "no." Id. at app. A at 317 tbl. 3.2. This does not necessarily, but might, 
reflect the fact hat some bisexuals do not experience themselves a being able to restrict themselves 
to one sex, such that hey do not experience themselves a having a "choice" between sexes. An- 
other way of putting this is that some bisexuals may actually fit the stereotypical view of bisexuals 
which holds that bisexuals feel intrinsically incomplete insexual relations with only one sex. 
295. See Halley, Biology, supra note 279, at 567-68 (criticizing reliance on immutability in 
legal context, but not in extra-legal political context). 
296. Id. at 567. 
297. See Ochs, supra note 63, at 228-29 (noting that "[m]any lesbians and gay men believe 
that bisexuals have less commitment o 'the community,' and that whatever a lesbian or gay man 
might have to offer to their [sic] bisexual partner will not be enough to outweigh the external bene- 
fits offered to those who are in heterosexual relationships"). 
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it. Moreover, even if bisexuals appear to be deeply committed tofighting 
heterosexism, they can be seen as inherently traitorous, insofar as solidarity 
requires not just supporting a group but also fighting (as opposed to con- 
sorting with) the group's enemies.298 
This interest in bisexual erasure is thus an interest in ensuring that he 
line of battle is clearly drawn. The conflict between sexual minorities and 
those who oppress them is framed as isomorphic with the conflict between 
gays and straights, thus making the battle line the virgule in the 
"straight/gay" binary.299 Precisely because gays view themselves a a belea- 
guered minority, their tolerance for those who might sap their political soli- 
darity by blurring that battle line is limited.300 
This interest may be more powerful for lesbians than for gay men. This 
may seem counterintuitive, as I earlier implied that because lesbians may 
have less invested in the immutability defense than gay men, bisexuals might 
not be as threatening to them along the axis of immutability.301 But it may be 
exactly because lesbians are more likely to view their orientation as fluid that 
bisexuals may be more deeply threatening to lesbians on the axis of political 
mobilization. If biology is believed not to provide a substrate for lesbian 
identity, then the fear that any given lesbian might become bisexual and 
thereby abandon the lesbian community looms larger.302 
Like the investment i  immutability, this investment i  political stability 
can be challenged. Destabilization actually has four pro-gay deployments, 
which I speculatively order here from least to most radical. First, the bisex- 
ual possibility suggests that he straight category isnot as monolithic orse- 
cure as it may originally seem. To the extent hat bisexuals are waverers, 
gays should court, rather than suppress, bisexuals who are living as straights. 
This is especially true if we accept he results of the sexuality studies consid- 
ered above,303 which indicate that the addition of bisexuals could signifi- 
cantly swell the ranks of homosexuals. Second, gays could deploy bisexual- 
ity's tendency to destabilize heterosexuality to enlist straights inthe fight 
298. See id. at 230 (describing lesbian hostility tobisexuals, and noting that part of the objec- 
tion was that some lesbians "'believed that only lesbians had an antipatriarchal sexuality, which 
meant hat only lesbians were working against sexism. . . [and] conflated sexual practice and politi- 
cal action and believed that what one did in bed, and with whom, had direct consequences for sup- 
porting or dismantling a patriarchal power structure"' (citation omitted)). 
299. See Mezey, supra note 8, at 115 (noting that "in a discourse of militant hetero- and ho- 
mosexuality the divisions are clear; one knows who the enemy is and hence one knows oneself"). 
300. See id. at 118 (noting that "[a]s an oppressed subculture, homosexual communities rely 
on an ethic of homosexual identity to maintain strength and coherence against he constant on- 
slaught of virulent [homophobic] attacks"). 
301. See note 293 supra and accompanying text. 
302. Another way in which lesbians may be more threatened by bisexuals on the axis of po- 
litical mobilization concerns the interest lesbians have in combatting patriarchy. I consider this 
interest below. See notes 345-352 infra nd accompanying text. 
303. See notes 110-176 supra and accompanying text. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.76 on Sun, 2 Jun 2013 16:33:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Jan. 2000] BISEXUAL ERASURE 409 
against he regulation ofhomoerotic conduct. Straights may be less likely to 
burden such minorities if they are worried about drifting into the stigmatized 
category themselves.304 Third, bisexuals could be seen as performing a me- 
diating or conciliatory office. If bisexuals are being erased in order to pre- 
serve the binary logic of agonistic conflict, itseems intuitive that bisexual 
visibility might challenge the paradigm of conflict i self.305 Finally, bisexu- 
als could be deployed not just as a third party alongside gays and straights, 
but as a category that permits gays to challenge any sexual orientation cate- 
gorization. Something akin to this insight isneatly captured in the bisexual 
retort to being called a fencesitter-namely, "your fence is sitting on me."306 
In this formulation, it is not fencesitting, butthe fence, that is the problem; 
and it is not bisexuality, but the line establishing binary categorization, that 
needs to be erased. 
The last possibility merits further discussion. A utopian version of the 
argument would use bisexuality as a means of retiring all sexual orientation 
classifications.307 Theargument that he prevailing orientation classifications 
should be retired should be a familiar one to gays, as it is an argument they 
espoused even before the patterned visibility of bisexuality.308 At the begin- 
ning of the 1970s, gay liberationists "prophesied the disappearance ofboth 
'the homosexual' and 'the heterosexual' through t e abolition of constraining 
categories." 309 One theory of why this movement toretire categories ulti- 
mately did not reach fruition is that it was difficult tocreate a politics out of 
it.310 Activists were faced with the perennial problem-how does one resist 
a categorization without organizing around the oppressed category?3 1 And 
304. Cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 160 (1980) (describing age as a cate- 
gory on which discrimination is less likely to occur because individuals understand that they will 
"drift" into the stigmatized category of old age). 
305. See Highleyman, supra note 12, at 90 (noting that "[m]any bisexuals object in principle 
to the gay and lesbian movement's 'us' versus 'them' paradigm"). 
306. Rebecca Kaplan, Your Fence Is Sitting on Me: The Hazards of Binary Thinking, in
BISEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 7, at 267, 267. 
307. See Mezey, supra note 8, at 99. 
308. See Amanda Udis-Kessler, Identity/Politics: A History of the Bise-xual Movement, in 
BISEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 7, at 17, 19 (noting that "[t]he word 'bisexual' existed before 
Stonewall, and there were people who lived as bisexuals, even famous ones at times" but that "the 
focus on bisexuality asa core aspect of one's identity does not seem to have arisen in any patterned 
way until after Stonewall"). 
309. Steven Epstein, Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism, in 
FORMS OF DESIRE: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY 
239, 252 (Edward Stein ed., 1990). According to Epstein, this post-Stonewall ctivism was a de- 
parture from homosexual politics in the preceding decades, which stressed the goal of integration 
without challenging the straight/gay dichotomy. See id. 
310. See id. at 253-54. 
31 1. See id. at 254 ("This is a familiar dilemma, nd one that is by no means peculiar to the 
gay movement: How do you protest a socially imposed categorization, except by organizing around 
the category? Just as blacks cannot fight he arbitrariness of racial classification without organizing 
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how can one organize around the category without reifying the very catego- 
rization one seeks to retire? 
It is worth revisiting these questions, as bisexuality provides an ingen- 
ious answer to them. This is because bisexuality may be "not just another 
sexual orientation but [also] a sexuality that undoes exual orientation as a 
category."312 One paradox is answered by another-the general paradox that 
one can only challenge a classification through classes that reify it is an- 
swered by the specific paradox that bisexuality is a class that challenges the 
very classification that creates it. Precisely because bisexuality no sooner 
asserts itself as a category than it questions its own boundaries, bisexuality is 
arguably the post-Stonewall activist's dream.313 
Again, however, these normative objections may not sway many gays 
who hold this particular investment in bisexual erasure. Gays face signifi- 
cant political oppression under the prevailing straight/gay p radigm. Given 
this, many gays feel that he energies of the movement should be devoted to 
arguing within, rather than against, that paradigm. This is particularly true 
since gays have used that paradigm to create an effective politics of opposi- 
tion. 
B. Bisexuality Destabilizes the Primacy of Sex 
The second investment straights and gays have in bisexual erasure is that 
bisexuals are seen to destabilize the primacy of sex as a diacritical xis. 
Straights and gays have a shared investment in the primacy of sex because 
their orientation identities rely on it. Straights have a peculiar investment in 
the primacy of sex because sex identities are currently determined by a 
straight matrix. And gays have a peculiar investment because homosexuality 
is sometimes deployed as a means of sex separatism, which both reflects and 
reinforces the primacy of sex. 
as blacks, so gays could not advocate the overthrow ofthe sexual order without making their gay- 
ness the very basis of their claims."). 
312. GARBER supra note 1 1, at 65; see also Mezey, supra note 8, at 99 ("Bisexuality as a cri- 
tique of the hetero/homo paradigm actually facilitates [a] more radical analysis, which concludes, 
ironically, that bisexuality works no better than the other two categories in accurately describing 
concrete sexual behavior, and that a new conceptualization of sexual identities, uch as one based 
on acts, is needed."). 
313. Or is it? One could contend that he conundrum is not so easily solved, for bisexuality's 
instability, which prevents itfrom reifying the categorization, also arguably makes it a politically 
ineffective category. Under this view, bisexuality offers the worst rather than the best of both 
worlds, being too inchoate to be an effective class and too rigid truly to contest he reification of
orientation categories. 
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1. Shared investment. 
Bisexuality disrupts he primacy of sex as a diacritical trait. One disqui- 
eting aspect of the bisexual is that she refuses to require that an object of de- 
sire belong to a particular sex. In the stereotypical view, this is because the 
bisexual is sex-blind,314 refusing to distinguish at all between men and 
women in her erotic life.315 Under this characterization, the world the bisex- 
ual sees is like Foucault's "world in which grins h[a]ng about without the 
cat."316 In this world, sexual pleasure becomes a (literally) floating signifier, 
a sexless mile left by a fading body. 
The stereotypical view appears to misdescribe the majority of bisexuals. 
Some bisexuals claim to be sex-blind in the sense that hey fall in love with a
person rather than with a sex.317 But most appear to desire men as men and 
to desire women as women. Thus in the Weinberg study, over four-fifths of 
the bisexuals interviewed distinguished between being sexual with aman and 
being sexual with a woman, citing behavioral, bodily, and emotional differ- 
ences.318 That finding comports with common sense-sex distinctions are so 
pervasive in contemporary American society that it is hard to believe that 
bisexuals could evade such distinctions. 
314. By "sex-blind," I mean that a person does not take sex into account in choosing erotic 
partners. Following Neil Gotanda's analysis of colorblindness, I distinguish between literal and 
figurative forms of sex-blindness. See Neil Gotaida, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color- 
Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1991). The literal form posits that the person does not even 
register other people's sexes. Literal sex-blindness is like medical color-blindness-just as the 
person who has red-green colorblindness cannot ell the difference b tween the two colors, so too 
does the person who has literal sex-blindness find it impossible to tell the difference b tween the 
sexes. Cf id. The figurative form, in contrast, notes that he person registers other people's sexes, 
but attaches no consequence to that perception. Figurative sex-blindness is like juridical color- 
blindness. Just as those who espouse the colorblindness ideal say that hey recognize differences in 
colors but attach no salience to those differences, so too do those spousing figurative s x-blindness 
say that hey recognize differences between sexes but attach no salience to those differences. Inmy 
review of the literature on bisexuality, I have not come across any instances of individuals who 
claim that they are literally sex-blind. By "sex-blindness" I therefore mean figurative s x- 
blindness. 
315. This is the view that underlies the fears urrounding the "bisexual harassment exemp- 
tion" discussed below. See notes 464-474 infra nd accompanying text. 
316. Michel Foucault, Introduction to HERCULINE BARBIN, BEING THE RECENTLY 
DISCOVERED MEMOIRS OF A NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH HERMAPHRODITE vii, xiii (Michel 
Foucault ed., Richard McDougall trans., 1980). Foucault describes this world as the world seen by 
the hermaphrodite, butit seems more aptly the (stereotypical) view of the bisexual's world. 
317. See COLKER, HYBRID, supra note 9, at 27 (describing bisexuals who state "'that when 
they fell in love it was with a person rather than a gender"') (quoting BETTY FAIRCHILD & NANCY 
HAYWARD, NoW THAT You KNOW: WHAT EVERY PARENT SHOULD KNow ABOUT HOMO- 
SEXUALITY 75 (1989)); Paula C. Rust, Who Are We and Where Do We Go from Here? Conceptual- 
izing Bisexuality, in CLOSER TO HOME: BISEXUALITY & FEMINISM 281, 298 (Elizabeth Reba Weise 
ed., 1992) (describing attitudes of lesbian women toward bisexuality ranging from "bisexuals are 
indiscriminate" to "bisexuals fall in love with a person, not a gender"). 
318. See WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 113, at 50-53. 
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Despite the fact that "sex-blind" bisexuals may comprise only a small 
minority ofall bisexuals, bisexuality still presents a deep threat to sex norms. 
Even if bisexuals are not completely sex-blind, they still do not presump- 
tively eliminate one sex from their fields of erotic possibility. For all bisexu- 
als, whether sex-blind or not, sex matters less.319 
Why is a challenge to the priority ofsex so threatening to monosexuals? 
There appear to be two answers-challenging theprimacy of sex destabilizes 
monosexual identity and underscores a tension between public and private 
attitudes toward sex. 
a. Destabilization. 
Challenging the primacy of sex destabilizes not only monosexual iden- 
tity, but human identity. Judith Butler posits that in contemporary American 
culture, we are not viewed as human until we have a sex, that "the moment in 
which an infant becomes humanized is when the question, 'is it a boy or 
girl?' is answered."320 Thus, "[t]hose bodily figures who do not fit into ei- 
ther gender fall outside the human, indeed, constitute he domain of the de- 
humanized and the abject against which the human itself is constituted."321 
Suzanne Kessler's study of the intersexed corroborates Butler's claim.322 
Kessler describes how the medical profession preserves the existing binary at 
all costs through surgical "reconstruction" shortly after the birth of the inter- 
sexual323-literally doctoring the data to fit the binary sex hypothesis. Even 
in situations where the intersexed infant ishealthy,324 thesurgery iscast as a 
"neonatal psychosexual medical emergency,"325 supporting the claim that he 
infant's status as a human being is endangered by the mere fact of intersexu- 
ality itself. In such a culture, not to possess a sex is not to be human. 
319. Marorie Garber ecounts the story of a woman, "Elizabeth," who fell in love with some- 
one on the internet who was purported tobe a man. See GARBER, supra note 1 1, at 33-34. When 
they finally met and the "man" revealed herself to be a woman, Elizabeth overcame her initial re- 
sistance over the course of the hour's conversation a d then made love to her. See id. at 34. Garber 
notes that Elizabeth does not self-identity as a bisexual, id., and she certainly would not seem to 
qualify as a "sex-blind" bisexual. Yet in her refusal to permit sex of object choice to be "the over- 
riding consideration," id., she perhaps represents he anxiety of the bisexual possibility. 
320. BUTLER, supra note 24, at 111. Linguistic support for this claim can be found in the fact 
that the infant who is not a "he" or a "she" must be an "it," a pronoun reserved for nonhuman 
subjects. 
321. Id. 
322. See generally KESSLER, supra note 18. 
323. See id. at 12-32. 
324. Kessler distinguishes between three kinds of genital surgery-(1) that which is lifesav- 
ing; (2) that which improves the quality of life; and (3) that which is aesthetic. See id. at 34. By 
"healthy" I mean a child who does not require the first two kinds of surgery. 
325. Id. 
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But if this is true, does bisexuality, which stereotypically does not pass 
desire through the lens of sex, threaten human identity? Much more would 
need to be said before answering inthe affirmative. Even without that dis- 
cussion, however, itcan be noted that bisexuality, like intersexuality, sug- 
gests that the question "Is it a boy or a girl?" is the wrong question to be 
asking. And if this is the question that determines our humanity, it should 
come as no surprise that he capacity of bisexuals to undermine the sex cate- 
gory is deeply threatening to individuals ofall categories.326 
But while the bisexual's ability to undermine s x categories i generi- 
cally troubling for all individuals in contemporary American society, it is 
arguably distinctively troubling for monosexuals. This is because monosex- 
uals, unlike bisexuals, define their orientation identities according to that 
distinction-that is, by their attraction to men but not women, or vice versa. 
An individual's orientation can be affected not only by challenging the fixity 
of his orientation, but also by challenging the fixity of the sex of his object 
choice. Without a clear and privileged istinction between "man" and 
"woman," there is no clear and privileged distinction between "straight" and 
"gay." In the previous analysis, we saw that bisexuality directly challenged 
sexual orientation categories by destabilizing them.327 Here we see that bi- 
sexuality indirectly challenges sexual orientation bydestabilizing sex. 
b. The tension between public and private treatments ofsex. 
There is a second reason why monosexuals might be peculiarly disturbed 
by the ability of bisexuals to call the primacy of sex into question. This re- 
lates to a tension in how sex is treated in the erotic and nonerotic realms. It 
is not quite true, as I said before, that it is always threatening to suggest hat 
the "Is it a boy or a girl?" question is the wrong question. In the nonerotic 
realm, this question is widely marked as immoral. Thus, American antidis- 
crimination law prohibits he state and many employers from attaching con- 
sequence to the answer to this question.328 Tosome extent these norms carry 
over into the nondesirous private realm-those who discriminate on the basis 
of sex in their private affiliations are increasingly subjected to moral, if not 
legal, censure.329 But when we enter the erotic realm, the norms hift dra- 
326. That bisexuals may also be threatened bybisexuality's capacity to undermine s x catego- 
ries may be seen in the insistence of many bisexuals, as noted above, that hey are attracted tomen 
as men and women as women. See note 318 supra and accompanying text. 
327. See notes 259-313 supra and accompanying text. 
328. See generally CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION (Herma Hill 
Kay & Martha S. West eds., 4th ed. 1996). 
329. See, e.g., Harvard Woman Sues Male 'Flies,' S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 1988, at B6 (de- 
scribing legal challenge to all-male student clubs); Andrea Estes & Erin N. O'Leary, Judge Orders 
Club to Put Women on Par with Men, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 2, 1998, at 4 (describing court order 
mandating sex integration ftournaments at Massachusetts golf club); Patricia Wen, Single-Sex 
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matically in the other direction, such that sex distinctions are not only per- 
mitted, but expected. Monosexuals routinely discriminate on the basis of sex 
in choosing their erotic partners; indeed, that practice constitutes them as 
monosexuals. 
There is thus a fundamental ension in the treatment of sex in the nonde- 
sirous and desirous realms. If I discriminate between male and female m- 
ployees in the workplace, I can expect in many quarters to be criticized for 
political insensitivity. But if I discriminate between male and female part- 
ners in my erotic attachments, I am much less likely to encounter such criti- 
cism. Indeed, to the extent hat I discriminate in favor of a same-sex erotic 
partner, it is my critic who can expect (in some quarters) to be criticized for 
political insensitivity. 
This tension requires justification, not only because of its facial incon- 
sistency, but also because of its deep consequentiality. Specifically, accep- 
tance of discrimination n the desirous private realm may render itimpossible 
to fully reject discrimination n the public realm. In the law, this problem is
perhaps best seen in the judicial refusal to mandate that legal distinctions 
between the sexes be completely abolished. Thus, while the Supreme 
Court's equal protection jurisprudence subjects race-based classifications to 
strict scrutiny,330 it subjects ex-based classifications only to intermediate 
scrutiny.331 Even as the actual nature of intermediate scrutiny has tacked 
closer to strict scrutiny,332 the Supreme Court has retained the rhetorical dis- 
tinction between race-based and sex-based classifications.333 We have thus 
not been able to push jurisprudential norms against sex discrimination as far 
as we have pushed norms against race discrimination. 
While commentators have justified this distinction i a number of 
ways,334 the justification most pertinent tothis analysis relates to desire. 
George Rutherglen xplains the lower tier of scrutiny associated with sex by 
noting that sex-based "classifications arevalued for their own sake within an 
Health Clubs Get Protection, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 1998, at Bi (noting NOW's opposition to 
bill legalizing single-sex health facilities). 
330. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 952 (1996); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995). 
331. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 515 (1996); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 127 (1994). 
332. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Un- 
decided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 75 (1996) (noting that he Court in Virginia "did not merely restate 
the intermediate scrutiny test but pressed it closer to strict scrutiny"). 
333. Cf Virginia, 518 U.S. 515. 
334. For example, they have noted that women, unlike blacks, are not a minority, see JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 164 (1980); that women, unlike blacks, have historically 
been integrated with the dominant group, see id.; and that women, unlike blacks, exhibit "real" 
physical differences that distinguish t em from the group to which they have been historically sub- 
ordinated, see Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1007 
(1984). 
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important area of human life, namely sexual conduct, whereas racial classifi- 
cations are neither so widely nor so openly valued in everyday life."335 Sex 
is different from race insofar as we not only permit, but expect, individuals to
have desires vectored toward only one sex. 
The extent o which the monosexual presumption in the desirous realm 
blocks an advance to a sex-blind regime in the nondesirous realm should not 
be underestimated. Our erotic relationships, after all, are often viewed as 
simultaneously constituting and reflecting our most important emotional t- 
tachments. Ifwe routinely structure these crucial relationships bydiscrimi- 
nating on the basis of sex, it should come as no surprise that we (and our ju- 
dicial institutions) experience a failure of nerve when asked to categorically 
abolish all sex-based istinctions. 
Monosexuals could defend the distinction between public sex-blindness 
and private sex-consciousness in a variety of ways.336 I do not seek to evalu- 
ate these rationales here, as my point is simply that bisexuals may occasion 
anxiety because they hold out the conceptual possibility that hese rationales 
are not dispositive. Bisexuality implies that sex need not be as important in 
our desirous lives as we have made it.337 Bisexuals and asexuals are thus the 
only individuals who at least have the capacity not to discriminate onthe 
basis of sex in any aspect of their lives.338 As such, they have the potential to 
evade the public/private tension with regard to sex in which monosexuals 
find themselves. 
2. Straight investment. 
Straights have a distinctive investment i  bisexual erasure relating to the 
primacy of sex. This is because sex is currently understood through a het- 
erosexual matrix; that is, straights have a monopoly on sex norms. And bi- 
sexuality, unlike homosexuality, hasthe potential todisrupt that monopoly. 
335. George Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. REv. 199, 209 
(1979). 
336. First, they could point o the fact hat hey experience their orientations to be immutable, 
such that he desire is beyond their control. Second, they could rely on autonomy arguments relat- 
ing to their ight o discriminate inan immensely intimate and consequential sphere of their life. 
Third, they could contend that heir private norms of sex-discrimination rely on "real differences" 
between men and women, which are recognized as permissible even by public anti-discrimination 
norms. Fourth, they could contend that differentiation between the sexes for desirous purposes 
should not be considered "discrimination" because it does not have subordinating effects. There are 
doubtless many other possible rationales. 
337. See COLKER, HYBRID supra note 9, at 30 (noting that "embracing the category of bi- 
sexuality would help society recognize that one can find an organizing principle other than biologi- 
cal sex to define sexual attractiveness"). 
338. I thank Ian Ayres for this point. 
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To see this, begin with the increasingly accepted view that we all per- 
form our sex to some degree.339 Sex, no less than any other performance, is 
always shaped by its audience. When we perform our sexes, for whom are 
we performing? The answer is at least partially that we are performing for 
those who might potentially desire us, and that he performance is an attempt 
to convert that potentiality into an actuality. The performance of sex will 
thus always be affected by prevailing codes of desire. When (as now) het- 
erosexuality is the prevailing code of desire, women will be encouraged to 
perform their sex in a way that is attractive to men (and vice versa, although 
the symmetry is not complete). To be a "woman" is to be attractive tomen, 
to be a "man" is to be attractive to women. 340 
It is therefore anerror to accede to the conventional wisdom that sex is a 
stable, prediscursive substrate from which heterosexuality s a simple back 
formation.341 While heterosexuality is a back formation from sex, it is also 
paradoxically true that sex is a back formation from heterosexuality. Current 
norms of sex and current norms of heterosexuality are thus implicated in a 
feedback loop in which each shores up the other. 
Homosexuality does not present much of a challenge to prevailing sex 
norms in this regard. Even if men begin to look with desire at other men, 
this may not significantly change sex performance, as that desirous look is 
read as the familiar look of the heterosexual woman now displaced in a 
man's body. This is the modem vestige of the older trope of the homosexual 
as "invert"-a "woman trapped inside a man's body" or vice versa.342 The 
logic of the invert is the means through which homosexuality is read back 
into a straight paradigm.343 
339. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 24, at 24-25. While Butler refers to gender rather than sex 
in this quotation, she elsewhere hypothesizes that there is no real distinction between gender and 
sex. See id. at 7 (describing the distinction as "no distinction at all"). 
340. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING, ETC. 161 (1993) ("So long as I am a straight 
man, a part of my being is hostage to women: I want them to exist as women, not men, as bearers 
of the possibility of my own sexual excitement."). 
341. See note 194 supra and accompanying text. 
342. See Tim Edwards, Beyond Sex and Gender: Masculinity, Homosexuality and Social The- 
ory, in MEN, MASCULINITIES & SOCIAL THEORY 110, 112 (Jeff Hearn & David Morgan eds., 1990) 
(noting characterization of male homosexuals as those who suffer from having a "feminine soul in a 
male body"). 
343. As Bersani notes, sometimes the infliction of the male gaze on a male performer is read 
back into the heterosexual matrix by inverting the sex of the performer ather than that of the ob- 
server: 
The New York Times reported on April 3, 1993, that a radar instructor who chose not to fly 
with an openly gay sailor, Keith Meinhold, feared that Meinhold's "presence in the cockpit 
would distract him from his responsibilities." The instructor "compared his 'shock' at learning 
there was a gay sailor in his midst to a woman discovering 'a man in the ladies' restroom."' 
Note the curious scatological transsexualism inour radar instructor's (let us hope momentary) 
identification fhis cockpit with a ladies' restroom. In this strange scenario, the potential gay 
attacker becomes the male intruder on female privacy, and the "original" straight man is 
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The bisexual, on the other hand, deeply destabilizes sex norms because 
her desirous look cannot be as easily collapsed into a straight paradigm. 
How does a man make a bisexual desire him? Not by adopting aspects that 
have traditionally been described as "masculine" as the bisexual is also po- 
tentially attracted tothe "feminine." The logic of inversion is insufficient 
here to protect raditional sex norms from bisexuality because bisexuality 
does not simply invert cross-sex desire, but rather supplements i  with same- 
sex desire. Bisexuality, then, contests heterosexuality's current monopoly on 
sex performance in away that homosexuality cannot. 
3. Gay investment. 
Gays, as well as straights, have investments in preserving the primacy of 
sex as a diacritical trait. Unlike straights, gays can deploy their homosexu- 
ality to engage in a sex separatism that is not only social, but also erotic. 
Bisexuals threaten this sex separatism by creating a bridge to the opposite 
sex. 
All gays can engage in a more total form of sex separatism than is possi- 
ble for noncelibate heterosexuals. Gays have at least the capacity to live a 
full erotic (as well as a social and a political) ife in a community from which 
the other sex is completely excluded. Thus, at least along the axis of separa- 
tism, lesbians and gay men are just as, if not more, likely than straights o
privilege the importance ofsex as a diacritical trait.344 
The best example of gay sex separatism is when women's political soli- 
darity (feminism) is hypothesized to be connected to their same-sex erotic 
attachment (lesbianism). As articulated inthe old slogan "Feminism is the 
theory, lesbianism is the practice,"345 theview is that he authenticity of a 
metamorphosed, through another man's imagined sexual attention, into the offended, harassed, 
or even violated woman. 
BERSANI, supra note 232, at 16-17 (citations omitted). 
344. This insight may be somewhat counterintuitive, given that homosexuality is often seen as 
undermining the importance of sex. It is of course true that homosexuality is often seen as sub- 
verting sex expectations, given that many stereotypically deem gay men to be less masculine and 
lesbians to be less feminine than their straight counterparts. It is also true that homosexuality can 
be seen as diminishing certain forms of hierarchy between the sexes to the extent, for example, that 
lesbianism can be seen as empowering feminism. But diminishing sex-based hierarchy and dimin- 
ishing sex-based consciousness are two different things, and I would contend that homosexuality 
can do the former not in spite of, but because of, the fact hat it does not do the latter. 
345. The slogan "Feminism is the theory, lesbianism is the practice," is usually attributed to
Ti-Grace Atkinson. See, e.g., Nancy Chater & Lilith Finkler, "Traversing Wide Territories ": A 
Journey from Lesbianism to Bisexuality, in PLURAL DESIRES: WRITING BISEXUAL WOMEN'S 
REALITIES 14, 15 (Leela Acharya, Nancy Chater, Dionne Falconer, Sharon Lewis, Leanna McLen- 
nan & Susan Nosov eds., 1995) (attribution f quotation to Atkinson by Finkler). As Nancy Chater 
notes, however, the original quote was actually "Feminism isa theory, lesbianism isa practice." Id. 
at 36 n. 1; see also GARBER, supra note 1 1, at 44 (quoting Atkinson correctly as saying "Feminism 
is a theory, lesbianism is a practice"). As Chater notes, the alteration i  the slogan is "subtle but 
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politics is determined byhow it plays out in erotic practice. While this is an 
extreme position, one way of reading it is to note that, as Adrienne Rich has 
famously argued, this distinction between political and erotic same-sex at- 
tachments may itself falsely binarize a continuum of practices in which 
women identify with other women.346 
Like lesbians, gay men can also create communities that are totally sex 
segregated. Indeed, given the dominance of men in almost every sphere of 
public life (perhaps most pertinently employment) it is likely to be easier for 
a gay man than for a lesbian to live a life that entirely excludes those of the 
other sex. But while gay men have more opportunity to engage in sex sepa- 
ratism, they may have less motive to do so. For if "Masculinism is the the- 
ory, gay maleness is the practice," does not trip off the tongue, it must be in 
part because men as a group are not disempowered.347 Lesbians may draw 
synergistic connections between their disempowered status as women and 
their disempowered status as homosexuals. In contrast, the gay man's privi- 
leged status as a man can be experienced as conflicting with his stigmatized 
status as a homosexual. Patriarchy makes the social meaning of lesbian 
separatism different from the social meaning of gay male separatism. 
This difference in turn may make bisexuals more threatening to lesbians 
than they are to gay men. If homosexuality permits a dream of a social 
world without the other sex, bisexuality disrupts hat dream by constantly 
holding out the possibility ofcross-sex attachment. But the awakening may 
be ruder for lesbians than for gay men, precisely because cross-sex attach- 
ment may signify capture by patriarchy. 
One way of understanding this is to consider so-called lesbian pornogra- 
phy, that is, the "[p]ortrayals of allegedly lesbian 'scenes"' that "are a staple 
of heterosexual pomography."348 It might be asked why the straight male 
consumers of this pornography find the scene so titillating, as it could actu- 
ally signify an erotic world in which there is no need for men.349 Many of 
the possible answers cluster around the power of the male gaze to override 
crucial," Chater, supra at 36 n. 1, arguably shading an ostensibly neutral distinction between femi- 
nism and lesbianism into a hierarchical formulation favoring the latter. 
346. See Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in POWERS OF 
DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 177-205 (Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell & Sharon Thomp- 
son eds., 1983). This breakdown of the distinction between the political and the personal may par- 
tially explain why lesbians are less likely than gay men to deploy immutability as an etiological 
explanation for their homosexuality. Whether itis in actuality chosen or not, lesbians may feel as if 
their same-sex attachments are more constructed than essential, given that such attachments are 
political as well as erotic. 
347. See SEDGWICK, supra note 4, at 36 (describing this position). 
348. John Stoltenberg, Pornography, Homophobia and Male Supremacy, inPORNOGRAPHY: 
WOMEN, VIOLENCE, & CIVIL LIBERTIES 145, 155 (Catherine Itzin ed., 1992). 
349. See Rich, supra note 346, at 187 (describing the male fear that "women could be indif- 
ferent to them altogether, that men could be allowed sexual and emotional-therefore economic- 
access to women only on women's terms"). 
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any intimation that he women are unavailable to straight men.350 If, for ex- 
ample, the male spectator believes that he women are both available to him, 
their numerosity enlivens rather than excludes: He sees two odalisques 
rather than one couple. The same inability to imagine a woman who does 
not desire men may lead to the belief that he absence of men in the sexual 
scene signifies that he himself isthat man, that he invisibility ofmen in the 
mise en scene is the invisibility of subject position. Yet again, the spectator 
may believe that he scene depicts women out of control of their sexuality, 
such that a man's entry would lead them to direct greater attention toward 
him. Undergirding all of the above interpretations s the assumption that he 
male gaze is so powerful that here is no female body that is not ultimately 
arrayed for male delectation. And this in turn means that here is no woman 
who does not care about he male gaze; there is no woman who does not de- 
sire men. 
One might herefore think that the male gaze reads all women into 
straight women. But the denomination f the scene as "lesbian" pornogra- 
phy, as well as the scene's surface depiction of a woman's desire for a 
woman, would seem to undercut this. I think we must entertain the possibil- 
ity that part of the appeal of these scenes lies in the male gaze's ability to 
override the desire that women have for each other. In other words, even 
when women are acknowledged todesire ach other, that desire is nonethe- 
less only there to be trumped by the desire that men have for them. In the 
context of "lesbian" pornography, themale gaze may be an optic where sex- 
ism and heterosexism are powerfully fused-men sexually conquer women 
at the same time as heterosexuality conquers homosexuality. Under this 
reading, the charge of the scene derives from the man's triumph over both 
feminism and lesbianism, sexual conquest is political conquest. For that 
charge to exist, then, the women cannot be straight, as the charge depends on 
an overridden same-sex desire. 
But this means that he "lesbians" in the pornography arebeing read not 
as straight women, but as "bisexuals."351 Straights inthis context may thus 
be using precisely the set of analytic moves described earlier, in which bi- 
sexuality destroys the ability of monosexuals to prove that hey are mono- 
sexual.352 No matter how ardently the women express their desire for each 
other, they are unable to exorcise the possibility raised by the male gaze, in 
which that desire not only coexists with, but is superseded by, a desire for 
350. See ANDREA DwoRKJN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 47 (1989) (de- 
scribing "lesbian" pornography as "the ultimate tribute to male power: the male is not in the room, 
yet the women are there for his pleasure"). 
351. This might be seen as an anomalous way in which straight males make bisexuals more, 
rather than less, visible. What is curious, however, is that they do not make bisexuals visible as 
such-recall that the pornography is still viewed as "lesbian" pornography, rather than as "bisex- 
ual" pornography. 
352. See notes 259-263 supra and accompanying text. 
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men. Bisexuality in this formulation may threaten lesbians as the trope 
through which women's attachments to women are imaginatively destroyed 
and falsified. Indeed, if I am right, he destruction a d falsification are what 
in part stimulate male desire. 
The analysis may be generalized beyond pornography-bisexuals may 
be threatening to lesbians as a cultural trope for the phantasmatic subversion 
of their same-sex desire by straight men. Patriarchy, here specially the male 
gaze, may thus make bisexuals more threatening along this axis to lesbians 
than to gay men. 
C. Bisexuality Destabilizes Norms of Monogamy 
Even in its nomenclature, bisexuality is framed as excess. To be "bi" is 
to be doubled,353 to be "mono" is to be one.354 To defamiliarize these for- 
mulations, we might return to the Freudian conception of originary bisexual- 
ity, which frames bisexuality as an prelapsarian wholeness from which we 
fall away.355 Rather than denominating the monosexual s whole and the 
bisexual as surfeit, we might denominate the bisexual as whole and the mon- 
osexual as fragment. Viewed in this light, the flaw might be seen not as the 
bisexual's excess, but rather the monosexual's ack.356 
That we do not view things in this light can be seen not only in the way 
we name bisexuals, but also in the way that we otherwise portray them. Bi- 
sexual desire is seen not as a completion, but rather as an excess. This is 
perhaps most clearly seen in the stereotype ofbisexuals as promiscuous.357 
It should therefore not surprise that the final investment straights and 
gays have in bisexual erasure stems from their perception that bisexuality 
threatens onns of monogamy. The investment inthat nonn shared by 
353. See 2 OED, supra note 9, at 165. 
354. See 9 id. at 1008-09. 
355. See note 92 supra and accompanying text. 
356. A similar paradigm shift was made in The Symposium with regard to sex. See PLATO, 
SYMPOSIUM 41-45 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Hayden Pellicia rev., 1996). There Aristophanes re- 
counts the story of how each man and woman was originally conjoined at the back to another man 
or woman. As punishment for arrogance, ach man and woman was cut away from his or her other 
half. This is why men and women now go about searching for other men and women, in the hopes 
that by finding their lost other halves, they can regain their prelapsarian wholeness. Again, this 
challenges our view that individual men and women are whole units and that paired men and 
women are doubled units. It instead encourages us to view the couple as the unit and individual 
men and women as incomplete halves of that unit. That view, of course, has more credence in 
contemporary American culture (think of descriptions ofcouples as "unions" or descriptions of 
spouses as "better halves") than the view that bisexuals represent a desired wholeness. 
357. See WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 113, at 69. The self-conception f some bisexual 
groups demonstrates the strengths ofthis stereotype. The Washington, D.C. Bi-Women's (and 
Men's) Network, for example, was formed for "more traditionally oriented bis into monogamous or 
duogamous relationships only." See Political Activism: ABrief History, in BI ANY OTHER NAME, 
supra note 257, at 359, 361. 
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straights and gays is the sexual jealousy both groups experience in non- 
monogamous (or potentially nonmonogamous) relationships. The distinc- 
tively straight investment relates to the perception that bisexual nonmonog- 
amy leads to the transmission of HIV from the gay community o the straight 
community. The distinctively gay investment relates to the desire of some 
gays to evade the portrayal ofgays as promiscuous. 
1. Shared investment. 
For both straights and gays, bisexuality can raise deep issues of sexual 
jealousy that may ultimately require its denigration r disavowal. I take the 
straight man who is romantically involved with a bisexual woman as my 
paradigm example. However, it should be clear that he anxieties discussed 
are not specific to his orientation r sex. 
At the most basic level, the straight man is threatened byhis female part- 
ner's bisexuality because he must compete not only with other men, but also 
with other women. One might say he is made to understand Woody Allen's 
famous quip that bisexuality doubles one's chances of getting a date on a 
Saturday night358 from the other side. This fear, understood purely quantita- 
tively, seems illogical. As a preliminary matter, itis based on bad math- 
shifting from being a "straight" woman to being a "bisexual" woman does 
not necessarily "double" your dating pool, as many straight men and lesbians 
will not date avowed bisexuals.359 More importantly, it seems unlikely that a
significant part of the jealousy engendered by bisexuality can be explained 
by the anxiety of entering a larger dating pool. Does it make a difference 
whether one is competing with five billion people rather than two-and-a-half 
billion people? Or even fifty rather than twenty-five people? 
These questions suggest that he threat of bisexuality is qualitative rather 
than quantitative. It is not that one's bisexual partner can leave you for twice 
as many people, but that she can leave you for a different kind of person. 
The anxiety isaroused not by rivals who might also offer what you possess, 
but by rivals who might offer what you do not possess. 
While this qualitative concern ismore intelligible, it is not beyond criti- 
cism. This is because the qualitative concern isbased in part on the assump- 
tion that if one desires both sexes, one must consummate hat desire with 
both sexes. As Paula Rust has noted, "the bisexual's ability to form relation- 
ships with members of both sexes is interpreted as a need for relationships 
358. See Joseph P. Kahn, The New Book on Bisexuality, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 6, 1995, at 75 
("To be bisexual, Woody Allen once said, immediately doubles your chances for a date on Saturday 
night."). 
359. See, e.g., RuST, CHALLENGE, supra note 71, at 101 (noting reluctance of lesbians to as- 
sociate with bisexuals). 
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with members of both sexes."360 Rust then criticizes this logic, asking read- 
ers to "imagine concluding that a person who finds both blue and brown eyes 
attractive would require two lovers, one with each eye color, instead of con- 
cluding that his person would be happy with either a blue-eyed or a brown- 
eyed lover."361 
Even if one retires the assumption that hose who desire both sexes must 
consummate heir desires for both sexes, the qualitative concern still sur- 
vives. This is because the straight man may be certain of his bisexual part- 
ner's fidelity, but may still be concerned that because of her stated bisexual- 
ity, he is not satisfying allof her desires. Her articulation fher desire for 
women is read as an articulation f his erotic inadequacy. 
But even this refined efense seems inadequate. As one commentator 
has noted, it would be incredibly hubristic to believe that any individual 
could ever satisfy all of another individual's desires, whether erotic or oth- 
erwise.362 In emphasizing this limitation, bisexuality could thus sound a 
healthy note of realism about the incompleteness of all human relation.363 
Moreover, one could argue that o be found inadequate because of one's sex 
would be less threatening than to be found inadequate on some other 
ground,364 as all of us are inadequate in possessing only one sex.365 
A final response might be that here is a difference b tween inarticulate 
and articulate bisexuality. To return to the earlier example, one might see a 
difference b tween a woman who mentions toher brown-eyed husband that 
she is also particularly attracted tomen with blue eyes and a woman who 
keeps reiterating this to her husband. The difference between saying that you 
are attracted toothers once and saying it repeatedly is the difference b tween 
realism and sadism; the first comports with norms of courteous monogamy 
while the second does not. Even if the woman continues to be attracted to
men with blue eyes, she is not only supposed to refrain from acting on that 
attraction, but also to refrain from repeatedly articulating it. Carrying oneself 
as a bisexual must be read against his norm of courtesy. A man might ac- 
cept that it is irrational tofeel particularly inadequate because his partner 
360. Paula C. Rust, Monogamy and Polyamory: Relationship Issues for Bisexuals, in 
BISEXUALITY: THE PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS OF AN INVISIBLE MINORITY 127, 128 (Beth A. 
Firestein ed., 1996). 
361. Id. One response to this is that an individual's sex is so much more important than an 
individual's eye color that he analogy is inapt. As discussed above, however, bisexuals may not 
necessarily hold the view that an individual's sex is more important than eye color. See notes 314- 
319 supra and accompanying text. 
362. See GARBER, supra note 11, at 451-52 (quoting interview ith Brian Ford). 
363. Id. at 451. 
364. See WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 113, at 108 (noting that bisexuals who dated bisexuals 
were more jealous of "outside" partners of their own sex because "a person of the same sex as 
themselves could meet similar needs and thus replace them."); see also GARBER, supra note 11, at 
449-50 (discussing study). 
365. I assume here that intersexuals l o possess one, rather than two, sexes. 
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stated to him once that she was attracted towomen. He might, however, find 
it rational to feel inadequate ifhis partner kept reminding him of this. 
The rub here is that he man is interpreting his partner's carrying herself 
as a bisexual to be such a reminder. But this is not necessarily the case, at 
least in the sense that his partner might carry herself as a bisexual for reasons 
other than to occasion jealousy. 
As ever, there are normative r buttals to each of the potential reasons 
why bisexuals might occasion jealousy. As ever, these normative r buttals 
do not mean that he jealousies will diminish. To the extent that hey endure, 
they will act as an incentive for bisexual erasure. 
2. Straight investment. 
Under the monogamy heading, the distinctively straight investment i  bi- 
sexual erasure relates to AIDS. Bisexuality has been prominently portrayed 
as a bridge that ransmits HIV from the gay community o the so-called gen- 
eral population.366 "Inthe minds of many heterosexual Americans, bisexual- 
ity has come to be strongly identified with images of married, ishonest, 
closeted men sneaking out on their unsuspecting wives, contracting AIDS 
through unsafe sex with other men, then infecting their innocent wives and 
children."367 In the late 1980s and early 90s, the mainstream press ran a 
flurry of stories concerning the AIDS threat bisexuals posed to heterosexu- 
als.368 
I earlier showed that bisexuals were viewed as an avenue through which 
heterosexuality was called into question.369 Bisexuals are thus perceived to 
be a bridge along which two undesirable traits-same-sex desire and HIV- 
pass from a gay minority toa straight majority. In the sexual orientation 
context, he majority ischaracterized as straight and HIV-negative, while the 
minority is characterized as gay and HIV-positive. The bisexual challenges 
both characterizations-the first epistemologically, the second epidemiologi- 
cally. His mere xistence calls the heterosexuality of the majority into ques- 
tion. And his sexual practices call its HIV-negative status into question. 
Alongside this convergence, however, is an important divergence. We 
saw that characterizing the bisexual as a carrier of same-sex desire plunged 
the bisexual into obscurity. In contrast, he characterization of the bisexual 
as a carrier of HIV lofted the bisexual into temporary visibility. The discrep- 
366. See Ochs, supra note 63, at 227. 
367. Id. 
368. See, e.g., David Gelman, A Perilous Double Love Life: In the AIDS Era, Bisexuals Are 
Becoming the Ultimate Pariahs, NEWSWEEK, July 13, 1987, at 44; Knox, supra note 272, at 57; 
Katie Leishman, Heterosexuals and AIDS, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1987, at 39, 48; Nordheimer, 
supra note 272, at 1. 
369. See notes 264-278 supra and accompanying text. 
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ancy can be explained by the perceived role of social visibility inperpetuat- 
ing each. Homosexuality is generally regarded to be spread through its visi- 
bility-the mere utterance of the "contagious word" of same-sex desire is 
thought to perpetuate it.370 HIV, on the other hand, is generally seen as 
spread through its invisibility-making HIV more visible, figuratively 
through education,371 or literally through tattooing,372 is viewed to be pro- 
phylactic. Straights who wish to control both homosexuality and HIV are 
thus in a double bind vis a vis bisexual visibility. To the extent hat hey 
wish to safeguard their own heterosexuality, they will wish to erase bisexu- 
als, as the existence of the bisexual makes it impossible for them to conclu- 
sively prove their heterosexuality. To the extent that hey wish to safeguard 
their HIV-negative status, however, they will seek to keep the bisexual visi- 
ble.373 HIV has forced straights toconfess the bisexual they would otherwise 
deny.374 
370. See JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 103-26 
(1997). 
371. See CINDY PATTON, INVENTING AIDS 52 (1990) ("In private conversations, in public 
health campaigns, and in the scientific and para-scientific literature, 'knowledge' is promoted as the 
essential ingredient in the effort o slow the transmission of HIV. To the fearful citizen, knowledge 
means information which proves that she/he will not develop AIDS."). 
372. See LARRY GROSS, CONTESTED CLOSETS 59 (1993) (noting William F. Buckley, Jr.'s 
proposal that men who test HIV-positive be tattooed). 
373. This double bind cinches particularly tightly because one way in which both homosexu- 
ality and HIV might properly be described as infectious is that one individual can affect an entire 
community. Leo Bersani says that the number of homosexuals in a population may be irrelevant 
insofar as homophobia is fueled by the "fearful excitement at the prospect of becoming what one 
already is." BERSANI, supra note 232, at 28. "One gay man ... deep in a distant province of a 
nation otherwise totally successful in its genocidal campaign against gays would be enough to hold 
up, for his appalled and expectant countrymen, the mirror in which they could not escape recogniz- 
ing their already recruited selves." Id. (I am assuming that this analysis would apply just as 
strongly to bisexuals). Similarly, it has been said that "'[i]t also takes only one bisexual to intro- 
duce the AIDS virus [sic] into the heterosexual community."' Jan Zita Grover, AIDS. Keywords, in 
AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM 17, 21 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988) (quoting 
ART ULENE, SAFE SEX IN A DANGEROUS WORLD (1987)). Thus, straights must ensure that not a 
single bisexual enters the cultural imagination while simultaneously ensuring that every single bi- 
sexual remains visible. 
374. No similar double bind occurs relative to homosexual visibility, where a generic invisi- 
bility rule has worked. This may seem counterintuitive, insofar as the straight goal would still be to 
cabin the two "diseases" of homosexuality and HIV, and insofar as the two "diseases" have op- 
posed relationships to discourse, with homosexuality being spread through discourse and HIV being 
spread by a lack of it. The significant difference between the bisexual and the homosexual, how- 
ever, is that homosexuals are not perceived as spreading HIV into the straight community. Thus 
one strategy to evade the double bind has been to spread HIV discourse only insofar as it does not 
pertain to same-sex sexual conduct. See PATTON, supra note 371, at 55-56 (describing state and 
federal funding restrictions on AIDS education that forbid funding of projects that "promote homo- 
sexuality"). This cabins HIV among straights while decreasing the spread of homosexuality, not 
only through dampening discourse about homosexuality, but also by leaving homosexuals more at 
risk for HIV. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.76 on Sun, 2 Jun 2013 16:33:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Jan. 2000] BISEXUAL ERASURE 425 
It may seem ironic to list the visibility ofbisexuals as carriers of AIDS in 
the mainstream press as a symptom ofbisexual erasure. But that case can be 
defended on two grounds. First, visibility about he bisexual AIDS threat has 
not been sustained, perhaps uggesting a straight investment in repressing 
straight vulnerability to AIDS.375 In other words, bisexuality may be re- 
pressed not in spite of, but because of, the perception that it is an epidemiol- 
ogical bridge. Such denial about risk can be seen in many other contexts, 
such as the minoritizing discourse of AIDS as a disease that only affects 
certain socially marginal groups.376 Second, to the extent hat he bisexual 
has been made visible as an AIDS threat, hat visibility has been so narrow 
and so negative as to be entirely delegitimating.377 And such delegitimation, 
375. An alternative explanation for why the role of bisexuals in the transmission fHIV has 
not achieved sustained visibility isthat research as demonstrated that his threat is not significant. 
This explanation seems weak, as the studies on the role of bisexuality in cross-sex HIV transmis- 
sion have been indeterminate. 
Some studies minimize the importance of bisexuality's role in such transmission. See, e.g., 
Maria L. Ekstrand, Thomas J. Coates, Joseph R. Guydish, Walter W. Hauck, Linda Collette & Ste- 
phen B. Hulley, Are Bisexually Identified Men in San Francisco a Common Vector for Spreading 
HIV Infection to Women?, 84 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 915, 919 (1994) (concluding "that single, 
bisexually identified men in San Francisco do not appear to be a common vector for spreading HIV 
disease to women"); James G. Kahn, Jill Gurvey, Lance M. Pollack, Diane Binson & Joseph A. 
Catania, How Many HIVInfections Cross the Bisexual Bridge? An Estimatefrom the United States, 
11 AIDS 1031, 1031 (1997) (concluding "that [cross-sex] transmission via bisexuality is a rela- 
tively minor component of the estimated 40,000 annual HIV infections inthe USA"). 
Other studies, however, contend that bisexuality's role in cross-sex transmission fHIV has 
been underestimated. See, e.g., Theresa Diaz, Susan Y. Chu, Margaret Frederick, Pat Hermann, 
Anna Levy, Eve Mokotff, Bruce Whyte, Mary Herr, Patricia J. Ehecko, Cornelis A. Rietmeijer, 
Frank Sorvillo & Qaiser Mukhtar, Sociodemographics and HIV Risk Behaviors of Bisexual Men 
with AIDS: Results from a Multistate Interview Project, 7 AIDS 1227, 1231 (1993) (documenting 
"multiple risk behaviors that may be more common among behaviorally bisexual men"); Thomas 
Lerner & Mary Ann Chiasson, Seroprevalence ofHuman Immunodeficiency Virus Type I and Sex- 
ual Behaviors in Bisexual African-American andHispanic Men Visiting a Sexually Transmitted 
Disease Clinic in New York City, 147 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 269, 271 (1998) (noting that "[i]t is 
conceivable that HIV transmission from bisexual men to their female sexual partners plays a greater 
role in heterosexual transmission i  African-American andHispanic ommunities than was previ- 
ously recognized"). 
I make no attempt to weigh the merits of these studies. I simply register the conflict between 
them as an indication that here has never been a scientific consensus that bisexuality has a minimal 
role in cross-sex HIV transmission. Indeed, studies reviewing the existing literature note that not 
enough research as been done to support any such view. See, e.g., Lynda S. Doll & Carolyn 
Beeker, Male Sexual Behavior and HIV Risk in the United States: Synthesis of Research with Impli- 
cations for Behavioral Interventions, 8 AIDS EDUC. & PREVENTION 205, 219-220 (1996) (review 
of existing research which notes that he role of bisexuals in HIV transmission may be significant in
certain contexts, but that "[flurther pidemiologic and behavioral research is urgently needed to 
more fully describes the[se] contexts"). 
376. See Paula A. Treichler, AIDS, Homophobia, nd Biomedical Discourse: An Epidemic of 
Signification, i  AIDS: CULTURAL ANALYSIS/CULTURAL CTIVISM, supra note 373, at 31, 65-67. 
377. This particular genre of visibility should not be taken as solicitude for bisexuals, but 
rather as solicitude for the way in which bisexuals can infect he straight population. In this, the 
bisexual occupies a parallel position to the prostitute. As Sedgwick has recognized, "[i]t has been 
notable. . that media coverage of prostitutes with AIDS has shown no interest inthe women them- 
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as noted above,378 contributes o bisexual erasure by chilling bisexuals from 
expressing their identities. 
3. Gay investment. 
The distinctively gay investment in bisexual erasure pertaining tomo- 
nogamy has two elements. First, many gays and lesbians wish to retire the 
stereotype ofgays as promiscuous. Second, some lesbians view bisexuals as 
carrying HIV into the relatively unaffected l sbian community. 
Self-identified gays, of course, do not speak univocally against promis- 
cuity. Some in the gay community view monogamy as an oppressive cul- 
tural institution f the heterosexual establishment.379 Butover time, those 
seeking to disestablish t e stereotype (and any underlying reality beneath 
it)380 have increased in number.381 One potential explanation for this shift is 
the AIDS epidemic, which has made many gays reconsider their non- 
monogamous sexual practices.382 Another is that he growing acceptability 
of homosexuality hasmade assimilation more of a possibility. 
selves, but only in their potential for infecting men." SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET, 
supra note 4, at 5 n.8. Similarly, media coverage of bisexuals with HIV has shown little interest in 
the bisexuals themselves, but only in their potential for infecting straights. See GARBER, supra note 
11, at 93-96. 
378. See note 235 supra and accompanying text. 
379. See, e.g., Pat Califia, UnMonogamy: Loving Tricks and Tricking Lovers, in PUBLIC SEX: 
THE CULTURE OF RADICAL SEX 199, 199-204 (1994) (criticizing monogamy as utopian and repres- 
sive); Douglas Crimp, How to Have Promiscuity in an Epidemic, in AIDS: CULTURAL 
ANALYSIS/CULTURAL ACTIVISM, supra note 373, at 237, 272 ("Gay male promiscuity should be 
seen . . . as a positive model of how sexual pleasures might be pursued by and granted to everyone 
if those pleasures were not confined within the narrow limits of institutionalized sexuality."); 
DOUGLAS SADOWNICK, SEX BETWEEN MEN: AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF THE SEX LIVES OF GAY 
MEN POSTWAR TO PRESENT 86 (1996) (noting arguments against monogamy made by gay activists 
in the 1960s). 
380. This stereotype finds more support in the gay male community than in the lesbian com- 
munity. See Donna Binder, Monogamy: Is It For Us?, THE ADVOCATE, June 23, 1998, at 29, 30. 
381. See, e.g., Bruce Bawer, Sex-Negative Me, in BEYOND QUEER: CHALLENGING AY LEFT 
ORTHODOXY 171, 172 (Bruce Bawer ed., 1996) [hereinafter BEYOND QUEER] ("To suggest that 
gays are more defined by their libidos [than straights] is to collaborate in the widespread, dehu- 
manizing view that gay sex is invariably mechanical, impersonal, even bestial, while straight sex is 
an integral part of the complex web of human feeling, connectedness, and commitment before 
God."); MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, LIFE OUTSIDE: THE SIGNORILE REPORT ON GAY MEN: SEX, 
DRUGS, MUSCLES, AND THE PASSAGES OF LIFE 208-65 (1997) (discussing the prevalence of mo- 
nogamous relationships in the gay male community). 
382. See, e.g., John W. Berresford, A Gay Right Agenda, in BEYOND QUEER, supra note 381, 
at 105, 108 (noting that "[i]n a curious way, AIDS itself may be helping [gay men] find social ac- 
ceptance," since it "has brought to a screeching halt" the gay male promiscuity of the 1970s and 
1980s); Frederick R. Lynch, Nonghetto Gays: An Ethnography ofSuburban Homosexuals, in GAY 
CULTURE iN AMERICA: ESSAYS FROM THE FIELD 165, 166 (Gilbert Herdt ed., 1992) (noting that 
"the advent of AIDS must have had some degree of adverse effect on the lure of the 'swinging 
single' life-style for homosexuals and heterosexuals alike"). Others-most prominently represented 
in the Sex Panic movement-have argued that AIDS should not push gays toward monogamy, but 
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The classic situs of the gay debate over promiscuity is the marriage con- 
text. Marriage isseen as deeply connected tomonogamy, insofar as it is the 
state's sanction of an ostensibly ife-long and erotically exclusive relation- 
ship between two individuals.383 While this nexus remains imperfect in
practice, the fiction of the marriage as both reflecting and reinforcing mo- 
nogamous commitment remains trong.384 Many gays have rejected mar- 
riage in the same way that hey have rejected monogamy, as exemplifying 
heterosexist (and sexist) norms.385 Here as elsewhere, however, there is a 
growing assimilationist faction in the gay community hat seeks the entitle- 
ment of marriage. Members of this faction express disdain for promiscuity 
in general and polygamy in particular (since the latter is often viewed as a 
potential consequence of sanctioning same-sex marriage).386 
To the extent hat bisexuals are viewed as intrinsically promiscuous, a - 
similationist gays will be loath to recognize them as political allies, as such 
an affiliation might corroborate, rather than rebut, the stereotype ofgays as 
promiscuous. Bisexuals may thus pose the gay rights movement with a 
milder version of the question posed by pedophiles387 or polygamists.388 On 
the one hand, solidarity with other sexual minorities suggests that they 
should be included within the movement; on the other, realism suggests that 
the legitimacy ofthe movement may be undermined bysuch affiliations. 
An additional concem voiced by lesbians against he ostensible promis- 
cuity of bisexuals is that bisexuals might carry HIV into the lesbian commu- 
nity. Despite the fact hat HIV is often characterized as a "gay" disease, les- 
bians are less at risk for sexual transmission f HIV than either gay men or 
rather toward the practice of safe sex. See, e.g., Joseph Sonnabend & Richard Berkowitz, Safer-Sex 
Panic, in SEX PANIC! 13, 14 (1997) (arguing that "it is the call for sexual restraint and monogamy 
with its inherent deemphasis of safer sex that now constitutes the greater hazard to the health of gay 
men"); Jim Eigo, The Monogamy Code, in SEX PANIC!, supra, at 15, 16 (arguing against the "attack 
on safer sex" and the promotion of "global gay male monogamy"). 
383. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 1 (1996). 
384. See id. atI. 
385. See, e.g., Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON: A READER (Andrew Sullivan ed., 1997). 
386. See Andrew Sullivan, Three's a Crowd, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 385, at 
278-79. 
387. See, e.g., Duncan Osborne, The Trouble with NAMBLA, THE ADVOCATE, Dec. 14, 1993, 
at 40 (reporting the International Lesbian and Gay Association's request that the North American 
Man-Boy Love Association resign from the organization); Joyce Price, Pedophiles Resisting Expul- 
sionfrom Gay Umbrella Organization, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27,1993, at A4 (similar). 
388. See, e.g., David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 
53, 53 (1997) ("During the hearings and debates that led to the Defense of Marriage Act, many 
members of Congress and many witnesses drew comparisons between polygamy and same-sex 
marriage."); Sullivan, supra note 386 (arguing that polygamy and same-sex marriage are easily 
distinguishable). 
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straights.389 It is thus unsurprising that some lesbians, like some heterosexu- 
als,390 fear the potential of bisexuals to serve as an epidemiological bridge 
from a "high-risk" to a "low-risk" community. One bisexual commentator 
notes that "gay women are hesitant o become involved with bi-the-way-girls 
because WE SPREAD AIDS or will leave them for a man,"391 while another 
suggests that she is perceived as an "AIDS-carrying high-risk parasite on the 
movement."392 The propinquity of the charge of HIV transmission to the 
charge or capitulation to patriarchy (framed either individually as the ulti- 
mate rejection of a woman for a man or politically as the inability of the bi- 
sexual parasite to reject heterosexual privilege) may be purely coincidental. 
It may, however, suggest that just as the straight community occasionally 
appears to make HIV stand for the "disease" of homosexuality,393 so too does 
the lesbian community make HIV stand for the "diseases" of patriarchy and 
capitulation to heterosexual privilege. 
D. Overlapping Monosexual Investments a a Cause of the 
Epistemic Contract 
This Part has suggested that straights and gays have entered into the 
epistemic ontract of bisexual erasure because of three different investments: 
(1) an investment in stabilizing sexual orientation; (2) an investment in re- 
taining the primacy of sex; and (3) an investment inpreserving norms of mo- 
nogamy. 
Straights and gays have an investment in stabilizing sexual orientation 
categories. The shared aspect of this investment is the security that all indi- 
viduals draw from rigid social orderings. The distinctively straight invest- 
ment is the retention of heterosexual privilege. And the distinctively gay 
investment relates to the perception that bisexuality endangers the immuta- 
bility defense and effective political mobilization. 
Both straights and gays may also wish to erase bisexuals because bisexu- 
ality has disturbing consequences for the current sex regime. All monosex- 
uals are created through a regime that privileges ex, and they thus have an 
investment in bisexual erasure that relates to their own constitution. 
Straights have a specific investment in bisexual erasure because bisexuality 
disrupts the power heterosexuality has to determine sex performance. And 
389. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Multivocal Prejudices and Homo Equity, 74 IND. L.J. 
1085, 1118 (1998) (noting that while gays are often characterized as carrying HIV, "the data makes 
it clear that ... lesbians seem to have the lowest rates of AIDS . . . of any of the groupings"). 
390. See notes 366-368 supra. 
391. Karen and Miranda Augustine, What Some Call Community ... Others Call Clicks, in 
PLURAL DESIRES, supra note 345, at 37, 37. 
392. Michelle Spring-Moore, Queergirl, in PLURAL DESIRES, supra note 345, at 226, 243. 
393. JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" 64 
(1993) (describing the conflation of homosexuality and AIDS as pathological diseases). 
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gays have a specific investment because bisexuality interferes with complete 
sex separatism. 
Finally, both straights and gays are disquieted by bisexuals insofar as bi- 
sexuals are thought o represent nonmonogamy. Straights and gays have a 
shared investment in decreasing sexual jealousy. Straights are peculiarly 
threatened insofar as they believe that bisexual nonmonogamy bridges the 
gap between the HIV-infected gay population and the uninfected straight 
population. And gays are distinctively threatened by bisexual nonmonogamy 
to the extent hat they wish to retire the stereotype of gays as nonmonoga- 
mous. 
These multiple and overlapping investments inbisexual erasure explain 
the longevity of the epistemic ontract. But they are not insurmountable. 
The very fact that bisexual erasure has been recognized indicates this, for the 
paradox of status hierarchy is that the oppressed category must have some 
power to be recognized as such.394 But this means that even as there are in- 
vestments in bisexual invisibility, there are simultaneous and countervailing 
investments inbisexual visibility. 
The group with the most powerful investment in bisexual visibility is 
composed of self-identified bisexuals. In the next Part, I look at how bisexu- 
als have responded to the epistemic ontract. That narrative is one of both 
capitulation and resistance, testifying toboth the strength of the epistemic 
contract and the possibility of its gradual dissolution. 
IV. SELF-IDENTIFIED BISEXUALS AND THE EPISTEMIC CONTRACT 
The longevity of the epistemic ontract can be explained in two ways. 
The first is that bisexuals are not harmed by the contract, or, more strongly, 
that bisexuals benefit from their own erasure such that the contract could be 
characterized as trilateral rather than bilateral. The second is that despite the 
fact that bisexuals are harmed by the contract, itis so powerful that bisexuals 
are prevented from fully conceiving of themselves as bisexuals, or from ef- 
fectively dissolving that contract even if they do. The two explanations are 
not mutually exclusive, insofar as bisexuals are not a monolithic group. 
Some bisexuals fit the stereotype of those who take advantage of heterosex- 
ual privilege while engaging in clandestine homosexual activity.395 Others 
experience bisexual erasure as a harm and militate for bisexual visibility.396 
394. Cf Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 
101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 68 (1987) ("Power is at its peak when it is least visible, when it shapes 
preferences, arranges agendas, and excludes erious challenges from discussion or even imagina- 
tion."). 
395. See notes 83-85 supra and accompanying text. 
396. See notes 402429 infra nd accompanying text. 
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Which explanation we view as dominant, however, has significant conse- 
quences for how serious we view the problem of bisexual erasure to be. 
While it is difficult toarbitrate b tween the two explanations, I will ar- 
gue in this Part that we should seriously entertain the viability of the second 
one. I begin this argument by observing that he epistemic contract prevents 
the articulation fbisexual identity atevery phase of bisexual development, 
impeding the formation fa bisexual subject hat could meaningfully consent 
to its own erasure. I then note that despite the demands of the contract, an 
increasingly visible bisexual movement has articulated its desire for visibil- 
ity. 
A. Bisexual Capitulation to the Epistemic Contract 
The epistemic contract obstructs every phase of bisexual development. I 
consider three phases here: (1) pre-coming out as bisexual; (2) post-coming 
out to some others; and (3) post-coming out to "all" others. 
The process of coming out as a bisexual may be retarded by the fact hat 
no robust emplate of bisexual identity exists. Even in a time where there is 
an increasingly available model of gay identity, there is no equivalent one for 
bisexual identity. Many individuals who might otherwise identify as bisex- 
ual may refrain from doing so only because they cannot imagine that iden- 
tity.397 Possible support for this hypothesis can be found in a recent study 
showing that bisexuals come out as bisexual relatively ater than homosexu- 
als come out as homosexual.398 
Even after a bisexual comes out to some others, she encounters enor- 
mous pressure to present herself to the rest of the world as straight. A study 
of the relative degrees of "outness" in the workplace among (1) gays, (2) bi- 
sexuals, and (3) straights with unorthodox sexual practices found that gays 
were most likely to be out, followed by bisexuals, followed by heterosexuals 
with unorthodox sexual practices.399 It is surely no accident that his exactly 
tracks the ascending degree to which these identities can be hidden within a 
heterosexual matrix. Moreover, even after a bisexual comes out to some 
others, he will be under pressure to be selectively closeted. This is perhaps 
most true in the dating context, where bisexuals find that both straights and 
gays can often be reluctant todate bisexuals. 
Finally, even a bisexual who is out to "all" others will have a difficult 
time communicating this. The monosexual presumption means that if a 
397. See GARBER, supra note 11, at 48-49 (giving accounts of bisexuals who were introduced 
to the bisexual category relatively late); WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 113, at 121 (noting that bi- 
sexuals generally "come out" later than homosexuals "because there is a less clear identity with 
which to 'come out"'). 
398. See WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 113, at 121. 
399. See id. at 188-89. 
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woman walks down the street holding hands with a man, we are likely to 
think of her as straight; ifshe does the same thing with a woman, we are 
likely to think of her as lesbian.400 This presumption leads us to code indi- 
viduals as monosexual unless they evidence concurrent bisexuality. 
This synchronic approach to orientation assignation can obtain even 
when a diachronic a count of the individual's erotic life is available. Ruth 
Colker supports his point by noting the reflexive use of the term "hasbian" 
to describe women who shift from a sustained same-sex relationship toa 
sustained cross-sex relationship.401 Such a shift could equally be described 
as sequential bisexuality-the pattern of conduct is thus overdetermined an
requires narratological resolution. That this ambiguity is resolved before 
being recognized suggests a synchronic approach to orientation attribution: 
The "hasbian" classification reads the current conduct as the "true" one and 
the past conduct as the repudiated one, rather than reading them both as an 
embrace of sequential bisexuality. Such a synchronic approach will tend to 
eliminate all but concurrent bisexuals from the bisexual category. 
B. Bisexual Resistance to the Epistemic Contract 
The argument that bisexuals capitulate o bisexual erasure because they 
are not harmed by it is also undercut by an increasingly visible bisexual 
movement. The movement's development can be crudely divided into three 
phases by decade. 
The bisexual movement did not begin in a patterned way until after 
Stonewall.402 One could do worse than date its inauguration to the formation 
of the National Bisexual Liberation (NBL) group in New York City in the 
early 1970s.403 The NBL began publication ofa magazine, Bisexual Expres- 
sion, in 1975, roughly coinciding with the first books and mainstream press 
about bisexuality.404 The magazine provided an antidote to the de- 
legitimating treatments of"bisexual chic" in the popular press (including 
Time405 and Newsweek406) that suggested that bisexuality was the perquisite 
400. See Ochs, supra note 63, at 225. 
401. See Ruth Colker, A Bisexual Jurisprudence, 3 LAW & SEXUALITY 127, 129-30 (1993) 
[hereinafter Colker, Bisexual Jurisprudence]. 
402. San Francisco's Sexual Freedom League, founded in 1967, might be seen as a precursor 
to the bisexual movement in that it encouraged experimentation with both sexes. It was not, how- 
ever, explicitly a bisexual organization. 
403. See Stephen Donaldson, The Bisexual Movement's Beginnings in the 70s: A Personal 
Retrospective, in BISEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 7, at 31, 42-43. 
404. See Donaldson, supra note 403, at 43. 
405. See The New Bisexuals, supra note 230, at 79. 
406. See Bisexual Chic, supra note 230, at 90. 
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of androgynous rock stars such as David Bowie or Elton John.407 The NBL's 
meetings consisted of monthly social events and consciousness-raising exer- 
cises.408 In its social cast, the organization was similar to many that followed 
in that decade 409 such as New York City's Bisexual Forum (founded in 
1975),410 San Francisco's Bisexual Center (founded in 1976),411 and Chi- 
cago's Bi-Ways (founded in 1978).412 Bisexual activists were also occasion- 
ally prominent in early gay-identified ndeavors. For example, Alan Rock- 
way, a "gay-identified bisexual," co-authored the well-known Dade County, 
Florida ordinance that became the first ordinance to protect gay rights, and 
which spawned the national anti-gay "Save Our Children" crusade.413 
In the 1980s, the bisexual movement shifted toward claims for greater 
recognition as a political movement,414 with activists attempting to distin- 
guish bisexuality from sexual swinging. BiPOL, the first bisexual political 
action group, formed in San Francisco in 1983.415 And many date the birth 
of the national bisexual movement o the second March on Washington for 
Lesbian and Gay Rights in 1987, where a national bisexual network, later 
known as BiNET USA was formed.416 The shift might have been expected 
as a simple byproduct of the increased maturity and self-consciousness ofthe 
bisexual movement, with increasing numbers of bisexual organizations pro- 
407. See Jay P. Paul, San Francisco's Bisexual Center and the Emergence of a Bisexual 
Movement, inBISEXUALITIES: THE IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE OF SEXUAL CONTACT WITH BOTH 
MEN AND WOMEN 130, 132 (Erwin J. Haeberle & Rolf Gindorf eds., 1998); see also GARBER, 
supra note 11, at 18-19 (describing Time and Newsweek articles); Donaldson, supra note 403, at 35 
(same). It was at this time that he term "AC/DC" became popularized to describe bisexual people. 
See GARBER, supra note 11, at 38. 
408. See Donaldson, supra note 403, at 42-43. 
409. See Udis-Kessler, supra note 308, at 22-23. 
410. See Chuck Mishaan, The Bisexual Scene in New York City, 11 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 223, 
224 (1985). The organization folded in 1983. See id. 
411. See Danielle Raymond & Liz A. Highleyman, Brief Timeline of Bisexual Activism in the 
United States, in BISEXUAL POLITICS, supra note 7, at 333, 334. The Bisexual Center of San Fran- 
cisco held its first press conference on June 30, 1977. Speakers included Dr. Benjamin Spock, Dr. 
Phyllis Lyon and Ruth Falk. Many of these speakers challenged Anita Bryant's efforts o bar ho- 
mosexuals from employment as school teachers and discussed other civil rights issues. See Maggi 
Rubenstein & Cynthia Ann Slater, A Profile of the San Francisco Bisexuality Center, 11 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 227, 228-30 (1985). 
412. See George Barr, Chicago Bi- Ways: An Informal History, 11 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 231, 
232-34 (1985). In the early 1980s, Action Bi-Women was formed in the Chicago area to develop a
feminist-oriented bisexual group. See id. at 234. 
413. See Political Activism: ABrief History, in BI ANY OTHER NAME, supra note 257, at 359, 
363. 
414. See Udis-Kessler, supra note 308, at 26 (discussing increasing political activity of bisex- 
ual movement). 
415. See id.; Raymond & Highleyman, supra note 411, at 334. 
416. See Paul, supra note 407, at 137; Political Activism, supra note 413, at 364; Raymond &
Highleyman, supra note 411, at 335. 
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liferating across the country.417 But the shift can also be attributed to the 
AIDS crisis, which came into public visibility in the early years of the dec- 
ade. In 1987, Time4l8 and Newsweek4l9 would again publish articles touching 
upon bisexuality, but this time not about "bisexual chic," but about bisexual- 
ity and AIDS.420 Bisexuality had now acquired a serious edge: Newsweek 
called bisexuals the "ultimate pariahs" of the AIDS crisis.421 
In the 1990s, bisexual politics has risen to greater national and interna- 
tional prominence. The First National Bisexual Conference convened in San 
Francisco in 1990, with Bisexual Pride Day proclaimed by the San Francisco 
Board of Supervisors.422 The following years saw the First International Bi- 
sexual Conference held in Amsterdam,423 the publication of two major bi- 
sexual anthologies,424 and the inauguration of a national bisexual maga- 
zine.425 By 1993, the March on Washington for Lesbian and Gay Civil 
Rights had become the March on Washington for Lesbian, Gay and Bi Equal 
Rights and Liberation.426 Whether to name or not to name bisexuals along- 
side gays and lesbians has become an explicit issue of debate.427 That debate 
has also trickled into the law. As evidenced by Colorado's Amendment 2428 
and the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy,429 bisexuals are increasingly 
nominally visible, even if politically repressed. 
417. These included the Boston Bisexual Women's Network in 1983, the East Coast Bisexual 
Network in 1985, the Seattle Women's Bisexual Network in 1985, and the Washington D.C. Bi- 
Women's (and Men's) Network in 1989. See Political Activism, supra note 413, at 360-61. 
418. See Martha Smiglis, Scott Brown, Dave Morrow & Leslie Whitaker, The Big Chill: Fear 
of AIDS, TIME, Feb. 16, 1998, at 50, 52. 
419. See Gelman, supra note 368. 
420. See Paul, supra note 407, at 137-39 (describing articles). 
421. Gelman, supra note 368, at 44; see also GARBER, supra note 11, at 93 (describing article). 
422. See Raymond & Highleyman, supra note 411, at 335-36. The conference was attended 
by over four hundred people from twenty-two states and five countries. See Paul, supra note 407, 
at 137. 
423. See KLEIN, supra note 81, at 169. The second and third international bisexual confer- 
ences occurred in London and New York in the mid-1990s. See id. 
424. See Bi ANY OTHER NAME, supra note 257; CLOSER TO HOME: BISEXUALITY AND 
FEMINISM (Elizabeth Rebea Weise ed., 1992). 
425. The Bay Area Bisexual Network began publishing the magazine Anything That Moves in 
January, 1991. See GARBER, supra note 11, at 54. 
426. See Raymond & Highleyman, supra note 411, at 337. 
427. See, e.g., GARBER, supra note I 1, at 80-81 (describing controversy over removal of word 
"bisexual" from Northampton, Massachusetts Lesbian and Gay Pride March in 1990); id. at 53 
(describing controversy over inclusion of word "bisexual" in masthead of San Francisco Bay 
Times, which then read, "The Gay/Lesbian/Bisexual Newspaper & Calendar of Events for the Bay 
Area"). 
428. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (quoting Colorado's Amendment 2,
which prohibits protection fbisexual status); notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text. 
429. See 10 U.S.C. ? 654(b)(2) (1994) (making unrebutted statements of bisexual self- 
identification grounds for separation from service); supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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The bisexual movement's aims are diverse, and both converge and di- 
verge with those of the gay rights movement. Thus, bisexuals, like gays, can 
be seen deploying bisexuality both as a means of retiring all sexual orienta- 
tion categorizations and as a means of contesting placement within those 
categorizations. On the other hand, bisexuals also have interests in their 
visibility that are specific to them: that is, interests hat combat biphobia 
rather than homophobia. These interests include the retirement of stereotypi- 
cal views about bisexuality, such as the perceptions that hey are indecisive, 
duplicitous, and promiscuous. 
C. The Dissolution of the Epistemic Contract 
The rise of the bisexual movement is probably the main factor leading to 
the dissolution of the epistemic contract of bisexual erasure. But as I have 
shown in critiquing the investments of both straights and gays in bisexual 
erasure, monosexuals also have undertheorized investments in bisexual visi- 
bility. The gay investments in bisexual visibility are perhaps easier to see- 
bisexuality, for example, can operate as a useful heuristic for evaluating the 
immutability defense, as well as a means of eroding heterosexual privilege 
by problematizing the concept of heterosexuality i self. Straights, however, 
have investments in bisexual visibility as well, such as challenging sex- 
separatism inthe gay community ordefending conventional norms of mo- 
nogamy. 
Given the rise of the bisexuality movement, i  seems safe to say that bi- 
sexuals will only grow more visible in the future. It is therefore time to con- 
sider how a world in which the epistemic contract no longer obtained might 
look. In the next Part, I consider how a particular world-the legal world- 
might be transformed by enhanced bisexual visibility. 
V. BISEXUALITY AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
Despite the fact that it is one of the main public sites in which formal 
determinations f exual orientation are made, the legal system is complicit 
in cultural ignorance about sexuality.430 It should therefore not be surprising 
that bisexuals are for the most part as invisible in the law as they are in our 
general culture. Indeed, if academic ommentary is any indication, bisexu- 
ality is far more undertheorized in the legal realm than it is in the social sci- 
ence realm. In 1993, Ruth Colker began an essay entitled ABisexual Juris- 
prudence with the statement: "A bisexual jurisprudence? Until I decided to 
write this essay, there was no such thing as a bisexual jurisprudence."431 A 
430. Cf POSNER, supra note 30, at 1 (noting that "judges know next to nothing about the 
subject [of human sexuality] beyond their own personal experience"). 
431. Colker, Bisexual Jurisprudence, supra note 401, at 127. 
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computer search of law review articles that deal with the subject of bisexual- 
ity bears out her claim: Only a half-dozen articles take bisexuality inthe law 
as their primary subject.432 
How might increased bisexual visibility affect the law? To begin think- 
ing about his question, I take the case of sexual harassment law. I do so for 
three reasons. First, bisexuals are more visible in this area of jurisprudence 
than in others.433 This visibility arises because liability under Title VII only 
lies if the sexual harassment occurs "because of ... sex." Under one inter- 
pretation, this doctrinal formulation permits bisexuals to evade liability when 
they sexually harass both men and women, because no victim can claim that 
the harassment occurred "because of' the victim's "sex." Bisexuals are thus 
not only distinguished from heterosexuals nd homosexuals, but are rhetori- 
cally privileged above both. 
As we shall see, this exemption has been closed as a practical matter. 
But both in recognizing and in closing the exemption, the courts have had to 
grapple with the reality of bisexuality ina way that hey have not had to in 
other areas. Thus, while the bisexual harassment exemption is unimportant 
as a practical matter, ithas made bisexuals uniquely visible in antidiscrimi- 
nation doctrine. 
Second, bisexual visibility has the normative consequence of narrowing 
another pernicious exemption in the sexual harassment jurisprudence.434 
This exemption, which I call the "horseplay exemption," arises when self- 
identified straights defend against charges of same-sex sexual harassment by
stating that the alleged homosexual harassment was in fact heterosexual 
horseplay. Because sexual harassment jurisprudence (at least in the past 
decade) has directed much more solicitude toward sexual harms than non- 
sexual harms, an alleged harasser who is deemed to have engaged in hetero- 
sexual horseplay ismuch more likely to be exempted from liability than one 
who is deemed to have engaged in homosexual harassment. This horseplay 
exemption ispernicious because it makes liability turn on status rather than 
on conduct-more specifically, onthe sexual orientation fthe actors rather 
432. I found three articles, two essays, and one student note that ook the role of the bisexual 
in the law as their main subject. See Ruth Colker, Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender and Dis- 
ability, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1995) (article); Ruth Colker, An Embodied Bisexual Perspective, 7 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 163 (1995) (article); Mezey, supra note 8 (article); Colker, Bisexual Juris- 
prudence, supra note 401 (review essay); Douglas S. Miller, Rumpole and the Equal Opportunity 
Harasser (or Judge Bork's Revenge), 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 165 (1996) (essay); Robin Applebaum, 
The "Undifferentiating L bido ": A Need for Federal Legislation to Prohibit Sexual Harassment by 
a Bisexual Sexual Harasser, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 601 (1997) (note). As this list shows, Ruth 
Colker has done the most writing in this area; her article ntitled Bi: Race, Sexual Orientation, 
Gender, and Disability has also been expanded into a prescient book. See COLKER, HYBRID, supra 
note 9. 
433. I omit further citation in this paragraph aswell as the ones that follow as the points made 
here are explored more deeply with citations below. See text accompanying otes 464-502 infra. 
434. See text accompanying otes 503-534 infra. 
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than on the nature of the allegedly harassing acts. And unlike the bisexual 
harassment exemption, the horseplay exemption is wide open. 
For reasons I will describe more fully, the horseplay exemption as it cur- 
rently stands is predicated on bisexual invisibility. Bisexual visibility thus 
has the salutary consequence of significantly narrowing this exemption. And 
because the courts have already made bisexuality visible in the context of the 
bisexual harassment exemption, this argument has a certain elegant force. 
While the courts have sought o keep the bisexual harassment exemption 
closed and the horseplay exemption open, this status quo is inconsistent. 
Narrowing the bisexual harassment exemption through bisexual visibility 
logically compels courts to significantly narrow the horseplay exemption. 
Call this the conservative critique. 
Finally, closing the horseplay exemption has its own spillover effects on 
the degree to which the sexual harassment jurisprudence will continue to 
fetishize desire as determinative of liability.435 The conservative critique is
conservative inthe sense that it accepts, rather than contests, the aforemen- 
tioned premise that sexual harm is more serious than nonsexual harm. As 
Vicki Schultz has recently and persuasively argued, however, this premise is 
deeply problematic.436 Her argument is timely, as the Supreme Court's re- 
cent decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services437 suggests that sex- 
ual harassment jurisprudence is at a cross-roads. It can either continue to 
privilege sexual harm over nonsexual harm or break with that practice to 
treat sexual and nonsexual harm equally. 
Bisexual visibility might act as a goad to force courts down the correct 
path after Oncale. Closing the horseplay exemption leaves many putative 
straights more at risk of earning the ascriptions ofhomoeroticism and har- 
assment. Bisexual visibility might hus encourage straights, a  well as gays, 
to resist a regime in which liability turns olely on desire. Call this the radi- 
cal critique. 
After briefly summarizing the development ofsexual harassment juris- 
prudence, this Part considers each of these reasons for considering bisexual 
visibility insexual harassment law. It then briefly considers the implications 
bisexual visibility might have outside the sexual harassment context. 
A. A Summary of the Development of the Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an unlawful employ- 
ment practice for an employer ... to discriminate gainst any individual with 
respect o his compensation, terms, conditions, orprivileges of employment, 
435. See text accompanying otes 535-554 infra. 
436. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998). 
437. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
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because of such individual's ... sex."438 This language has been interpreted 
to prohibit sexual harassment inthe workplace. As Katherine Franke has 
noted, however, courts have long been unclear about why sexual harassment 
is sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, and have generated at least 
three different theories.439 The first is that sexual harassment is actionable 
insofar as it would not have occurred but for the victim's ex; that is, insofar 
as it occurred "because of . . . sex" under the language of the statute.440 The 
second is that it is actionable because it is sexual in nature.441 The third is 
that sexual harassment is actionable because it enacts one sex's subordina- 
tion of another.442 
The first wo theories have been the most dominant. The struggle be- 
tween them can be characterized as passing through four conceptual phases. 
In the first phase, the "because of . . . sex" theory was the ascendant theory. 
Indeed, the desire-based theory was not even acknowledged-early claims of 
desire-based harassment were rejected as not raising a cognizable claim un- 
der Title VII. Thus, in Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,443 the judge dismissed 
allegations of desire-based harassment by reasoning that no Title VII claim 
could lie when the alleged harasser was merely "satisfying a personal 
urge,"444 asopposed to acting pursuant toa company policy.445 And in Tom- 
kins v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co.,446 the district court refused to 
recognize desire-based claims under Title VII because otherwise "[a]n invi- 
tation to dinner could become an invitation toa federal lawsuit."447 Charac- 
terizing the sexual conduct as idiosyncratic, or as raising slippery slope 
problems, the courts essentially sidestepped the question of whether this was 
discrimination "because of. . . sex."448 
438. 42 U.S.C. ? 2000e-2(a) (1994). 
439. See Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 
691, 692-93 (1997). 
440. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986); Bundy v. 
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989 n.49 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977); see also Franke, supra note 439, at 705-14. 
441. See, e.g., Yeary v. Goodwill Indus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 1997); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 
F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Franke, supra note 439, at 714-25. 
442. See Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (N.D. Ind. 1995); 
Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988); see also Franke, supra note 439, at 
725-29. 
443. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977). 
444. Id. at 163. 
445. For similar easoning, see Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 235-36 (N.D. 
Cal. 1976) (finding that no Title VII claim could lie for the isolated and unauthorized sex miscon- 
duct of one employee to another), rev 'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979). 
446. 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
447. Id. at 557. 
448. See Franke, supra note 439, at 700 (noting judicial concern over the slippery slope 
problem). 
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In the second phase, courts rejected this evasion as illogical, finding that 
desire-based harassment typically occurred "because of ... sex." The im- 
petus for this belief came from feminist activists such as Kerri Weisel, who 
contended that desire-based harassment was sex-based harassment because 
an individual usually directs desire only at one sex or the other. 449 
The first court o adopt his theory was the D.C. Circuit, in the 1977 case 
of Barnes v. Costle.450 The district ourt in Barnes had granted summary 
judgment to the defendant because it found that Paulette Barnes "'was dis- 
criminated against, not because she was a woman, but because she refused to 
engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor.'`451 A panel of the D.C. Cir- 
cuit reversed, noting that desire-based claims and "because of ... sex" 
claims could not be dissociated inthis way. It stated: 
We cannot accept this analysis of the situation .... But for [Barnes's] woman- 
hood, from aught hat appears, her participation i  sexual activity would never 
have been solicited.... [Bames] became the target of her superior's sexual de- 
sires because she was a woman, and was asked to bow to his demands as the 
price for holding her job. The circumstance imparting high visibility to the role 
of gender in the affair is that no male employee was susceptible to such an ap- 
proach by appellant's upervisor. Thus gender cannot be eliminated from the 
formulation which appellant advocates, and that formulation advances a prima 
facie case of sex discrimination within the purview of Title VII.452 
Other circuits oon adopted this theory.453 And in 1986, in Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson,454 the Supreme Court noted that: "Without question, when a 
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, 
that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."455 
In the third phase, as Schultz has shown, a chiasmus occurred between 
the two theories.456 The desire-based theory, which had been the subordinate 
theory, became the dominant heory; the "because of ... sex" theory, which 
had been the dominant theory, became the subordinate heory. Desire was 
now often framed as either a precondition r an important component of a 
successful Title VII sexual harassment claim. The ascendancy of the desire- 
based theory manifested itself in a number of ways, perhaps most promi- 
449. See Schultz, supra note 436, at 1702 (citing Kerri Weisel, Title VII: Legal Protection 
Against Sexual Harassment, 53 WASH. L. REv. 123, 133-35 (1977)). 
450. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
451. Id. at 986 (quoting Barnes v. Train, Civ. No. 1828-73, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 
1974)). 
452. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990. 
453. See, e.g., Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Tomkins v. Public 
Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
454. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
455. Id. at 64. 
456. See Schultz, supra note 436, at 1690 ("Ironically, courts that once refused to recognize 
that sexual advances may occur because of sex now insist on such advances and fail to perceive 
many other problems that confront women workers as sex-based."). 
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nently in the denomination fthe cause of action as "sexual harassment" 
rather than as "sex-based" or "gender-based" harassment.457 It could also be 
seen in the EEOC guidelines, which advanced a desire-based theory of har- 
assment.458 That ascendancy could also be seen in the case law. Some 
courts held desire to be a prerequisite for a successful Title VII claim,459 and 
even courts that considered both sexual and nonsexual claims often ignored 
or subordinated the latter.460 
The Supreme Court's recent opinion in Oncale can be seen as potentially 
ushering in a fourth phase. In Oncale, the Supreme Court had to ascertain 
whether same-sex sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII, and if 
so, under what restrictions. In so doing, it had to choose a theory from a set 
that included the desire-based theory461 and the "because of ... sex" the- 
ory.462 
The Supreme Court embraced the "because of ... sex" theory.463 This 
holding has obvious implications for all of sexual harassment jurisprudence, 
insofar as it rejected the view that desire is a requirement for a successful 
Title VII suit. As I demonstrate below, however, whether Oncale can truly 
be seen as breaking from the third phase remains to be seen. 
B. Bisexual Visibility-The Recognition and Closing of the Bisexual 
Harassment Exemption 
Sexual harassment jurisprudence is distinctive inthat it not only names 
bisexuality but treats it differently (and rhetorically more favorably) than 
either heterosexuality or homosexuality. It would be a mistake, however, to 
457. See id. at 1692. 
458. See id. at 1704 & nn.95 & 97 (noting that hat EEOC guidelines could be and were read 
to privilege sexual harm) (citing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 62 Fed. Reg. 
63,622 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. ? 1604.11 (1997))). 
459. See Schultz, supra note 436, at 1718 & n.167 (citing, inter alia, Yeary v. Goodwill In- 
dus.-Knoxville, Inc., 107 F.3d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1997); Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 
702, 706 (5th Cir. 1997); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
460. See Schultz, supra note 436, at 1710-29 (citing, inter alia, Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 
510 U.S. 17 (1993); King v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990); Scott v. Sears, Roe- 
buck & Co., 798 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1986); Reynolds v. Atlantic City Convention Ctr., 53 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1852 (D.N.J. 1990), affd, 925 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1991); Raley v. Board of St. 
Mary's Comm'rs, 752 F. Supp. 1272, 1280-81 (D. Md. 1990); Graham v. American Airlines, 731 F. 
Supp. 1494, 1500-01 (N.D. Okla. 1989); Ross v. Double Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. 
Tex. 1987); Sapp v. City of Warner Robins, 655 F. Supp. 1043, 1049-50 (M.D. Ga. 1987)). 
461. Compare McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. Of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (ruling that same-sex sexual harassment claim was not actionable where defendants were 
heterosexual), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 819 (1996), with Wrightson v. Pizza Hut, 99 F.3d 138, 143-44 
(4th Cir. 1996) (ruling that same-sex sexual harassment claim was actionable where defendants 
were homosexual). 
462. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 90 F.3d 1372, 1377 (8th Cir. 1996). 
463. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore S rvs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998). 
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take the court's recognition fthe bisexual harassment exemption asan indi- 
cation of bisexual privilege. As a practical matter, the bisexual harassment 
exemption has been closed. Nonetheless, inorder to close the bisexual har- 
assment exemption i a coherent way, courts have been forced into theoriz- 
ing bisexuality with some sophistication. Thus, despite the fact that he ex- 
emption isnot jurisprudentially important, it has compelled a significant ad- 
mission about bisexual existence. 
1. The recognition of the bisexual harassment exemption- 
bisexual visibility. 
Bisexuals were first made visible in the sexual harassment jurisprudence 
when the shift from the first phase to the second phase was being contem- 
plated. In Corne,464 the court stated that it would be "ludicrous" to call de- 
sire-based harassment sex discrimination, "because to do so would mean that 
if the conduct complained of [male sexual advances on females] was directed 
equally to males there would be no basis for suit."465 The bisexual possibil- 
ity was thus adduced to problematize the extension of Title VII's coverage to 
desire-based claims. 
While it made the shift from the first phase to the second phase despite 
this problem, the D.C. Circuit in Barnes was not able to solve it. Barnes 
simply buried the unresolved issue in a footnote, noting that "[i]n the case of 
the bisexual superior, the insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute 
gender discrimination because it would apply to male and female mployees 
alike."466 This left the Barnes theory vulnerable toattack, as could be seen in 
a subsequent case in the circuit adopting that theory. In dissenting from a 
denial of rehearing in Vinson v. Taylor, 467 then-judges Scalia, Bork, and 
Starr argued as follows: 
[T]his court has twice stated that Title VII does not prohibit sexual harassment 
by a "bisexual superior [because] the insistence upon sexual favors would ... 
apply to male and female mployees alike." [citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 
983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981)).] Thus, this court holds that only the differentiating libido runs 
afoul of Title VII, and bisexual harassment, however blatant and however of- 
fensive and disturbing, is legally permissible. Had Congress been aiming at 
sexual harassment, it seems unlikely that a woman would be protected from 
unwelcome heterosexual orlesbian advances but left unprotected when a bisex- 
ual attacks. That bizarre result suggests that Congress was not thinking of indi- 
vidual harassment a all but of discrimination in conditions of employment be- 
cause of gender. If it is proper to classify harassment as discrimination for Title 
464. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). 
465. Id. at 163. 
466. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
467. 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
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VII purposes, that decision at least demands adjustments in subsidiary doc- 
trines.468 
These judges thus contended that Title VII could not have been intended to 
reach desire-based discrimination because doing so would permit bisexuals 
to evade liability. 
The embarrassment that bisexuality causes sexual harassment jurispru- 
dence is clear. An individual who would be liable for engaging in certain 
conduct can evade liability for that conduct by engaging in more of the con- 
duct directed at the opposite sex. I call this the "double for nothing" prob- 
lem-by doubling the proscribed conduct, he harasser lowers his liability to 
nothing.469 This result is so counterintuitive hatcommentators who usually 
seem far apart on the political spectrum-such as Robert Bork and Catharine 
MacKinnon-can agree that his result is anomalous.470 
The problem of the bisexual harasser demonstrates he manner in which 
bisexuality destabilizes norms that privilege s x-based istinctions. Title VII 
privileges sex as a diacritical xis-only discrimination that occurs on this 
axis (or on another enumerated axis) is actionable. As such, the statute can- 
not encompass bisexuals who are truly sex-blind within its prohibitions. I 
earlier noted that he sex-blind bisexual (or asexual) might be celebrated as
the only type of individual who could credibly say that she never discrimi- 
nated on the basis of gender.471 But the sex-blind bisexual may express hos- 
tility to others indiscriminately as well. And when she does so, our norms 
against sex discrimination will be insufficient to hold her liable. 
The fact hat bisexuals have garnered this "advantage" over both hetero- 
sexuals and homosexuals explains their elative visibility inthe sexual har- 
assment jurisprudence. In areas of the law where differential reatment of the 
sexes is not required, bisexuals are neither privileged nor visible. A bisexual 
468. Id. at 1333 n.7. 
469. It bears note that his "double for nothing" problem is not just a problem in the desire- 
based harassment context, insofar as a harasser who harassed both men and women in nonsexual 
ways would also evade liability under a strict application of the "because of .. . sex" test. The bi- 
sexual harassment exemption isthus a subset of an "equal opportunity" harassment exemption. The 
fact that "double for nothing" is not specific to the desire-based context should not be surprising, 
because the problem arises from the asymmetrical treatment ofsex required by the "because of ... 
sex" language in the statute, rather than anything specific to desire. 
But this means that he minatory statements made about "double for nothing" in Vinson lack 
subtlety. These judges argued that Title VII could not have been intended to reach the desire-based 
context because of "double for nothing." But the fact that the problem is not specific to desire 
means that it cannot-without further a gument be used by courts to sustain the proposition that 
Title VII covers nondesire-based harms but not desire-based harms. 
470. Compare Vinson, 760 F.2d at 1333 n.7 (noting that a bisexual harassment exemption 
would entail a "bizarre result"), with Brief amicus curiae of Catharine A. MacKinnon, at 22 n.6, 
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore S rvs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568) (stating, in the course 
of a description ofthe bisexual harasser, that "equal discrimination s a clear oxymoron"). 
471. See text accompanying ote 338 supra. 
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could not defend against a same-sex sodomy charge by saying that he had 
also engaged in cross-sex sodomy. This means that here is no incentive for 
commentators to make bisexuals visible in the sodomy context-there is no 
privilege against which critics must inveigh. 
The visibility of bisexuals in sexual harassment jurisprudence also sug- 
gests that bisexuals may in some instances be more visible in the law than in 
society in general. Courts noted the bisexual possibility inthe late 1970s,472 
well in advance of a national bisexual movement.473 This is somewhat sur- 
prising, as legal knowledge of sexuality generally lags behind social knowl- 
edge of sexuality.474 The exception to the general rule, however, may be ex- 
plained by the formalism of the law. The logic of the "because of . .. sex" 
formulation forced courts to hypothetically envision the bisexual harasser 
long before he ever made an actual appearance. Logic thus opened up 
imaginative spaces of possibility before such spaces were politically occu- 
pied in any robust way. 
2. (Incoherently) closing the bisexual harassment exemption- 
bisexual invisibility. 
One strategy for dealing with the bisexual harassment exemption-class 
erasure-could have been predicted from the previous discussion of bisexu- 
ality. When Vinson finally made its way to the Supreme Court, the Court 
stated that desire-based harassment was cognizable under Title VII.475 In so 
stating, the Court implicitly rejected the argument made by then-judges 
Bork, Scalia, and Starr in that case. The basis for that rejection, however, 
was not clear; the Court evaded giving one by simply ignoring bisexuals.476 
And when the Oncale Court reaffirmed that sexual harassment was cogniza- 
ble insofar as it was discrimination "because of ... sex,"477 itonce again 
sidestepped the problem of the bisexual harasser by erasing bisexuality.478 
The invisibility ofbisexuality inOncale was particularly ironic, given that 
Justice Scalia-who as a circuit judge had insisted on the visibility of bi- 
sexuality-wrote the opinion for the Court.479 
472. See, e.g., Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55. 
473. See note 416 supra and accompanying text (dating inauguration of national bisexual 
movement o late 1980s). 
474. See notes 431-432 supra and accompanying text. 
475. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). 
476. See id. (making no mention of the bisexual harassment exemption). 
477. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78-80 (1998). 
478. See id. (making no mention of the bisexual harassment exemption). 
479. Compare Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, Scalia, 
Starr JJ., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc) (raising the possibility of the bisexual harasser), 
with Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (ignoring the possibility of bisexual harasser). 
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As the contrast between Justice Scalia's positions in Oncale and in Vin- 
son illustrates, lision is not a particularly persuasive strategy inthis area of 
jurisprudence, as courts that have already confessed the existence of bisexu- 
ality in one case cannot logically deny it in another. Perhaps in recognition 
of this, other circuit courts have engaged in milder forms of class erasure, 
engaging not in elision but in explicit (and incomplete) denial of the exis- 
tence of the class. Thus, in Henson v. City of Dundee,480 the Eleventh Circuit 
stated that "[e]xcept in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervi- 
sor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based on 
sex."481 That 1982 opinion's language about he "exceedingly atypical case 
of a bisexual supervisor" has become a boilerplate phrase in sexual harass- 
ment cases.482 But neither the Henson court nor any other court employing 
its phrase ver explains why bisexual supervision is so rare. 
In fairness to these courts, actual defendants who deploy the bisexual 
harassment defense are rare. Such defendants appear more often in fiction483 
or hypotheticals484 than actual litigation485; thedefense has been raised in 
only two cases and has been rejected in both.486 Defendants may understand 
that he "double for nothing" reasoning underlying the defense violates eq- 
uitable intuitions,487 andmay fear that courts will privilege that intuition 
above the exemption. Alternatively, bisexual harassers who self-identify as 
straight may fear coming out as bisexual more than they fear potential liabil- 
ity. Such harassers could rationally assume that he potential stigma of being 
480. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
481. Id. at905n.11. 
482. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 576 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Henson v. 
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n.1 1 (1 Ith Cir. 1982)); Fredette v.BVP Management Assocs., 
112 F.3d 1503, 1506 n.5 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (same); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 
1995) (same); Demele v. Belle of Orleans, L.L.C., 1997 WL 411558 at *7 n.7 (E.D. La. July 21, 
1997) (same). 
483. See Miller, supra note 432, at 165. 
484. See, e.g., Applebaum, supra note 432, at 601-02 & n. 1. 
485. See Amicus Brief of Catharine MacKinnon, supra note 470, at 21-22 ("The so-called bi- 
sexual harasser, eluding equality snares by indiscriminately sexually harassing men and women 
alike, stalks the judicial imagination, cutting quite a figure in legal hypotheticals." (footnotes omit- 
ted)). 
486. The bisexual harasser defense has been raised, but not accepted, in two cases. See Raney 
v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287-88 (D.D.C. 1995); Ryczek v. Guest Servs., Inc., 877 
F. Supp. 754, 762 (D.D.C. 1995) (granting summary judgment to defendant on other grounds). A 
similar "equal opportunity harasser" defense has been raised to no avail in two other cases. See 
Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operat- 
ing Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1336-38 (D. Wyo. 1993). In other cases, defendants have failed to 
raise the bisexual harasser defense where it might have been expected. See, e.g., Griswold v. Fre- 
senius USA, Inc., 978 F. Supp. 718, 723 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (involving married man who allegedly 
sexually harassed other men and failed to raise bisexual harasser exemption); Hopkins v. Baltimore 
Gas & Elec. Co., 871 F. Supp. 822, 824 n.2, 835 (D. Md. 1994) (same). 
487. Cf. Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 144 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting, in ? 
1983 context, hat it would take "audacity" for a defendant toraise a bisexual harassment defense). 
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labeled harassers was less than the definite stigma of self-identifying as bi- 
sexuals.488 
The fortuity hat not many bisexuals have pressed the defense, however, 
avoids rather than answers the problem of the bisexual harassment exemp- 
tion. It also does not suffice in those situations inwhich the defense is actu- 
ally raised. Perhaps in response to both points, some courts have proffered a 
different way of dealing with the problem of the bisexual harassment ex- 
emption. This approach, which is ultimately more coherent, trades on bisex- 
ual visibility, rather than invisibility. 
3. (Coherently) closing the bisexual harassment exemption- 
bisexual visibility (again). 
A more coherent way of closing (or at least significantly narrowing) the 
bisexual harassment exemption notes that while bisexuals may desire both 
men and women, they will not necessarily manifest that desire in a sex- 
neutral way. This premise significantly mitigates the "double for nothing" 
problem, for if bisexuals treat men and women in sex-differentiated ways, 
they will still be liable under a "because of. .. sex" test. The courts, albeit in 
a haphazard and undertheorized way, have hypothesized a number of ways in 
which bisexual desire may have sex-differentiated manifestations. In so do- 
ing, they have significantly narrowed the bisexual harassment exemption by 
making the bisexual more, rather than less, visible. 
First, some courts have stated that a bisexual harasser will not evade li- 
ability if he only harasses members of one sex. In other words, the harasser 
cannot escape liability simply by desiring both sexes, he must also express 
that desire in harassing ways toward both sexes. This requirement of actual 
harassment ofboth sexes distinguishes the bisexual harasser exemption from 
the bisexual harassment exemption. In Raney v. District of Columbia,489 the 
district ourt noted that Barnes v. Costle490 could be read as providing for the 
former xemption, while the subsequent case of Bundy v. Jackson49' could be 
read as providing for the latter. The Raney court itself read Bundy as a clari- 
fication of Barnes, and thus required actual harassment ofboth sexes.492 It 
noted that while the defendant inthat case had raised the defense that he was 
bisexual, he was alleged to have only harassed men, and the court herefore 
rejected his defense. 
488. This is particularly true given that, as Colker has pointed out, an employee who self- 
identifies as bisexual can be terminated on that basis without incurring Title VII liability for the 
employer. See Colker, BisexualJurisprudence, supra note 401, at 135-36. 
489. 892 F. Supp. 283, 287-88 (D.D.C. 1995). 
490. 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
491. 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
492. See Raney, 892 F. Supp. at 288. 
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Second, one court has stated in dicta that a sequential bisexual cannot 
deploy the exemption even if he harasses both men and women. In Tietgen 
v. Brown 'sWestminster Motors, Inc. ,493 the court noted that he bisexual har- 
assment exemption "may not prohibit sexual harassment by a bisexual har- 
asser" insofar as one assumes that he or she "chooses whom to solicit for sex 
according to some criteria other than gender."494 It went on, however, to 
contest this assumption, oting that "it may be that a bisexual solicits a per- 
son for sex based on the person's gender, which gender the bisexual prefers 
at that moment."495 The court hus raised the possibility of, for example, an 
individual who directs his sexual attention solely to women for a period of 
time, then switches over to directing his attention solely to men for a period 
of time.496 Even if he harassed the same numbers of men and women, one 
could still argue that at the time he was harassing any individual man, no 
woman was in danger, and vice versa. If one accepted this argument, his 
harassment would have occurred "because of . . . sex."497 
Finally, courts have implied that even if the harasser had concurrent sex- 
ual desire for both men and women and harassed them both, he could still be 
liable if he expressed that desire in different ways. In Chiapuzio v. BLT Op- 
erating Corp.,498 a district ourt noted that he defendant's claim that its em- 
ployee Eddie Bell harassed both men and women "raised the specter of the 
'bisexual harasser."'499 The court exorcised that possibility by contending 
that although Bell harassed both men and women, he harassed them in dif- 
ferent ways; specifically, by making remarks about sex acts he wanted to 
493. 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
494. Id. at 1501 n.10. 
495. Id. 
496. The Weinberg study documented the existence of bisexuals who were attracted to one 
sex or the other depending on their "mood" at a given time. See WEINBERG ET AL., supra note 1 13, 
at 55. One such bisexual stated: "I don't think it has much to do with pitting a good-looking man 
against a good-looking woman. I think it has more to do with my own feelings of whether I'm 
attracted tomen or women more at a particular point." Id. 
497. As Garber notes, the distinction between sequential and concurrent bisexuality is less 
than clear: 
Clinicians these days tend to characterize bisexuality as either "sequential" or "concurrent," 
depending upon whether the same-sex/opposite-sex relationships are going on at the same 
time. But although this will at first seem useful in making ross distinctions, it isfinally less 
clear than it appears. For one thing, what, precisely, is "the same time"? Alternate nights? 
The same night? The same bed? 
GARBER, supra note 1 1, at 147. If one collapses the distinction between sequential and concurrent 
bisexuality in this way, one can completely close the bisexual harassment exemption, but only, 
perhaps, at the cost of absurdity. 
498. 826 F. Supp. 1334 (D. Wyo. 1993). 
499. Id. at 1336. 
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perform with women but not with men.500 Therefore, the court concluded, 
Bell's harassment occurred "because of.. . sex."Sol 
Chiapuzio is not really an example of a court finding a defendant liable 
for concurrently harassing both sexes in a desire-based but sex-differentiated 
way. This is because the court determined that while Bell's harassment of
women was sexual, his harassment ofmen was not. The court hus deemed 
that Bell was not a bisexual harasser, but rather an "equal opportunity" har- 
asser-that is, someone who harassed both men and women, but who did not 
harass both in sexual ways. Indeed, the fact hat Bell harassed one sex but 
not the other in a sexual way provided the sex-based istinction needed for 
Title VII liability. 
The logic of Chiapuzio, however, may be easily extended to sex- 
differentiated d sire-based harassment ofboth sexes. To see this, consider 
that he court could have reasonably read Bell's comments owards men as 
being sexual in nature, and could still have found Bell liable. Bell's conduct 
is entirely consistent with what a man who had desire for both men and 
women might do in a society that stigmatized same-sex but not cross-sex 
desire-that is, express his desire for women openly, but find more closeted 
ways of expressing his desire for men. Even if the court had found this to be 
the case, however, Bell would still have been liable. If desire (even sex- 
neutral desire) manifests itself in a systematically sex-differentiated way,that 
is logically sufficient to meet he "because of . . . sex" requirement. 
These analytic moves do not completely close the bisexual harassment 
exemption-there might be a bisexual harasser who was genuinely "sex- 
blind" such that he sex of the victim had no salience to him.502 In such a 
case, the bisexual harassment exemption would still obtain. Nonetheless, 
making the bisexual more visible has the effect of significantly narrowing the 
bisexual harassment exemption. By painting a subtler picture of the bisexual, 
we see that not all bisexuals are "sex-blind," and to the extent hat hey are 
not, they will be liable even under a "but for" test. 
C. Recognizing and Closing the Horseplay Exemption 
Bisexual visibility does not have much normative bite in the context of 
the bisexual harassment exemption. The exemption has already been closed 
as a practical matter; bisexual visibility only provides a more coherent justi- 
fication for that closure. In contrast, bisexual visibility has significant or- 
500. See id. at 1337-38. 
501. See id. at 1338. 
502. As noted above, however, I am dubious about the robustness of the "sex-blind" bisexual 
category. See notes 317-319 supra and accompanying text. 
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mative consequences for another exemption i the sexual harassment juris- 
prudence: the horseplay exemption. 
The horseplay exemption occurs in the same-sex sexual harassment 
context. The exemption arises when harassers (almost invariably males) de- 
fend against accusations of homosexual harassment byrecasting the conduct 
as heterosexual horseplay. Because the jurisprudence emphasizes sexual 
over nonsexual harm,S03 this re-characterization of the conduct, ifsuccessful, 
often absolves the harassers of liability. 
Unlike the bisexual harassment exemption, the horseplay exemption is
wide open as a matter of practice.504 This discrepancy an be explained by 
the relationship that each exemption has to judicial intuitions about fairness. 
The bisexual harassment exemption was closed because the "double for 
nothing" problem itraised violated ajudicial intuition fequity. The horse- 
play exemption, incontrast, is consistent with such a judicial intuition. Spe- 
cifically, the exemption reflects the intuition that the homosocial and the 
homoerotic are sufficiently intertwined that ambiguity should be resolved in 
favor of the former, lest heterosexuals be mistakenly re-characterized as 
nonheterosexuals.Sos Thestatus quo in which the bisexual harassment ex- 
emption is closed while the horseplay exemption remains open thus is so- 
ciologically intelligible. 
That status quo, however, also defies logic. This is because the recogni- 
tion and closure of the bisexual harassment exemption relied on bisexual 
visibility. The horseplay exemption as it now stands, however, elies on bi- 
sexual invisibility. Closing the bisexual harassment exemption thus logically 
requires at least significantly narrowing the horseplay exemption. 
In making this argument, I first examine the nature of the judicial intui- 
tion that keeps the horseplay exemption open. I then ote the analytic moves 
the courts make to protect the horseplay exemption, pointing out that hese 
moves rely on bisexual invisibility. Finally, I consider how the enhanced 
visibility of bisexuality would foreclose these moves, requiring a significant 
narrowing ofthe exemption. 
503. Some may question whether this is still the case after Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). I address this question below. See notes 535-549 infra nd ac- 
companying text. 
504. See, e.g., McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. Of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 
1996); Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ala. 1996); Tietgen v. Brown's 
Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
505. This intuition isprobably the impetus behind the various "queen-for-a-day" exemptions 
described above, in which adventitious homosexual conduct is not seen as damaging an otherwise 
heterosexual status. See notes 100-106 supra and accompanying text. 
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1. Understanding horseplay-the homosocial and the homoerotic. 
Intimate actions among men are ambiguous-they can be either homo- 
social or homoerotic. This ambiguity is peculiar insofar as the two ways in 
which it can be resolved are diametrical opposites. Usually when an ambi- 
guity must be resolved, the two ways of resolving itare quite similar to each 
other; indeed, it is their similarity hat leads to the confusion. Intimate acts 
among men, however, are not ambiguous in this way; the social meanings 
and consequences of homosociality are squarely opposed to those of homo- 
eroticism. 
One way of construing the opposition is to understand homosociality as a 
means of making men, and homoeroticism as a means of unmaking them. 
Homosociality is a means of making men insofar as the men who can take 
(and dish out) hazing, razzing, or horseplay are constituted as "real" men, 
while those who cannot (or who choose to opt out) are constituted as "failed" 
men. These rites are often explicitly formulated as initiations where the 
manhood of those hazed is tested and the manhood of those hazing is reaf- 
firmed.506 Even when they are not so formulated, homosocial behaviors of- 
ten perform that function. Over a course of homosocial conduct-however 
inchoate-a verdict isreached as to whether the new worker is "one of the 
guys" or not.507 
Homoeroticism, in sharp contrast, is a means of unmaking men.508 As 
can be seen in the earliest formulations of homosexual men as "inverts"- 
that is, as women trapped inside men's bodies509-a homosexual male was a 
man who would reveal himself to be a woman (and thus a failed man). That 
gay men are viewed as failed men can also be seen in the characterization of 
failed men as gay men.510 In case after case, the workplace outcast is cast 
506. See HANK NUWER, THE DEADLY RITE OF HAZING 204-06 (1990) (describing highly 
sexualized hazing ritual through which Coast Guard initiates are inducted-or not-into the group). 
507. See Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame, and Silence in the 
Construction fGender Identity, inTHEORIZING MASCULINITIES 119, 128-29 (Harry Brod & Mi- 
chael Kaufman eds., 1994) ("Other men watch us, rank us, grant our acceptance into the realm of 
manhood.... Masculinity is a homosocial enactment. We test ourselves, perforn heroic feats, take 
enormous risks, all because we want other men to grant us our manhood."). 
508. This is, of course, a culturally contingent claim. In other cultural contexts, homoeroti- 
cism could be seen as a means of initiating youths into manhood. See, e.g., EVA CANTARELLA, 
BISEXUALITY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD 6-8 (Cormac 6 Cuilleanain trans., 1992) (describing such 
initiations in ancient Greek society). 
509. See Edwards, supra note 342, at 112. 
510. See Gary Kinsman, Men Loving Men: The Challenge of Gay Liberation, in BEYOND 
PATRIARCHY: ESSAYS BY MEN ON PLEASURE, POWER, AND CHANGE 103, 104 (Michael Kaufman 
ed., 1987) ("'Real' men are intrinsically heterosexual; gay men, therefore, are not real men."); Jo- 
seph H. Pleck, Men 's Power with Women, Other Men, and Society: A Men 's Movement Analysis, in 
THE AMERICAN MAN 417, 424 (Elizabeth H. Pleck & Joseph H. Pleck eds., 1980) ("Our society 
uses the male heterosexual-homosexual dichotomy as a central symbol for all the rankings of mas- 
culinity, for the division on any grounds between men who are 'real men' and have power and 
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"4out" as a homosexual, regardless of whether there is evidence that he mani- 
fested any same-sex desire.511 
The fact hat intimate intra-male acts can be interpreted in diametrically 
opposed ways makes that interpretive act extremely fraught.512 A misreading 
of homosociality as homoeroticism will have the devastating consequence of 
branding a real man as a failed man. In resolving that ambiguity, the risk- 
averse decisionmaker will err on the side of heterosexuality. This tendency 
could be defended on the grounds that we believe the majority of the popula- 
tion to be straight. That defense, however, may be insufficient, in that he 
courts are not dealing with the general population, but with the subset of that 
population whose same-sex conduct has given rise to a claim of harassment. 
This suggests that he premise here may be less statistical than equitable; 
courts may believe that where any ambiguity exists, it is better to let the 
guilty homosexual go free than to convict he innocent heterosexual. That 
equitable premise, however, will create problems of its own when the costs 
males who are not. Any kind of powerlessness or refusal to compete becomes imbued with the 
imagery of homosexuality."). 
511. See, e.g., Johnson v.Hondo, Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1997) (worker's masculin- 
ity impugned by allegations of homosexuality, despite lack of evidence of same-sex desire); Doe v. 
City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1997) (worker with earring called "queer" and 
"fag" despite lack of evidence of same-sex desire). 
512. One might ask if it is just an unfortunate coincidence for real men that the modality 
through which real men constitute hemselves and other eal men looks awfully like the modality 
through which failed men constitute hemselves and other failed men. I believe that it is no acci- 
dent. 
To see this, imagine a world in which same-sex horseplay did not exist-where men consti- 
tuted themselves and others as real men by other existing methods-by work perfornance, say, or 
by salary. Real men never touch or engage in sexual banter. Thus, whenever a man touches an- 
other man or attempts sexual banter with him, the import isunambiguous-that man is gay. What 
do real men lose when they enter this imaginary world? 
At least two things. First, they lose the ability to appropriate he signifier of the "private parts" 
to show how close they are to each other. Even if we assume the absence of desire, it still makes 
sense that many homosocial hazing activities involve male genitalia. This is because the genitalia 
are being deployed here as signifiers of the private, rather than as signifiers of sex (although of 
course their signification as the "private" stems in part from their use in sex). When someone's 
genitalia re used in a hazing ritual, the message is that the hazed man's most private parts are 
available to the men who haze him. Such hazing can be interpreted as a forn of domination-of 
forcing the hazed man to admit hat he is powerless to keep the hazers from violating any part of his 
body. Or it can be seen as a forn of community-of forcing the hazed man to admit hat he group 
is so tight hat here is no realm of the "private" that he can withhold from the group. In either case, 
the hazed man's constitution as a "real" man will depend on his ability to demonstrate hat he can 
survive this incident of powerlessness. 
Second, they lose the ability to prove that hey are so powerful that hey can engage in taboo 
activities without suffering the consequences of that aboo. Straight men may be most able to con- 
stitute themselves a straight men when they engage in homosocial activity, because this permits 
them to demonstrate hat even when they skate very close to the edge of homosexual ascription, 
they never fall over it. Another way of thinking about this is to consider how the closeted homo- 
sexual might be most afraid of engaging in "parodic" demonstrations of homosexuality, lest that 
ostensible parody be recognized asrevealing his underlying homosexuality. 
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of letting a bisexual or a homosexual go free as a heterosexual include the 
unredressed harms he has visited on others. This is the precise issue raised in 
the sexual harassment context. 
2. Recognizing the horseplay exemption-bisexual invisibility. 
In the same-sex sexual harassment context, courts are often confronted 
with male-on-male intimate conduct and asked to determine whether that 
conduct is homosocial or homoerotic. The priority ofdesire-based claims in 
the sexual harassment jurisprudence means that he harasser will be much 
more likely to be liable if the conduct isdeemed sexual. Thus, the task of the 
courts is doubly fraught; they are not only determining sexual orientation, 
but also liability. To decide that he harassser isheterosexual is often simul- 
taneously to decide that he is not liable; to decide that he harasser ishomo- 
sexual is often simultaneously to decide that he is liable. 
The courts' reluctance to interpret ambiguous conduct as homoerotic 
rather than as homosocial isoften carried to extremes; solong as the harasser 
has not openly admitted his homosexuality or bisexuality, courts work furi- 
ously to assign him a heterosexual identity. For example, in McWilliams v.
Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,513 the court noted that the harassers 
engaged in the following conduct: 
On at least three occasions, coworkers tied McWilliams' hands together, blind- 
folded him, and forced him to his knees. On one of these occasions, a coworker 
placed his finger in McWilliams' mouth to simulate an oral sexual act. During 
another of these incidents, a coworker, Doug Witsman, and another placed a 
broomstick toMcWilliams' anus while a third exposed his genitals to McWil- 
liams. On yet another occasion, Witsman entered the bus on which McWil- 
liams was working and fondled him.514 
This conduct skates close to violating prohibitions on sodomy (a quintessen- 
tially sexual category) in some jurisdictions.515 Nonetheless, McWilliams's 
coworkers characterized it as "horseplay."516 While the McWilliams court 
did not itself use this characterization, other courts have described the con- 
duct in this case as "razzing and hazing"517 or"mere locker room antics, 
joking, or horseplay."518 
513. 72 F.3d 1 191 (4th Cir. 1996). 
514. Id. at1193. 
515. Texas's sodomy statute, for example, prohibits same-sex "deviate sexual intercourse," 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. ? 21.06(a) (West 1994), and defines "deviate sexual intercourse" toin- 
clude "the penetration f... the anus of another person with an object." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. ? 
21.01(1)(B) (West 1994). 
516. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72F.3d 1191, 1194 (4th Cir. 1996). 
517. Fredette v.BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1997). 
518. Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
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Courts rationalize the resolution ofambiguity infavor of heterosexuality 
in two ways. First, courts reason from the premise that the harasser has 
manifested cross-sex desire to the conclusion that he therefore harbors no 
same-sex desire. Second, they state that hey will not impute sexual desire to 
a harasser in the same-sex context unless the plaintiff has actually proven 
that he harasser ishomosexual.519 To say that he courts do not mention bi- 
sexuality in making either of these analytic moves does not seem to be say- 
ing much. The damage that bisexuality could do to these moves is nonobvi- 
ous. But when we examine these moves more closely, we see that both of 
them can be deeply problematized bybisexual visibility. 
3. Closing the horseplay exemption-bisexual visibility. 
Bisexual visibility significantly narrows the horseplay exemption by 
challenging the two analytic moves made to keep it open. Bisexual visibility 
disrupts he first move-the assertion of heterosexual status as pre-emptive 
of homoerotic conduct-because it makes this status impossible to prove 
conclusively. When the harasser is claiming heterosexual status, all he is 
really adducing isevidence that he manifests cross-sex desire-that he has a 
wife, that he is perceived as straight by colleagues, etc. When the plaintiff is 
claiming that homoerotic conduct occurred, he is imputing same-sex desire 
to the harasser. In finding these allegations to be in tension, the courts are 
really saying that allegations of cross-sex desire and allegations of same-sex 
desire conflict. But as noted above,520 the premise that bisexuality exists 
means that he harasser's allegations of cross-sex desire and the plaintiff's 
allegations of same-sex desire are not necessarily intension. If both the har- 
asser s allegations of cross-sex desire and the plaintiff's allegations of same- 
sex desire are plausible, the factfinder should not assume that either is lying 
or mistaken, but rather should entertain the possibility that they are both 
right, and that he harasser is therefore bisexual. This of course makes it 
more likely that courts will deem the conduct o be sexual, which in turn 
makes it more likely that hey will deem it to be a Title VII violation. 
One example of the first analytic move can be found in Johnson v. 
Hondo, Inc.521 Johnson a d Hicks worked in an all-male nvironment for the 
Coca-Cola Company.522 Johnson's complaint alleged that Hicks subjected 
him to "homosexual dvances,"523 including statements such as "I'm going 
519. A third strategy that the courts use is simply to denominate he conduct in question as 
horseplay by repressing the homoerotic possibility. This strategy relies on fiat rather than argu- 
ment-the difficult interpretive problem of whether the defendant is engaged in homosocial or 
homosexual behavior is wished away rather than confronted. I do not address it further here. 
520. See notes 259-313 supra and accompanying text. 
521. 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 1997). 
522. See id. at 410. 
523. Id. at 413. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.76 on Sun, 2 Jun 2013 16:33:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
452 STANFORD LAWREVIEW [Vol. 52:353 
to make you suck my dick," come down to the carwash and suck my dick," 
"come across the street and suck my dick," and actions uch as simulated 
masturbation.524 
The court found that here had been no harassment because it found that 
Johnson's testimony belied his belief that Hicks had made a "homosexual 
advance" on him.525 The court maintained: 
For example, Johnson testified that on one occasion, Hicks approached him and 
said: "I'm going to get my dick sucked," and then, apparently referring to
Johnson's girlfriend, Hicks said "I think she's probably watching TV now. I'll 
go by and have that bitch suck my dick." Hicks also said, "that bitch ought o 
be getting in the shower ight now .... [T]hat redhead bitch got a nice ass too. 
I ought o go get my dick sucked." It is extremely difficult toreconcile remarks 
such as these with Johnson's strained contention that Hicks was making "homo- 
sexual advances" toward him.526 
The court thus used Hicks's expressions of cross-sex desire as negating the 
possibility that he harbored same-sex desire. This is logical only if the bi- 
sexual possibility is elided. If the bisexual possibility is recognized, the alle- 
gations of cross-sex desire are irrelevant. For while the allegations of cross- 
sex desire arguably negate the inference that Hicks is homosexual, they do 
not negate the inference that he engaged in "homosexual dvances." And it 
is the latter, ather than the former, which is relevant for the purpose of de- 
termining whether Johnson has a desire-based claim. Notwithstanding this
problem, however, the logic of Johnson has been used in other cases.527 
524. Id. at 410 n.1. 
525. Id. at 413. 
526. Id. 
527. In Bolt v. Norfolk S. Corp., 22 F. Supp.2d 512 (E.D. Va. 1997), the court denied a same- 
sex sexual harassment claim because "the record provides no basis for an inference that Williams 
[the defendant] was homosexual other than his harassing conduct." Id. at 518. Evidence drawn 
from the record for the opposite conclusion included: (1) "Williams was married uring most of the 
time in question"; (2) "Bolt [the plaintiffl saw Williams out with a woman socially"; (3) "Bolt 
never saw Williams on a date with a man"; (4) "Williams denie[d] that he is a homosexual and 
aver[red] that he has never held any sexual attraction for Bolt"; (5) "Bolt said he did not know if 
Williams was homosexual, or how to tell if someone was homosexual, and admitted that he did not 
know whether Williams ubjectively intended to joke, engage in horseplay or was serious." Id. at 
518-19. The court hen noted that "[t]he only evidence other than the harassing conduct itself is a 
sworn affidavit by a co-worker who avers that he was told by co-workers shortly after joining Nor- 
folk Southern that Williams was homosexual, despite the fact he was married." Id. at 519. It then 
noted that "[t]his tatement, however, would be inadmissible attrial to prove Williams actually is 
homosexual." Id. 
Similarly, in Gibson v. Tanks Inc., 930 F. Supp. 1107 (M.D.N.C. 1996), the court rejected a
same-sex sexual harassment claim in part due to the absence of evidence that the defendant was 
homosexual, noting that "[i]n fact, [the plaintiffs] deposition indicates that [the defendant] was 
married uring the time the alleged sexual harassment occurred." Id. at 1109. 
And in Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1368 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd and 
remanded on other grounds, 114 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1997), the court found no sexual harassment of
the female plaintiffs by their female supervisors, noting the absence of "evidence that the defen- 
dants are lesbians," and pointing out that "[i]n fact, the record emonstrates ju t the opposite." Id. 
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A second strategy the courts use to characterize the conduct as horseplay 
relies on the fact hat he plaintiff has not proven that he harasser ishomo- 
sexual. Thus, in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervisors,528 the 
court dismissed McWilliams's suit because "no claim is made that any [of 
the harassers] was homosexual."529 Other courts have approved its require- 
ment hat a plaintiff must generally plead and prove the homosexuality of the 
harasser in order to prevail in a same-sex harassment suit.530 
Even assuming a straight/gay binary, making liability turn on one's sex- 
ual orientation is a potential nightmare, aising issues of privacy and propri- 
ety.531 And once the bisexual possibility is introduced, the inquiry becomes 
even more complicated. In a simple straight/gay regime, the plaintiffs at- 
tempt to prove same-sex desire would be blocked by credible evidence of the 
harasser's cross-sex desire. But again, once the bisexual possibility is intro- 
duced, such evidence of cross-sex desire represents almost no obstacle to the 
plaintiff trying to make out a claim of same-sex desire. The plaintiff seeking 
to prove that he harasser harbored same-sex desire would thus be entitled to 
continue digging for that evidence no matter how much evidence of cross- 
sex desire the harasser adduced. 
To my knowledge, only one court has attached consequences to its own 
acknowledgement of he bisexual possibility. In that case, Griswold v. Fre- 
senius USA, Inc. ,532 the court observed that an alleged harasser who had ad- 
duced evidence of cross-sex desire could still have engaged in homoerotic 
conduct.533 Based on this observation, the court permitted the plaintiff to
continue s arching for evidence of the alleged harasser's bisexuality.534 
When the bisexual harassment exemption is read against he horseplay 
exemption, it becomes clear that we cannot close the first without signifi- 
cantly narrowing the second. Once courts admit in one context that bisexuals 
exist, they cannot hen turn around in another context and presume that 
cross-sex desire ipso facto negates the existence of same-sex desire. If the 
at 1380. Examples drawn from the record included (1) "the kinds of decorations chosen for [one 
supervisor's] birthday party"; (2) one supervisor's "flirtatious questioning of the outside services 
employee"; (3) "numerous discussions [the supervisors] participated inconcerning their own and 
other employees' heterosexual sexual experiences"; (4) the plaintiffs' admission that "they do not 
know if [the supervisors] were even interested inhaving sex with the plaintiffs, with each other, or 
if they were lesbians"; and (5) the fact hat both supervisors "were married uring the relevant time 
period." Id. at 1374, 1380. 
528. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1995). 
529. Id. at 1195. 
530. See, e.g., Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1502 (E.D. 
Va. 1996) (noting but waiving requirement). 
531. See McWilliams, 72 F.3d at 1198 (Michael, J., dissenting) (describing pursuit of har- 
asser's "'true' sexual orientation" as "complicated, far-ranging and elusive"). 
532. 978 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ohio 1997). 
533. See id. at 727-28, 730. 
534. See id. at 730. 
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horseplay exemption were to be made consistent with the portrait of the bi- 
sexual painted in the context of the bisexual harassment exemption, many 
more putative straights would be liable. Whether conduct was nonsexual 
horseplay or sexual harassment would be an issue of fact. And in the resolu- 
tion of that issue of fact, alleged harassers would no longer be permitted to
categorically negate the possibility ofhomoerotic conduct simply by making 
plausible protestations f cross-sex desire. 
D. Sexual Harassment at a Crossroads 
I have demonstrated hat closing the bisexual harassment exemption has 
implications for the horseplay exemption. Closing the horseplay exemption 
in turn has implications for the rest of sexual harassment jurisprudence. The 
jurisprudence is currently at a crossroads where courts must choose whether 
to continue privileging desire or to break from that radition toembrace a
"because of . .. sex" standard that stops privileging desire. While the latter 
route clearly makes better sense, it is unclear even after Oncale that the 
courts will take it. Because it problematizes the regulation ofdesire, bisexu- 
ality could act as a goad that prompts he jurisprudence to depart from its 
historical fetishization of desire. 
1. The post-Oncale status quo. 
In her article, Schultz trenchantly argues against he pre-Oncale status 
quo, in which desire-based claims were seen as more valid than nondesire 
based claims.535 The crux of her argument is that Title VII prohibits dis- 
crimination the basis of sex; that sex discrimination takes many forms that 
have nothing to do with desire; and therefore that interpretations of Title VII 
that fetishize desire will be underinclusive.536 When amale welder sabotages 
a female welder's equipment because he believes that women should not be 
welders, for example, it seems clear that sex discrimination s occurring even 
though sexual desire is not obviously at issue. Schultz proposes that sexual 
harassment jurisprudence should return to the statutory language and protect 
against any discrimination-sexual or otherwise-that occurs "because of 
. .. sex."537 
This proposal has important consequences for same-sex sexual harass- 
ment. In that context, a rule privileging desire has the pernicious conse- 
quence of assigning different sanctions for the same conduct based on the 
sexual orientation f the harasser. In considering the horseplay exemption, I 
demonstrated hat he same conduct could be characterized either as hetero- 
535. See Schultz, supra note 436. 
536. See id. at 1796-1805. 
537. See id. 
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sexual horseplay or homosexual harassment, and that courts made that de- 
termination based on the sexual orientation fthe harasser. We also saw 
that, under a desire-based paradigm, an individual was much more likely to 
be liable for so-called homosexual harassment than for so-called heterosex- 
ual horseplay. But this effectively means that he sexual orientation fthe 
parties can be determinative of liability; a straight person and a gay person 
could do the same thing and be punished ifferently.538 Schutlz's proposal 
forecloses this inequitable r sult, encouraging courts to redirect their atten- 
tion to conduct rather than simply relying on desire-based status. 
As Schultz's article was going to press,539 the Supreme Court handed 
down its decision in Oncale.540 The Oncale Court's holding is completely 
consistent with Schultz's proposal. The Court not only stated that he plain- 
tiff must "always prove that the conduct at issue ... constituted 'dis- 
crimina[tion] ... because of . .. sex,"'541 but also clarified that "harassing 
conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of 
discrimination on the basis of sex."542 Thus the Court held that sexual har- 
assment subsumed all (sufficiently severe and pervasive) discrimination that 
occurs "because of . .. sex," including, but not limited to, desire-based har- 
assment. 
It would be naifve, however, to celebrate Oncale's holding too quickly as 
implementing Schultz's proposal. Prior courts have adopted rules analogous 
538. It might fairly be asked whether the same actions undertaken bya nonheterosexual and a 
heterosexual re truly the "same" conduct. After all, desire could be characterized not as a status, 
but as an intent. And there are multiple circumstances in which the same action is treated as two 
different forms of conduct based on intent. If two men shoot their neighbors, but one does so in- 
tentionally and the other does not, the first is deemed to have committed murder, the second man- 
slaughter. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW ? 31.02 (1995) ("The common 
law definition of'murder' is 'the killing of a human being with malice aforethought.' Manslaugh- 
ter is 'an unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought."'). The same act- 
shooting a human being-is deemed to be two legally distinguishable conducts-murder and 
manslaughter-based onsomething that is entirely within the individual mind. 
This distinction is arguably deployed in the Court's hypothetical in Oncale, where the Court 
distinguishes between the coach smacking the buttocks of a male football player on the football 
field and smacking the buttocks of a male secretary back in the office. See Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998). The smacks are the same act, but are treated as 
two legally distinct forms of conduct. The first, in the Court's view, is clearly horseplay, the second 
is just as clearly harassment. See id. at 81. The distinction between them, the Court says, is con- 
text. See id. at 81-82. But context here is shorthand for desire-in the first instance the conduct is 
read as not desirous, in the second it is read as the opposite. 
The flaw in the analogy is that desire should not be equated with bad intent for at least two 
reasons. First, desire may not always be within individual control. Second, desire can be seen as 
having many positive aspects, such that adding desire to an otherwise acceptable act does not in 
itself make it worse. 
539. See Schultz, supra note 436, at 1683 n-t. 
540. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
541. Id. at 81. 
542. Id. at 80. 
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to Oncale's holding only to have them ignored or undermined inpractice. 
As Schultz notes,543 the D.C. Circuit held in the 1985 case of McKinney v.
Dole544 that harassment could be cognizable under Title VII even if it did not 
involve "sexual advances or ... other incidents with clearly sexual over- 
tones."545 The McKinney court found that "any harassment orother unequal 
treatment ... that would not occur but for the sex of the employee or em- 
ployees may, if sufficiently patterned orpervasive, comprise an illegal con- 
dition of employment under Title VII."546 Seven other circuits adopted ana- 
logues of this rule,547 which sounds remarkably like the rule adopted in On- 
cale. 
The McKinney rule, however, has had little influence.548 Some subse- 
quent courts have outright ignored it. Other courts have undermined it by 
recognizing both sexual harm and nonsexual harm, but by privileging the 
former over the latter. In other words, while the rule articulated inMcKinney 
made it clear that both nonsexual nd sexual harms were cognizable, itleft 
open the question of the relative emphasis courts hould place on each kind 
of harm. Courts were thus not constrained bythe McKinney rule from con- 
tinuing to privilege desire. 
Although the authority ofthe Supreme Court makes it unlikely that he 
Oncale holding will be ignored, itcould be undermined in exactly the way 
that he McKinney rule was undermined. Indeed, the norms articulated by 
the Oncale Court seem almost o invite a continued fetishization f desire. 
This can be seen in its discussions of the two requirements for a successful 
sexual harassment claim: the "because of . .. sex" requirement and the "se- 
verity and pervasiveness" requirement. 
In enunciating its"because of . . . sex" requirement, the Court began by 
stating that "[c]ourts and juries have found the inference of discrimination 
easy to draw in most male-female s xual harassment si uations, because the 
challenged conduct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual 
activity; it is reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been 
made to someone of the same sex."549 The Court here privileged the desire- 
based route to proving sex discrimination by:(1) characterizing desire-based 
conduct as the "typical" form of male-female harassment (without noting 
that it may be typical only because of the historical fetishization of sexuality 
by the courts); and (2) noting that he inference ofdiscrimination s "easy to 
draw" in contexts where desire is present. 
543. See Schultz, supra note 436, at 1733. 
544. 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
545. Id. at1138. 
546. Id. 
547. See Schultz, supra note 436, at 1733 n.250. 
548. See id. at 1732-38. 
549. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore S rvs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
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The Court also appeared to privilege desire-based claims in its discussion 
of the "severity and pervasiveness" requirement. I  noted: "A professional 
football player's working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive 
... if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field-even 
if the same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the 
coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office."550 But if the smack of 
a football's player's buttocks sounds different from the smack of a secre- 
tary's buttocks because the former smacks less of sexuality, this uggests that 
conduct is more likely to be deemed severe and pervasive if it is desire- 
based. 
Thus, while the Supreme Court explicitly held that both desire-based 
harms and nondesire-based harms hould be cognizable, itarguably contin- 
ued to privilege desire-based harms over nondesire-based ones. What will 
stop lower courts from doing the same? 
2. Bisexuality as goad. 
Bisexuality may be deployed to help the courts down the right path after 
Oncale. I earlier noted that he tendency of bisexuality toconfuse sexual 
orientation categories had pro-gay deployments. One such deployment was 
that bisexuality could threaten straights with falling into the stigmatized 
category of bisexuality.551 The theory was that he more likely straights were 
to be threatened with homoerotic ascription, the less likely they would be to 
assign liability to that ascription. 
One way to see how this works is to ask why the Court is so sure that he 
coach smacking the football player on the buttocks a he heads out onto the 
field is engaged in horseplay. The answer seems to be that his is football; 
that some homosocial cts are so transparently homosocial that hey cannot 
be read any other way. But this, as we have already seen, is simply untrue- 
the homosocial and the homosexual re inextricably intertwined. Anyone 
who thinks that football isalways homosocial needs to review his Tennessee 
Williams.552 The bisexual possibility powerfully exposes the illogic of this 
conclusory defense. 
When that defense is stripped away, it becomes clear that the reason 
football cannot be homoerotic is that some homosocial cts are so valued that 
they cannot afford to be tainted with homosexuality.553 Thus, even if ambi- 
550. Id. at 81. 
551. See notes 303-304 supra and accompanying text. 
552. See generally TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, CAT ON A HOT TIN ROOF (1955) (play turning on 
the homoerotic undertones of "homosocial" interactions between football players). 
553. Another example of this dynamic might be the National Organization of Women's hos- 
tility toward lesbians in the 1970s. See BARRY D. ADAM, THE RISE OF A GAY AND LESBIAN 
MOVEMENT 97 (rev. ed. 1995) (noting then-President Betty Friedan's description of lesbians as a 
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guity between the homosocial nd the homosexual isrecognized atone level, 
it must be repressed on another. 
But this answer-that while the homosocial/homosexual binary is intrin- 
sically unstable, straights desperately try to preserve its stability-should 
serve as a clue for those arguing against he regulation of desire. For if that 
binary can be shown to be so unstable that self-identified heterosexuals 
themselves become threatened with potential homoerotic ascription, they too 
will have an investment i  not having liability turn on orientation.554 
This is bisexuality's final and most tentative critique of sexual harass- 
ment law. By destabilizing the homosocial/homoerotic binary, bisexuality 
reveals that sexuality is so fluid that heterosexuality is impossible to prove. 
Historically, the reaction to the bisexual threat has been repression, but bi- 
sexual visibility has become sufficiently great hat this repression has be- 
come more difficult. Increased bisexual visibility makes the deployment ofa 
desire-based paradigm ore risky for straights, who will encounter chal- 
lenges not only to their conduct (horseplay) but also to their status (hetero- 
sexual). To the extent hat self-identified straights have investments in 
keeping those statuses immured from scrutiny, a different form of repression 
is in order. It is now not the bisexual, but desire itself, that must be abjured. 
In sexual harassment jurisprudence, this means that he courts may wish to 
leave the path they have been on, shifting from a desire-based paradigm of 
sexual harassment to a broader "because of ... sex" paradigm. 
E. Other Applications 
Although bisexuals are most visible in sexual harassment jurisprudence, 
bisexuality's potential to effect changes in doctrine isnot limited to that area. 
I do no more than touch on two other areas in which it might make a differ- 
ence-the "don't ask, don't ell" policy and same-sex marriage. 
The "don't ask, don't tell" policy raises issues analogous to those in the 
sexual harassment context in that individual liability turns on sexual orienta- 
tion. An individual deemed homosexual will be evicted from the military if
he engages in homosexual conduct, such as same-sex sodomy.555 An indi- 
vidual deemed heterosexual, however, can engage in the exact same conduct, 
"lavender menace" to the feminist movement); ROSALIND ROSENBERG, DIVIDED LIVES: AMER- 
ICAN WOMEN IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 208 (1992) (describing Friedan's view that "NOW 
could not survive ... if feminism was identified with lesbianism"). 
554. While this strategy is admittedly speculative, ithas parallels in the race context in the 
ante-bellum era. As Ariela Gross observes, abolitionists and fugitive slaves writing in the North 
used cases in which individuals who appeared "white" were enslaved to bring home the horror of 
slavery to white audiences. See Ariela Gross, Litigating Whiteness, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 127 (1998). 
Such accounts were meant o encourage "white readers to imagine themselves inthe enslaved [per- 
son's] shoes." Id. 
555. See 10 U.S.C.A. ? 654(b)(1) (West 1994). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.76 on Sun, 2 Jun 2013 16:33:04 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Jan. 2000] BISEXUAL ERASURE 459 
and not be so evicted under the "queen for a day" exemption.556 Here, the 
heterosexual ascription performs aneven more powerful role because it pro- 
tects individuals even from the consequences of their concededly homoerotic 
(rather than homosocial) acts. No one is arguing that same-sex sodomy is 
simply heterosexual horseplay, but sodomy will not have consequences for 
the individual who can prove that he is "heterosexual." Again, sexual orien- 
tation status defines liability. Again, there is no reason why bisexuality 
could not destabilize those statuses in such a way as to force straights oin- 
terrogate such a desire-based paradigm. 
At this point, a bisexual activist might comment on the fact hat he two 
examples I have thus far adduced-sexual harassment and "don't ask, don't 
tell"-link increased bisexual visibility toincreased bisexual iability. How 
should bisexuals feel about he fact hat hey are being rendered more visible 
simply to be held more accountable? Is this deployment ofbisexual visibil- 
ity truly pro-bisexual? Or is it pro-gay and anti-bisexual? Insofar as these 
examples are concerned, it would certainly seem that bisexuals are being de- 
ployed either to out self-identified straights as bisexuals or to threaten them 
with being outed. Of course, as can be seen from the gay context, outing is 
not necessarily against he interests ofthe group into which the individual is
outed: even when costly to the individuals involved, ithas been viewed by 
many as beneficial to the community at large.557 Itmight be helpful, how- 
ever, to think of a legal instance in which bisexual visibility might actually 
redound to the benefit of the individual bisexual litigant. 
Marriage may be such an example. Both gays and bisexuals can argue 
that he cross-sex requirement of marriage violates ex discrimination norms 
because it permits one sex but not the other from marrying members of a 
given sex. The bisexual, however, might express an additional harm. This 
harm is that he state is contributing to sex-consciousness in ociety by dis- 
tinguishing in this way between men and women. For the sex-blind bisexual, 
this consciousness i in itself a harm, because it impedes her from seeing 
"through" sex to other traits that she may find more important. Because the 
homosexual, just as much as the heterosexual, does not purport tobe blind to 
sex in this way, this is not a harm that he will adduce.558 
The claim that he state harms the bisexual by forcing her to view the 
world through the lens of sex is, of course, a rather utopian one. This is es- 
556. See 10 U.S.C.A. ? 654(b)(1)(A)-(E) (West 1994). 
557. See, e.g., WARREN JOHANSSON & WILLIAM A. PERCY, OUTING: SHATTERING THE 
CONSPIRACY OF SILENCE 229 (1994) (noting that while outing impinges on an individual's privacy, 
its net effects can be beneficial for the group). 
558. There is another distinction between sexual harassment and "don't ask, don't tell" on the 
one hand and marriage on the other. While sexual harassment and "don't ask, don't tell" primarily 
implicate bisexuality's influence on norms of sexual orientation, the marriage context primarily 
implicates bisexuality's influence on norms of sex. This is because the marriage context is one that 
technically discriminates on the basis of sex rather than on sexual orientation. 
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pecially true given my expressed oubt as to whether any bisexual truly is 
sex-blind.559 Yet a bisexual could respond by noting that even if she is not 
completely sex-blind, she has a right o aspire to lowering the salience of sex 
in her life. She could also attempt an analogy to race, noting that the Su- 
preme Court has owned the American judiciary's obligation ot to increase 
race-consciousness in society.560 
CONCLUSION 
"We have not yet reached a point," Garber notes, "though nothing is
unimaginable, at which monosexuals, hetero- and homo-, band together to 
stave off the advancement ofbisexuals."561 This article has argued that we 
have actually never left that point. It has maintained that bisexuality is
erased because self-identified straights and self-identified gays have entered 
into an epistemic contract of bisexual erasure. And it has suggested that he 
rising visibility of bisexuality might have transformative consequences for 
how we think about sexual orientation politics and law. 
The strength ofthis hypothesis will depend in part on its ability to ex- 
plain the erasure of bisexuality indaily life. I thus end where I began, with 
the anecdote of my own erasure of bisexuals in my seminar on sexual orien- 
tation. Do the explanations I provide intuitively explain why that erasure 
occurred? In one sense, the answer must be no. I do not think that I erased 
bisexuals because of a fear of not being able to prove my orientation, or out 
of a fear of failing to retain sex as an important diacritical xis, or out of a 
fear of nonmonogamy. Rather, my erasure can be most easily explained by 
the fact hat bisexuality is not part of our cultural or semantic stock: it is dif- 
ficult constantly to read cases, articles, or popular accounts that erase bisexu- 
als without following suit. But this just displaces the question from the indi- 
vidual evel to the cultural level, for it is ultimately not that interesting sim- 
ply to point out that individuals erase bisexuals because they belong to cul- 
tures that do. And when the question arises of what cultural investments 
559. See notes 317-318 supra and accompanying text. 
560. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 228-29 (1995) (approving 
prior opinion that criticized affirmative action program for delaying "'the time when race will be- 
come a truly irrelevant, orat least insignificant, factor"') (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 
448, 545 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (warning that 
"[r]adical gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes ... threatens to carry us further from the 
goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that he Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire"); City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (criticizing "[t]he dissent's watered-down version of equal 
protection review" for ensuring "that race will always be relevant in American life, and that the 
ultimate goal of eliminat[ing] entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant factor's 
as a human being's race, will never be achieved" (citation omitted)). 
561. GARBER, supra note 11, at 80. 
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might lead to the erasure of bisexuals, I believe the investments I have de- 
scribed gain in plausibility. 
The degree to which the hypothesis ofthis article is held accountable to 
lived experience deserves more global comment. Colleagues have repeat- 
edly noted this article's obsession with logic-its insistence on analyzing 
bisexuality instrictly Cartesian terms. That observation has often been ac- 
companied by the exhortation to give less to the reader's head and more to 
her experience. The implication fthe exhortation is that he logical account 
of bisexuality leaves something important about bisexuality unconsidered. 
This is doubtless true. The logical approach of the article may be read as 
compensation for the often parlously imprecise t rms in which debates about 
sexuality in general and bisexuality inparticular e conducted. Yet the fact 
that it may also be read as overcompensation is important. Sexual identity 
has always truck me as a kind of illogic, given that sexuality issuch a pow- 
erful solvent of identity, a modality that expands the consciousness through 
shock and surprise. If this is right, hen bisexuality may be the sexual iden- 
tity that best reflects he oxymoronic nature of all sexual identity, insofar as 
bisexuality, too, is a contradiction, a class and its own dissolution. This may 
explain why explanations ofbisexuality that seek to tame bisexuality within 
the bounds of Cartesian reason will always feel anxiously incomplete. 
But this has consequences for the law, which is often a project hat 
privileges such reason. It may mean that if we are concerned about the 
"logical" regulation of sexuality as failing to respect sexuality's fluid and 
narrative nature, we might do worse than to begin by looking at the sexual 
identity-bisexuality-that bes represents hat nature. Properly harnessed, 
bisexuality's destabilizing force may be a powerful means of contesting that 
regulation. 
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